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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation examines global shifts in medical and religious thinking about 
leprosy, using the southern African kingdom of Swaziland as a case study from the start 
of British rule in 1902 to the first decade of the twenty-first century. Involving a wide 
variety of both local and international actors, these encounters were frequently 
characterized by highly unequal power dynamics, especially between Swazis and Western 
doctors, bureaucrats, and missionaries. However, it is a central theme of this work that 
Swazis often turned Western scientific and religious preoccupations with leprosy into 
assets for their own benefit. Understanding the reasons why and under what 
circumstances Swazis did so illuminates the processes by which peoples of different 
cultures adapt themselves to shifting circumstances. Rather than abandoning local 
cultural ideas in favor of those of more powerful outsiders, I argue that the adaptations 
enacted by Swazis were coherent within their own cultural perspectives and are best 
 vii
understood as evolutions of local ideas instead of the byproduct of a foreign value 
system. 
Influenced by the narrative approach of microhistory, this project correlates 
evidence from three major archival collections, representing chiefly the perspective of 
British colonial figures and medical missionaries from the Church of the Nazarene, with 
insights derived from oral interviews conducted with both medical personnel and former 
leprosy patients in Swaziland. In so doing, it investigates themes related to the transfer of 
stigma across social and cultural boundaries; the clashing expectations of cultures divided 
by geography, language, education, and more; the limits of Western science and 
bureaucracy when attempting to exercise control over other cultures; and the continual 
negotiations through which all parties pursued their particular agendas. In analyzing the 
interplay between the primarily scientific and political concerns of the British colonial 
government and the chiefly spiritual concerns of the Nazarene medical missionaries, the 
story makes possible an understanding of how Swazis created advantageous spaces for 
themselves. I argue that they did this primarily by entering into relationships of social 
dependency, which they understood as creating bonds of mutual obligation between 
themselves and Westerners.
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Introduction	
!
In the opening decades of the twentieth century, people in many parts of the world 
had only one way of talking about leprosy, which centered around the perception of the 
disease as disfiguring, easily transmissible, and incurable. The sinister perception of 
leprosy, along with its deep connections to biblical texts, made it the focus of substantial 
attention globally, but especially in those portions of the world connected under the Pax 
Brittanica, the rule of the British Empire. By the concluding decades of the same century, 
the narrative regarding the disease was strikingly different. In 1981, the World Health 
Organization recommended a new course of treatment, known as Multi-Drug Therapy, 
which is now used around the world and has rendered leprosy routinely curable; 
furthermore, we now know that leprosy is relatively difficult to transmit. Even many of 
the disfigurements suffered by leprosy patients, we now know are not directly caused by 
the disease itself but are the byproduct of the nerve damage that leprosy does cause and 
that can be either avoided or ameliorated with early treatment. And in contrast to the 
largely fear driven attention paid to the illness in earlier decades, today one finds leprosy 
listed by the WHO amongst other Neglected Tropical Diseases like yaws and 
leishmaniasis. 	

This dissertation examines the story of these large-scale changes in thinking about 
leprosy in the context of the southern African country of Swaziland from the 
commencement of British rule in 1902 to the first decade of the twenty-first century. In 
telling the story, I highlight both the correspondences and the disconnects between local 
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and international views of leprosy. The story unfolds as one among many Swazi 
encounters with Western visions of modernity. As at the gold mines along the 
Witwatersrand or in the law courts of the British administration, the encounter was one 
characterized by highly unequal power relationships, which is not to say that Swazis 
failed to ever seize the initiative. In fact, it is a central theme of this dissertation that 
Swazis often learned to turn Western preoccupations with leprosy into an asset for their 
own benefit. 	

Many of the key ideas behind this dissertation came about as a result of a single 
interview I conducted in June 2009, with an elderly Swazi woman, known as Gogo 
Shiba, a former patient at the Mbuluzi Leprosy Hospital, Swaziland’s only institution for 
the treatment of the disease between 1948 and 1982. First admitted in 1952 while still a 
young girl, she had required treatment for leprosy over the course of several decades, 
primarily because of the irregular progression of her condition. Gogo’s leprosy had been 
quite severe, and as a result, she suffered from very poor eyesight and had lost most of 
her fingers and toes. At the end of an admittedly rather unremarkable hour, after I had 
exhausted my supply of questions, I thanked her for taking so much time to speak to me 
and inquired whether she had anything else she wanted to say to me. The subject of our 
interview immediately shifted to the deterioration of her quality of life after the Mbuluzi 
Leprosy Hospital had closed, and patients had been sent back to their homes. Central to 
her memory was the recollection of receiving meat from the Swazi monarch, Sobhuza II, 
and of the many visitors who came to Mbuluzi from overseas, bringing with them gifts of 
clothing and food. Now, she told me, ‘no one cares for us.’ No one cares for leprosy 
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patients or their families. She especially highlighted the difference between her situation 
and that of HIV/AIDS sufferers in Swaziland, who in her mind now had many patrons, 
both local and abroad, who provided them with the same benefits of free food and 
clothing that she herself had once received.  This perceived slight of leprosy sufferers 1
was a source of obvious resentment on Gogo Shiba’s part, and that narrative of loss had 
become an entrenched part of her life. My contact who had facilitated this first meeting 
with Gogo Shiba, a former employee of Swaziland’s Leprosy Control Programme, told 
me that he had heard similar complaints from her in the past, and in follow up contacts 
with her by both myself and my research assistant during the following year, we heard 
much the same story from her.	

Gogo Shiba’s story helped me begin to think of my research into the history of 
leprosy care in Swaziland in a new light. In interviewing elderly former patients like 
Gogo Shiba, I expected to uncover stories – or at least hints of stories – about the 
experience of isolation resulting from Mbuluzi’s mountainous and geographically remote 
site, as well as from the stigmas associated with the disease, something I had been led to 
expect by preliminary conversations with missionaries who had worked in Swaziland and 
an early reading of the available missionary correspondence. Instead, she spoke of 
Mbuluzi as a kind of high point in her life, and other patients with whom I subsequently 
spoke echoed her feelings of fondness for the place and for the people who worked there, 
though not necessarily the same degree of resentment over their experience after Mbuluzi 
closed its doors. I recognized, even in the interview, that at some level Gogo Shiba’s 
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 Josephine Shiba, interview by author, 2 July 2009.1
memory of life at Mbuluzi was accurate. In reading through the documentary evidence 
related to the hospital, I had noticed that there were, frequently, visitors of all kinds and 
from many different places to the Leprosy Hospital, and it was true that they brought 
many gifts to the people there. In addition, notes found in Dr David Hynd’s personal 
papers indicate that in the 1950s, Gogo Shiba was one of at least a dozen ‘specially 
supported cases,’ meaning that a supporter of the Mission to Lepers (now, the Leprosy 
Mission) in South Africa or London was contributing to the operating fund of the mission 
in her name and was receiving photographs and other intermittent news about her 
wellbeing and progress with leprosy treatment.  I also knew that there was some reality to 2
her perception that ‘no one cared” about leprosy patients any longer. As the numbers of 
leprosy patients dwindled in the 1970s and 1980s, the numbers of people involved in the 
work also slowly faded, and the attention of people shifted elsewhere, particularly to the 
pandemic of HIV/AIDS, which from the 1980s onward swamped all other public health 
concerns. Although I found myself resonating with Gogo Shiba’s narrative about her life, 
it took me a great deal longer to discern how her insights fit into the larger story of 
leprosy care in Swaziland.	

In the end, as I reflected on the stories of Gogo Shiba and others like her who had 
personal experience with leprosy and compared them to the documentary evidence I 
found in archival collections, I recognized that she had helped me identify some central 
and interrelated truths, each of which figures prominently in this dissertation. Firstly, 
 4
 David Hynd to Miss Vera Bond, 27 May 1953, David Hynd Collection, Nazarene Archives, Lenexa, 2
Kansas.
despite the fact that leprosy stigmatization has been a relatively common feature of many 
societies (and not just Western ones), it cannot be said with any accuracy that Swazi 
society demonstrated any systematic stigmatization of people with leprosy. Thus, people 
like Gogo Shiba rarely had any experience with social rejection as a result of their illness 
that might have disposed them to think of it as something they should especially fear. 
Secondly, Swazis with leprosy often recognized that their medical condition brought 
them an unusual amount of attention from Western governments and missionaries. In 
response, they deployed a range of strategies that helped them turn that attention to their 
own advantage, particularly in pursuit of material resources. This gap in the cultural 
meanings of leprosy and the space thereby created for otherwise disempowered Swazis to 
secure benefits for themselves is at the core of this project.	

	
 This dissertation examines the major phases in the evolution of leprosy care in 
Swaziland throughout the twentieth century with an eye to the tensions and clashes 
created by differing cultural expectations.  In so doing, it illustrates how Swaziland 
became one nexus, among many others, in the operation of a global network of people 
invested in leprosy for a variety of reasons, not just as a mechanical process but as a 
means by which people transferred significant social and cultural ideas (beyond 
stigmatized ideas alone) across many kinds of boundaries. Because the story itself is so 
multifaceted, it reveals a number of large themes that tend to ebb and flow across time:	

Stigma	

	
 The story of leprosy in Western societies is closely bound up in the idea of leprosy 
sufferers as the victims of social stigmas, which Peter Burke describes as “the associative 
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condition that predisposes people towards set attitudes, which, rather than being 
biologically driven, reflect the continuation of socialising (or perhaps un-socialising) 
experiences and then feature as a form of discrimination against certain identifiable 
groups of people.”  Commonly associated in Western states today with people living with 3
mental illness or physical disabilities, but also associated with racial difference, leprosy 
sufferers from the medieval period to the twentieth centuries endured some of the very 
harshest social stigmas in Western culture.   The physical ravages of the disease at its 4
worst, disfiguring nodules on the face, lost fingers or toes as a consequence of nerve 
desensitization, made leprosy readily identifiable and nearly impossible to mask.  But 
leprosy also bore associations with biblical texts and mandates, which further dramatized 
the condition of leprosy sufferers.  As a consequence, many people with leprosy have 
experienced social rejection in a variety of forms.  	

	
 Erving Goffman notes that the origins of the word “stigma” come from Greek and 
that it originally referred to “bodily signs designed to expose something unusual and bad 
about the moral status of the signifier. The signs were cut or burnt into the body and 
advertised that the bearer was a slave, a criminal, or a traitor - a blemished person, 
ritually polluted, to be avoided, especially in public places.”   This image is well suited to 5
 6
 Peter Burke, “Disadvantage and Stigma: A Theoretical Framework for Associated Conditions,” in Social 3
Work and Disadvantage: Addressing the Roots of Stigma through Association, ed. Peter Burke and Jonathan 
Parker (London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 2007), 16.
 On racial stigmatization, see Glenn C. Loury, “Racial Stigma: Toward a New Paradigm for Discrimination 4
Theory,” in Understanding Poverty (2006).
 Erving Goffman, Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice 5
Hall, 1963), 1.
the case of leprosy, for although the signs were not placed upon the signifier by human 
action, a person suffering from leprosy was clearly identifiable as unusual; the imposition 
of a negative moral framework upon the medical victim, although not a necessary 
development, followed readily enough.  Goffman and other scholars do, however, 
emphasize the idea of leprosy as a two-way condition; the person being stigmatized must 
necessarily feel shame and rejection as a consequence of others’ attitudes.   However, this 6
was not necessarily the case in Swaziland.  Although many Westerners especially saw 
leprosy sufferers as objects of pity at best, the Swazis who lived with the disease often 
found ways to make their lives more bearable and even to seize upon the advantages that 
came with being seen as the object of another’s pity.	

	
 Although Swazis did not habitually stigmatize leprosy sufferers in their midst, this 
does not mean that stigmatizing ideas cannot be transferred across cultural boundaries, a 
phenomenon I have attempted to pay careful attention to in this dissertation. Burke notes 
that stigma can also sometimes rub off, from the stigmatized party to those who 
voluntarily associate with them.  With regard to leprosy workers, this does not appear to 
generally be the case, especially for those with religious connections.  Quite the opposite, 
they were largely heroized; think, for example, of people like Father Damien, the 
nineteenth century Belgian priest canonized in 2009 for his work with the leprosy 
sufferers of Hawaii. Though nowhere near as famous, the people who voluntarily 
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 Wim van Brakel, “Measuring Stigma and Social Participation Among Persons Affected by Leprosy in the 6
SARI Project, Cirebon District, Indonesia,” paper given at the 18th International Leprosy Congress, 
Brussels, Belgium, Sept. 17, 2013. This session of the ILC, featuring papers on the theme of stigma, was 
probably the best attended breakout session I witnessed at the entire Congress, an indication of just how 
high a priority leprosy workers still place on the issue of stigma.
associated themselves with the leprosy work in Swaziland, particularly those connected 
to the mission of the Church of the Nazarene, received wide ranging admiration for their 
work.  Leprosy workers stood in the place of Jesus, fulfilling his command to cleanse the 
lepers, and, just as Jesus associated with leprosy victims, so the people who chose to 
work among leprosy sufferers received a type of indirect holiness by means of their 
association with Christ. While there is plenty of evidence that Swazis who volunteered 
for leprosy work could also receive this imparted holiness by association, there is also 
evidence that some Swazis learned to stigmatize leprosy sufferers by way of their 
exposure to Western thinking about the illness, thereby introducing stigma into contexts 
where it had been previously unknown.	

Scientific Optimism & Disease Control	

	
 The core tenet of the “civilizing mission” as an impetus for European empire was 
the idea that the world’s peoples, both individually and as societies, would be improved 
by exposure to the benefits of Western civilization. In pursuit of this vision, no tool was 
more important than Western confidence in science. This confidence stemmed not 
exclusively, or perhaps even particularly, from the work of laboratory scientists, but 
extended to a wide ranging system of knowledge that Helen Tilley has described as the 
product of an array of “institutions and activities, including professional networks and 
systems of patronage, learned societies and research institutions, field sites and 
laboratories, and cognitive frameworks and disciplinary structures.”   Under this rubric, 7
 8
 Helen Tilley, Africa as a Living Laboratory: Empire, Development, and the Problem of Scientific 7
Knowledge, 1870-1950 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 6.
the works of medical doctors and anthropologists existed alongside the projects of 
chemists and botanists in contributing to a spirit that treated knowledge as somehow 
certain, bounded, and nearly universally beneficent. Especially in the twentieth century, 
one of the chief expressions of this idea was in the area of medicine, as the introduction 
of antibiotics and other treatment options produced dramatic improvements in Western 
efforts to combat disease.  With this success came an increased optimism that the next 
logical step in the process was to gain “control” of disease by attacking its root causes; if 
this could be done, it was only a small step to aspire towards eradication of particular 
ailments from certain populations.  In doing so, as Michael Worboys has argued, “doctors 8
and scientists promised to help governments control tropical colonies and their peoples.”  9
This happened first by making these colonies safe for European habitation and then by 
giving attention to improving the health of indigenous populations. 	

	
 This led to a steady stream of scientists, doctors, and public health workers 
entering Africa to carry out surveys, vaccination campaigns, pest control, and more. The 
hope that these processes would lead quickly to the eradication of leprosy, malaria, 
sleeping sickness, and other ailments from African populations often proved unfounded, 
as lessons learned in labs or even in field experiences proved difficult to apply in all 
contexts. In the case of malaria, for example, Alilio, Bygbjerg, and Breman have argued 
that early successes reached in mostly temperate climates during the post-World War II 
era produced an unwarranted optimism that the same results could be reproduced 
 9
 Ibid, 186.8
 Michael Worboys, “The Colonial World as Mission and Mandate: Leprosy and Empire, 1900-1940,” 9
Osiris, 2nd Series, 15, Nature and Empire: Science and the Colonial Enterprise (2000): 211.
throughout the African continent. This, in turn, led to a downturn in investment in malaria 
research such that, when the initial optimism proved unfounded, there were few resources 
available to meet new challenges.  	
10
	
 In the case of the story of leprosy in Swaziland, this narrative of disease control 
and the aspiration to eradicate the ailment was the de rigueur language of officers at all 
levels of the British administration and their successors in post-independence Swaziland. 
In part because Swaziland had relatively low levels of leprosy infection, many 
individuals viewed leprosy as an ideal candidate for demonstrating the power of Western 
science and its benefits for humanity. However, as especially demonstrated in the story of 
the Swaziland Leprosy Survey (a core element of chapter three), such optimism often 
proved misplaced, not only because leprosy itself proved more resilient in the face of 
advancing medical knowledge than people expected, but also because scientific 
knowledge applied without appropriate regard for the cultural context often proved to be 
an unwelcome intrusion into Swazi lives.	

Clashing Cultural Expectations	

	
 It is virtually a truism among Africanists that the colonial period produced an 
enormous variety of cultural clashes between African populations and their European 
rulers. For example, Keletso Atkins has illustrated the conflicts created when nineteenth 
century European employers in Natal found themselves at odds with their laborers over 
the very concept of time and such basic questions as how long the work day should last 
 10
 Martin S. Alilio, Ib C. Bygbjerg, and Joel G. Breman, “Are Multilateral Malaria Research and Control 10
Programs the Most Successful? Lessons from the Past 100 Years in Africa,” The American Journal of 
Tropical Medicine and Hygiene 71, no. 2 supplement (August, 2004): 268-78.
or when laborers should be paid their monthly wages.  As in the situation Atkins 11
describes, the story of leprosy in Swaziland found African and Western views about the 
disease approaching the illness from fundamentally different perspectives. I explore this 
theme most thoroughly in the first chapter, yet it remains pertinent throughout, as this 
failure of alignment frequently led to failures of communication regarding priorities.  But 
these clashes of culture were in no way limited to interactions between Africans and 
Westerners.  There were also many cases in which debates over leprosy control brought 
to light the different cultural expectations among Westerners as well, along lines of 
nationality, religion, and more. These differences are especially prominent in chapter 
three, in the discussion of how the Mbuluzi Leprosy Hospital became a joint endeavor 
between Swaziland’s British administration and the missionaries of the Church of the 
Nazarene.	

Dependency & Posturing/Positioning	

	
 No insight has been more influential in my work than James Ferguson’s recent 
ideas about moral dependency. Ferguson contrasts the early nineteenth century period of 
Ngoni expansion and the later growth of an industrial capitalist complex in southern 
Africa with contemporary state welfare initiatives in this region.  What linked the two 
older systems, according to Ferguson, is that both of them engaged in a struggle over 
people whom they wished to incorporate as a means of enrichment. While the power 
dynamics in these struggles were clearly unequal, Ferguson highlights the ways in which 
 11
 Keletso E. Atkins, The Moon is Dead! Give Us Our Money! The Cultural Origins of an African Work 11
Ethic, Natal, South Africa, 1843-1900 (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1993), esp. 78-99.
the relationships formed with incorporated persons provided a recognizable form of 
social membership and implied the existence of moral bonds between persons of differing 
social rank. This, Ferguson argues, may have been preferable to current thinking about 
state welfare programs that, in their attempts to promote autonomy and protect people 
from humiliating experiences of unequal power relationships, may instead offer only “a 
cold and impersonal relation with a technocratic state.”  The widowed mother in rural 12
Eastern Cape who withdraws her state welfare grant from an ATM experiences a kind of 
“asocial assistance” that offers, at best, a very shallow kind of moral bond between 
herself and the nation.  	

	
 In the Swaziland situation, the experience of leprosy in the middle portion of the 
twentieth century clearly offered people the opportunity to enter into a form of 
membership that was inherently unequal and yet fully social, as we will see in the 
discussions of the Ncabaneni Leprosy Settlement and the Mbuluzi Leprosy Hospital, 
outlined in chapters two and four. The Swazi men and women who submitted themselves 
to the treatment regime and peculiar patterns of life at these places did so largely 
voluntarily, and I argue that they did so at least in part in order to position themselves 
within an identifiable hierarchy in which both superior and subordinate had specific 
obligations.  Historians and other social scientists have understood hierarchy as an 
important feature of Swazi social organization since Hilda Kuper’s pioneering 
anthropological work in the 1930s and 1940s, in which she described a system of rank 
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within which Swazis lived and defined their relationships to one another.  Therefore, 13
these relations of dependence did not necessarily appear to Swazis as oppressive to their 
individual liberty but as helping define their personhood and that of their superiors, 
creating a moral bond of mutual benefit to all parties.	

  	
 Although these dynamics of dependency are rather distinctly related to the Swazi 
situation with regard to leprosy, the act of positioning oneself relative to changing 
realities was certainly not limited solely to Swazi men and women affected by leprosy. 
One of the defining realities of the story recounted in this dissertation is that people 
invested in leprosy work had to constantly reposition themselves in light of changing 
realities and/or priorities.  In no context was this more evident than it was in the decision-
making of the British government in Swaziland, which constantly had to submit to the 
difficulties of financial shortfalls and altered foreign policy, especially in the era of World 
War II. But this active positioning extended also to the British efforts to maintain a 
positive face about the transformative power of science. Especially in the years before the 
1948 introduction of dapsone, the first effective drug for leprosy treatment, this public 
commitment to scientific optimism was somewhat regularly maintained in the face of 
scanty evidence, that provided little certainty regarding the effectiveness of available 
treatment regimes. This facet of the leprosy experience very much demonstrates the limits 
of the colonial state and of Western efforts to “civilize” African peoples more generally.	

Why Swaziland?	
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My own position relative to the subject of this dissertation can hardly be 
described as that of an outsider. In 1985, my father accepted a missionary assignment 
with the Church of the Nazarene as a medical doctor at the Raleigh Fitkin Memorial 
Hospital in Manzini, Swaziland. Although the Leprosy Hospital itself had been shuttered 
three years earlier, the church building on the grounds was still in use as the Mbuluzi 
Church of the Nazarene.  Within months of our arrival, Claudia Stevenson, Mbuluzi’s last 
nurse matron and at that time part of the Leprosy Control Programme staff that emerged 
out of the decision to close down the Mbuluzi Leprosy Hospital, invited my father to take 
on the responsibilities of preaching to the small congregation that gathered there on 
Sundays. That my father agreed to do so was, in no small part, a consequence of the 
general sentiment that being solely a medical doctor was, in some fashion, an inadequate 
expression of the missionary’s calling, as it did not contribute overtly to the work of 
evangelization. So, for a period of about 18 months, my family made the weekly 35-mile 
journey from Manzini to Mbuluzi for Sunday services.  In chapter four, I will discuss that 
journey as an informal pilgrimage for many who had completed it during earlier decades, 
but I admit that I do not remember the journey as a particularly sacred one in my own 
life. My father’s sermons, delivered in English and then translated into siSwati, were 
about the only portion of the Sunday services that I could understand.  The people there 
were, I am sure, warm enough, but I felt acutely alien in that context and was never able 
(chiefly for lack of trying) to bridge that gap in any significant way.	

I don’t recall at what point in our time I learned that Mbuluzi had formerly been a 
leprosy hospital. I do, however, remember that knowledge having a striking impact on 
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my seven or eight year old self. I suppose that, at that stage of my life, I had had just 
enough exposure to biblical narratives to know that leprosy was something truly 
terrifying, and I transferred those feelings to my surroundings.  This was not so much true 
of the people at the Mbuluzi Church, from whom I already felt quite alienated, but of the 
buildings themselves, especially the old hospital building which stood a mere stone’s 
throw from the church. Unused at the time, the building in my memory was showing 
signs of decay, which only increased my feeling that it was somehow an ominous and 
threatening place. In the vague manner of children, I wondered whether I too might 
contract leprosy if I somehow made a wrong step on those grounds. Having experienced, 
in some very circumscribed fashion, the powerful anxieties that leprosy evokes within the 
context of the Judeo-Christian tradition, I was quite curious to discover the sources of 
that potency as I began delving into this research project.	

Aside from my family’s time at the Mbuluzi Leprosy Hospital, my father also 
served for a period of two years between 1991 and 1993 as the supervising physician for 
the Leprosy Control Programme, which had relocated its base of operations to the RFMH 
after the closing of Mbuluzi. Under this new arrangement, the leprosy work was chiefly 
the responsibility of lay case workers employed and trained by the Southern Africa 
branch of the International Leprosy Mission, the most prominent Christian relief agency 
focused specifically on leprosy. The tasks of these lay case workers involved a great deal 
of home monitoring and social service provision for patients with disabilities, but the 
Nazarene mission provided the supervising medical doctor who saw patients when they 
visited the offices located in a wing of the RFMH.  My father’s role was a relatively 
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minor one – confirming diagnoses, writing prescriptions, occasionally attending a 
meeting of the Management Committee of the Leprosy Control Programme. In this 
capacity, he and his colleagues do make some appearance in my fifth chapter, discussing 
the features of leprosy care in Swaziland after Mbuluzi’s closure. I was a little older by 
this time, but I still remember feeling distinctly uneasy on the one or two occasions when 
I happened to follow my father into the small leprosy unit of the hospital. Consequently, 
many of the questions that led me into this research project and that I attempt to address 
in this dissertation took shape in these formative years of my own childhood.	

Besides my own personal experiences, however, there are other reasons why 
Swaziland makes a good choice for this kind of study, chiefly related to its compact size. 
Only a little over 17,000 square kilometers in size and with a population that even today 
remains under 1.5 million, Swaziland is one of Africa’s smallest countries. Its immediate 
proximity to and historically interconnected relationship with its much larger neighbor, 
South Africa, mean that its story is inextricably caught up in the themes of race and 
empire, labor migration, and more that dominate the written histories of this region. 
Therefore, despite the fact that this is, in one sense, a dissertation narrowly focused on 
telling the story of a single disease in one small corner of the world, much larger concerns 
emerge with surprising clarity within that story. Philip Bonner’s observation about the 
nineteenth century history of the Swazi state holds true for my own study as well, in that 
it “engages more or less continuously with virtually every other chiefdom or state in 
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south-eastern Africa, and so acts as a kind of prism through which the broader processes 
and trends in the region can be viewed.” 	
14
Making assertions that one small case study offers a lens for understanding wider 
patterns is a risky endeavor, perhaps nowhere more so than in Africa, where the habits of 
Westerners drawing conclusions based on assumptions, very limited data, or outright 
misunderstandings has been far too pronounced both historically and in the contemporary 
world.  One example of this problem will be discussed in chapter three in the story of 15
A.J. Sowden’s Leprosy Survey of the late 1940s, which failed, at least in part, because 
Sowden assumed that lessons he had learned from previous experiences in Nigeria and 
the Sudan would readily transfer to the Swaziland context. Despite these dangers, there 
are still strong reasons to regard Swaziland as a useful focal point of analysis when trying 
to understand larger patterns.	

Literature & Method	

	
 In pursuit of these aims, I have employed a range of both primary and secondary 
materials. My primary source material is chiefly drawn from three large archival 
collections. The earliest seeds of this project were planted in 2005 when I first visited the 
official archives of the Church of the Nazarene in pursuit of an entirely different project 
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that never came to fruition. Reading through the papers of Nazarene missionaries to 
Swaziland, I noted then just how much attention the leprosy work received, despite its 
relatively small size, and wondered why this might be the case. After I shifted the focus 
of my research to leprosy, I returned to those archives and dug much more extensively 
into the papers of David Hynd, Elizabeth Cole, and others who played roles in the 
Nazarene mission’s engagement with leprosy work in Swaziland. The papers of 
missionary doctor David Hynd, a prolific letter writer and meticulous record keeper, were 
especially significant for this project.	

	
 The second archive I leaned upon was the collection at the Swaziland National 
Archives, where I first conducted preliminary research in 2009 and then several weeks 
worth of research in 2010. The available materials in this collection heavily favor the 
period prior to independence in 1968, if only because the best available finding aid only 
covers the material from this era. Nevertheless, this was not a serious impediment to my 
work because, as I explain in the third chapter, the decision to hand over the operational 
side of the work at Mbuluzi to the Nazarene missionaries brought a steady decline in the 
level of government involvement; thus, materials from this collection diminish in 
significance in the final chapters of this dissertation. An argument from absence of 
evidence is hardly the most convincing, but this is where the Hynd collection from the 
Nazarene Archives is particularly helpful in corroborating my argument. Had government 
involvement remained constant, one can safely assume that Hynd, who meticulously kept 
copies of all his correspondence, would have had a large collection of government 
correspondence that reflected their continued involvement. This, however, is simply not 
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the case; there is a steady diminishing of the volume of Hynd’s correspondence with the 
government after 1948. Nevertheless, the Swaziland National Archive collection was 
certainly the most critical in helping me sketch out the events that took place prior to the 
opening of the Mbuluzi Leprosy Hospital in 1948, and it provided the main reservoir of 
primary source material for my first three chapters.	

	
 The last archival collection that features prominently in this dissertation, and the 
most unique resource employed here, is the collection of papers at the Raleigh Fitkin 
Memorial Hospital in Manzini, Swaziland. When I first discovered this collection in 
2009, it was simply a pile of correspondence folders and other records shoved into a 
closet in the administrative wing of the hospital, alongside broken down typewriters and 
other discarded relics of past hospital administrations. Even in this chaotic state, it did not 
take long to discover files of value to this project, as well as to the larger history of the 
hospital and the Nazarene mission work in Swaziland. Without question, it was here that I 
most directly benefited from my father’s legacy at the hospital, as the hospital 
administration was quite willing to work with me in turning this collection into 
something usable by researchers. In 2010 and 2012, I returned to Swaziland with groups 
of students and other volunteers from Eastern Nazarene College, where we began turning 
this collection of documents into a functional archive. Although that vision has not yet 
reached full realization, I was able to make use of the materials in that collection, which 
proved absolutely vital for understanding the history of leprosy work in Swaziland from 
the 1960s onwards.	
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 In addition to these large archival collections, I also benefitted from smaller 
document collections made available to me by the Swaziland Ministry of Health in 
Mbabane, the Leprosy Mission’s Southern Africa office in Johannesburg, and from the 
LEPRA (the successor organization to the British Empire Leprosy Relief Association, or 
BELRA) archives in the United Kingdom. But the other chief source of corollary 
evidence for this project was the interviews I conducted in both the United States and 
Swaziland with former missionaries, caseworkers, and patients. In all, I conducted 
several dozen of these interviews, some of which were scheduled, semi-structured, and 
recorded while many others took place relatively spontaneously during car rides or at 
other moments when the introduction of a recorder would have stunted the conversation.	

	
 The greatest number of my interviews occurred with former patients and staff 
people of the hospital at Mbuluzi.  Because Mbuluzi was always a relatively small 
operation, because of the length of time that had passed since its closure, and because the 
Swaziland Leprosy Control Programme had functionally ceased to exist in 2005, the task 
of finding such people was not a particularly simple one. Without the help of Simon 
Dube, a longtime employee of the Leprosy Mission during the time when it operated 
Swaziland’s Leprosy Control Programme and also one of my key informants in his own 
right, I would have had a very difficult time indeed. Simon facilitated my first 
introduction to Gogo Shiba in 2009 and helped me identify some of the key areas in the 
country where former leprosy patients now lived. In particular, the majority of my 
interviews took place in the areas of Dlangeni, in north-central Swaziland, and 
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Mankayane, in the western portion of the country, mostly with the aid of translation done 
by my research assistant, Mxolisi Dlamini.	

	
 As is typical in a research process like this one, identifying one informant would 
usually lead to suggestions about one or two others whom we might contact, sometimes 
nearby, often not so near. In rural areas, Swazi settlement patterns remain widely 
dispersed, rather than clustered in village communities, so Mxolisi and I spent many 
hours driving or walking from one household to another following up on contacts. 
Because of this pattern of dispersal, it was generally impossible to make more than one 
visit to the homestead of a particular informant, though there were several that I made a 
point of visiting more than once, such as Gogo Shiba. In another case, I arranged for 
three informants who had spent a number of years in the 1950s and 1960s as children 
together at Mbuluzi to return to the hospital grounds with me for an afternoon so that I 
could listen to their stories in the context of the place where their memories had taken 
shape. I never paid any of my informants a prearranged cash figure, though I was always 
careful to leave with them maize meal, cooking oil, soap, and other small household 
staples as a gesture of my appreciation for their assistance. In a very few instances, when 
interviewing a local indvuna (headman) or other person in a recognized position of 
political authority, I would leave a small cash gift rather than household goods, but never 
more than a figure equivalent to about $25. Such expressions of gratitude are a very 
normal part of Swazi culture, an expression that acknowledged my position of 
dependency in a fashion not altogether unrelated to the same relationships of dependence 
that I describe in this dissertation.	
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 These interviews stand in back of most sections of this dissertation and 
emphatically shaped my thinking about the subject of leprosy in Swaziland. They do not, 
however, appear as fully in my footnotes as they perhaps should in order to represent 
their impact on my thinking. There are two reasons for this. The first is practical; I did not 
want to privilege my English language interviews (whether with Swazis or with 
expatriates who lived in Swaziland) over those conducted in siSwati with the help of a 
translator. Although during my fieldwork I reached a place where I felt confident that I 
was following the general direction of a siSwati language interview even before 
translation, I did not acquire an adequate mastery of the language to feel confident 
rendering translations of those comments into English. For this reason, I have tried to 
highlight in the text the key insights that emerged as common themes in multiple 
interviews, rather than quoting particular informants on specific points. The other reason 
is more directly related to the central claims of this dissertation: for most Swazis, the 
experience of leprosy was in and of itself a relatively unremarkable event, a reality that 
was reflected in much of their commentary to me, which contrasted rather starkly with 
the energetic commentary of the Westerners who were so deeply invested in the various 
facets of leprosy work. I have tried to make this contrast clear and to provide appropriate 
analysis explaining the significance of that difference throughout.	

	
 With regard to secondary literature, it has only been in the midst of the writing 
process that I have realized just how profoundly my own historical methodologies and 
approach to written narrative have been shaped by the field of microhistory. It should 
come as no surprise, then, that no individual work has had a more significant influence on 
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me than Carlo Ginzburg’s The Cheese and the Worms (1992).  An intimate and often 
surprising reconstruction of the world of a sixteenth-century miller from northern Italy 
who finds himself facing down heresy charges before the Inquisition, the book has 
virtually no overlap with my own areas of historical research, yet I find myself deeply 
persuaded by Ginzburg’s undergirding argument about the fruitfulness of investigating 
the “reciprocal movement” of cultural influences between a dominant and subordinate 
class of people.  Furthermore, the model Ginzburg offers for understanding “big” 16
historical concepts via the most ordinary of stories has helped me immeasurably in 
thinking about the kind of story I want to tell. Similarly, and much closer to my own field 
of historical research, Timothy Couzens’s Murder at Morija (2003) applies these sorts of 
methodologies to the Paris Evangelical Mission in Lesotho to create a thoroughly 
engaging narrative of a small event that still manages to illuminate much wider historical 
realities. I would be a fool to claim that my own work has accomplished anything on the 
scale of these two in their adept movement from small stories to big ideas, but I hope that 
I have offered a reasonable approximation of their approach.	

	
 The great promise, as I see it, of the microhistory approach is that it makes 
possible a distinctly human sort of narrative that can be readily understood and 
appreciated by a wide range of readers. During my graduate training, there were no 
bigger buzzwords in the field of African Studies than the concepts of “agency” and 
“resistance.” In my memory, it would have been a rare seminar indeed in which no one 
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made reference to the idea that Africans were in some way demonstrating their agency by 
their resistance to the hegemony of the colonial state. These were, and remain, concepts 
that contributed significantly to our general understanding of the African past, but they 
also can distort our ability to see it in all of its complexity. In this dissertation, I do not 
seek in any way to subvert these concepts, but I do think that we gain something 
significant when we allow these and other theoretical frameworks to take a backseat to 
textured narrative. In some sense, I suppose that I have taken for granted the idea that 
Africans demonstrated agency in making the world around them, and I have tried to focus 
instead on bringing together the multitude of voices from many parts of the world that 
connected with one another in Swaziland around issues regarding leprosy. In this way, I 
hope that my work makes a meaningful contribution to a number of other bodies of 
research, from which I have drawn important concepts.	

	
 The first of these is the emerging field of medical history and specifically those 
works which look at leprosy in its global context.  There are numerous recent works 
examining the history of leprosy in a variety of contexts from medieval Europe 
(Demaitre, 2007) to India (Barrett, 2008) to the United States (Moran, 2007).  Tony 
Gould’s recent work on leprosy purports to tell the story of “leprosy in the modern 
world,” but it is generally focused on the story of leprosy in Europe and the United States 
and has significantly less to say about the disease elsewhere in the world (Gould, 2005).  
Rod Edmond’s analysis of the position of leprosy sufferers within the British Empire is 
focused on the period before 1928, but it provides an important point of departure for my 
own analysis in the first chapter. (Edmond, 2007).  	
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 There is also a significant body of research into the social understanding of health 
and debility in Africa, which underpins my own research.  Julie Livingston’s work on 
debility in Botswana (2005), Diana Wylie’s book on cultural racism in apartheid South 
Africa (2001), Feierman and Janzen’s edited volume on health and healing (1992), and 
Megan Vaughan’s work on power relations expressed in the treatment of African illnesses 
(1991) all provide theoretical support for research into the character, social consequences, 
and treatment of disease in Africa.  Other works by Bryant (1966), Callaway (1970), 
Ngubane (1977), Vilakazi (1962), Berglund(1989), and Kuper (1965) have helped me 
situate my discussion of leprosy within the specific cosmology of the Swazis and their 
Nguni neighbors.	

The history of leprosy in Africa remains relatively understudied, but significant 
progress in closing the gaps has been made in recent years.  Some of the first historical 
work in the field was done by John Iliffe (1987) and Megan Vaughan (1991) who each 
devoted a chapter to the topic in their respective books.  Iliffe describes briefly, and in 
necessarily sweeping terms, the scope of the disease across Africa while viewing it as a 
distinct expression of poverty in Africa.  Vaughan focuses exclusively upon the question 
of how European medical officials and missionaries forged a particular identity as 
“lepers” for victims of the disease, while saying almost nothing about how Africans 
themselves thought about the disease or treated its victims in their communities.  Eric 
Silla’s 1998 book on leprosy in Mali remains the leading book-length treatment of the 
disease in the African context and has been, in many ways, a model for the most recent 
generation of scholarship on leprosy in Africa, particularly in his efforts to treat leprosy 
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patients as human agents, actively working to maintain control of their own lives. In 
addition to my own work, Silla’s approach has clearly had an influence on recent 
scholarship by Manton (2003), Shankar (2007), and Vongsathorn (2012).	

Because of the prominence of missionaries in my research, my work also aims to 
provide an intimate and complex portrait of the intentions and motivations of an 
evangelical mission in Africa. In addition to Couzens’s work referenced above, Barbara 
Cooper’s work on the Sudan Interior Mission in Niger (2006) has been particularly 
influential in my efforts to reconstruct this perspective, in part because leprosy work also 
featured prominently in the story of SIM’s work. Along with Shobana Shankar’s very 
recent work on SIM work in northern Nigeria (2014), these projects illustrate how 
important leprosy work was for Christian missionaries seeking a point of entry into 
Islamic societies. Other works from Carpenter (1990), Hardiman (2006), and Robert 
(1997) have also helped provide critical contextual elements.  Older works of memoir and 
biography from missionaries in other parts of Africa (McCord, 1951; Duncan, 1958) also 
helped me early in my research to situate the language of the Nazarene missionaries in a 
broader context, providing useful points of comparison that illustrated the exceptional 
nature of leprosy work even within the broader framework of medical missions more 
generally.	

The Vocabulary of Leprosy	

	
 Few diseases have been the cause of as much fear and stigmatization of other 
human beings as leprosy has been, and for this reason one has to choose carefully the 
vocabulary employed to describe both the illness and those who experience it. The word 
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“leper” is especially problematic in this sense, because it effectively denies the 
personhood of the individual living with the illness and equates their personhood with 
their illness. For this reason, the word has been more or less universally rejected by 
people working in any field of research related to leprosy. In this dissertation, I have 
scrupulously avoided the use of the term in my own language, preferring instead to talk 
about “leprosy patients” or other kinds of formulations that attempt to separate the 
realities of personhood and illness. However, as is customary in recent historical writing 
about leprosy, I have not made any attempt to expunge the term from the vocabulary of 
my sources; as such, it appears frequently in quotes found throughout this work.	

	
 Even the use of the term “leprosy” can be somewhat problematic, because of the 
multiple layers of meaning associated with the term. However, there are a number of 
specific reasons why I have chosen to use this term rather than alternatives such as 
“Hansen’s Disease” or “hanseniasis.” First of all, as I explain in the first chapter, there is 
no evidence that the disease was the cause of any serious stigmatization among people 
living in Swaziland for whom the disease seems to have been a relatively new one. There 
is, therefore, little or no danger of inadvertently perpetuating false stereotypes or other 
dangerous ideas by continuing to use the term. Secondly, the term “leprosy” is the only 
one ever used to describe the disease in the Swaziland context, although it is clear that 
many people working in this field were aware of debates that existed during the twentieth 
century about what to call the disease. To take just one example, the archival files of the 
Raleigh Fitkin Memorial Hospital contained a 1970 Brazilian publication that emerged 
out of the movement that ultimately resulted in that country officially adopting the name 
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hanseniasis in place of leprosy. The representatives of the research unit that produced this 
publication argued strongly for renaming the disease as hanseniasis because using the 
name leprosy would cause patients a “terrific shock” from which they “could never 
recover emotionally” while also negating an opportunity of educating that individual 
about their condition.  Despite their knowledge of these concerns in other contexts, to 17
my knowledge, no one even proposed that people involved with Swaziland’s leprosy 
control programme switch to using an alternate formulation. To make the switch now 
would seem to unnecessarily obscure the situation. 	

	
 Lastly, I think that it is important, particularly when attempting to understand the 
mindset of the missionaries involved in the leprosy work, to be ever mindful that, 
however rightly or wrongly, they very plainly associated the work they were doing with 
the biblical texts that, in their English-language Bibles, made reference to “leprosy.” 
These links will be made more explicit in the chapters to follow, especially chapters two 
and four; however, a few comments regarding the biblical usage of the word will help set 
the stage for those discussions.	

	
 References to leprosy appear in many parts of the biblical narratives and would 
have been quite familiar to the missionaries of the Church of the Nazarene serving in 
Swaziland, as they were to Western missionaries throughout the world. In the book of 2 
Kings, for example, one finds the stories of Namaan, the Syrian general who is cured of 
his leprosy by the Israelite prophet Elisha, and Uzziah, the king of Judah who was struck 
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with leprosy as a consequence of his attempt to perform the priestly duty of burning 
incense in the temple. Of even more immediate significance to the missionaries were 
those stories in the Gospels in which Jesus miraculously healed people described as 
having leprosy. In Luke 17, for example, Jesus healed ten men who had cried out to him 
from a distance appealing for his help; of the ten, only one returned to Jesus to express 
his gratitude for healing. That the man who returned was a Samaritan, and therefore 
doubly subject to rejection from the majority Jewish culture within which Jesus lived, 
only served to further the sense that leprosy was a disease of the outcast.	

	
 This indeed was the central theme in biblical discussions of leprosy. In the 
thirteenth and fourteenth chapters of Leviticus, a total of ninety-one verses are devoted 
specifically to establishing a diagnosis of leprosy. The Leviticus texts describe a range of 
possible means by which leprosy could be identified, but once finalized, the priest (who 
bore the responsibility of identifying the disease) would pronounce the man or woman 
unclean. Upon diagnosis, the text transferred the responsibility chiefly to the victim of the 
illness: “Now the leper on whom the sore is, his clothes shall be torn and his head bare; 
and he shall cover his mustache and cry, ‘Unclean! Unclean!’ He shall be unclean. All the 
days he has the sore he shall be unclean. He is unclean, and he shall dwell alone; his 
dwelling shall be outside the camp.”  People identified as having leprosy had no option 18
except to remain in isolation from the rest of society unless or until they were able to get 
a priest to declare them cleansed of their illness and aid them in performing the necessary 
purification rituals. This, of course, was the reason why the ten men described in the Luke 
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passage were calling out from a distance; they were simply not allowed to approach other 
people in their unclean state.	

	
 The reality is that the illnesses named as leprosy in English-language Bibles are 
almost certainly not the same illness that today goes by that name. The Hebrew word 
used in the Leviticus text and elsewhere is tzara’at, and the symptoms associated with 
this illness, as described in the text itself, do not correspond well with modern leprosy. 
Rather, the word appears to encapsulate a range of skin conditions, particularly psoriasis. 
Much of this has been known and accepted in leprosy circles since at least the middle of 
the twentieth century, but the disconnect in medical pathology between the illness they 
read about in the Bible and the disease they described by the same name in their own 
context was of virtually no significance to the missionaries of the Church of the Nazarene 
in Swaziland. Indeed, I do not have an example of this being mentioned in any letter or 
other document originating from a missionary source at any time during the period of this 
study, but references to the particular Scriptural texts connected with leprosy continued to 
recur.  Determining to what extent this represented a willful decision to overlook the 
differences between biblical leprosy and the disease in their own context is ultimately less 
significant than simply recognizing that this link to the biblical language was of vital 
importance in motivating missionary efforts.	

Leprosy’s Medical Biology	

	
 It is not always easy to separate leprosy as a medical condition from the 
sensationalized understandings of the disease that stem in large part from the association 
of the disease with the conditions described in biblical texts. Furthermore, leprosy 
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presents in an exceptionally wide variety of ways, which sometimes complicates correct 
diagnosis of the illness and makes it hard to generalize about the lived experience of 
patients who contract the disease. Some patients experience very few visible effects as a 
consequence of contracting leprosy, while others suffer severe nerve damage and 
dramatic physical disfiguration, though such cases are increasingly rare in an age of 
multi-drug therapy. Nevertheless, understanding the biological causes of the illness and 
something of the range of its possible expressions provides crucial context for this 
dissertation.	

	
 The disease that is today known as leprosy is caused by a microorganism called 
Microbacterium leprae.  First observed under the microscope in 1873 by a Norwegian 19
medical doctor by the name of Gerhard A. Hansen, the bacteria is sometimes called 
Hansen’s bacillus, and the disease itself is not uncommonly referred to as Hansen’s 
Disease, especially in countries like Brazil where there remain heightened concerns about 
social stigmas suffered by people affected by the disease.  Somewhat curiously, more 20
than 140 years after Hansen’s discovery of the bacillus, the exact method of transmission 
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of leprosy remains unknown. However, as there are only two known viable hosts for the 
leprosy bacillus, humans and armadillos, and since the bacillus survives only a relatively 
short period of time once separated from its host, there is little question that proximity to 
a person affected by leprosy is the primary contributing factor to transmission. The best 
research on the subject indicates that leprosy most commonly spreads by way of nasal 
droplets, much like the common cold. However, the disease is much less contagious than 
the common cold, and in the vast majority of cases, people are infected with leprosy only 
after a prolonged period of exposure to a carrier, often years.	

	
 Diagnosis of leprosy can be accomplished both in a clinical setting by means of 
observation or by means of a laboratory observation of skins smears collected from 
possible sites of infection. In the laboratory, a skin smear sample may contain visible rod-
shaped bacilli which are a tell tale sign of leprosy infection; such cases are today 
classified as multibacillary (MB) leprosy. The trouble, however, is that it is possible for a 
person to manifest symptoms of leprosy while having so few bacilli in their body that the 
skin smear may not show a positive result; people in this category are classified as having 
paucibacillary (PB) leprosy, and the doctors must rely upon clinical observations to 
confirm a leprosy diagnosis. The distinctive feature of leprosy in a clinical situation is a 
skin lesion with definite sensory loss in the affected area, often with signs of thickened 
nerves. In many cases today, thanks to early detection and effective treatments, relatively 
few patients progress beyond these relatively mild symptoms. Left untreated, however, 
leprosy may develop a much wider range of symptoms and related physical effects, 
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including the appearance of nodules, blindness, or the permanent deformation of 
extremities as a consequence of the nerve damage.	

	
 Such symptoms, however, are not certain to develop even in cases where no 
treatment is administered, as the progress of leprosy is highly uncertain and largely 
dependent upon the individual’s immune response. Most individuals have an immune 
response system strong enough to prevent any symptoms of leprosy from developing at 
all, and only a very small number of people have such a weak immune response that the 
leprosy bacilli might produce their full range of physical symptoms if the disease is left 
untreated. This is why it typically requires exposure over a prolonged period of time for a 
person to develop symptoms of leprosy, and it is also why leprosy is today chiefly a 
disease found in developing world regions where the effects of poverty more generally 
(poor nutrition, the presence of other illnesses, etc.) may compromise a person’s immune 
system adequately to allow the leprosy bacilli to multiply.	

	
 Once a doctor or other medical professional has confirmed a diagnosis of leprosy, 
the course of treatment is dependent upon the classification of the particular case. In the 
early twentieth century, doctors differentiated between two kinds of leprosy: nodular 
leprosy, which affected chiefly the skin, and maculoanesthetic, commonly called simply 
“nerve type” because its most visible effects were on the nerves.  Subsequently, and for 21
much of the time period during which the Mbuluzi Leprosy Hospital operated in 
Swaziland, doctors categorized leprosy according to a system called the Ridley-Jopling 
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Classification, which gave some greater recognition to the different gradations of leprosy 
presentation. In this system, the severity of a patient’s case was determined based on 
clinical observations and placed along a spectrum ranging from Tuberculoid (TT) to 
Lepromatous (LL), with a range of Borderline classifications (BT, BB, BL) lying between 
them. The determination of how to classify a particular patient came about as the result of 
a thorough physical examination, which would allow medical personnel to assess the 
extent of nerve involvement, the numbers of lesions and nodules, and the distribution of 
these around the body as primary guides to assessing the severity of the case. More 
recently, leprosy case workers have been encouraged to simply classify the case as MB or 
PB prior to prescribing a course of treatment. A definitive diagnosis of MB or PB, 
however, requires laboratory facilities that are not available in many contexts in which 
leprosy diagnosis may occur  most commonly, so some field workers still use the Ridley-
Jopling Classifications which do not require lab tests. In such cases, the default diagnosis 
is MB leprosy with its more aggressive and prolonged course of treatment.	

	
 Depending on the classification of the diagnosis, a patient will receive a course of 
multi-drug therapy to complete.  In the case of PB classification, a patient follows a six-
month course of treatment, taking a daily dose of dapsone along with a monthly dose of 
rifampicin. In the case of MB classification, patients undergo 12 months of treatment 
using three drugs: dapsone and rifampicin in the same dosages as with PB cases plus an 
additional dosage of clofazimine, which has a monthly pulse dosage along with a smaller 
daily dose. Of the three drugs used in multi-drug therapy, it is the rifampicin, a powerful 
antibiotic, that is responsible for elimination of more than ninety percent of leprosy 
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bacilli in the very first dosage; from that point forward, a patient can safely be regarded 
as non-infectious. However, the remaining course of treatment is necessary in order to 
eliminate persisting bacilli in the patient, prevent the possible resurgence of the disease in 
the patient, and reduce the chances of allowing drug-resistant strains of the bacillus to 
evolve. 	

	
 A patient that follows a regular course of treatment with multi-drug therapy today 
can and should have every expectation for a full recovery, as this method has proven to 
have a very high success rate. This high level of certainty stands starkly in contrast with 
the prevailing situation during the earliest period of British rule in Swaziland when the 
development of a vision for remedying leprosy in the state was in its most nascent form.  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Chapter 1  
Leprosy in Context: Government, Missionary, & Swazi Attitudes Before 1932	
!
	
 On March 25, 1918, the deputy assistant commissioner for the Mankaiana District 
in western Swaziland, a man by the name of D.H. Harvey, wrote to his superiors in the 
governing British administration, seated in Mbabane. Harvey addressed his letter to the 
territory’s highest ranking representative of British rule, Resident Commissioner de 
Symon Honey:	

I feel it incumbent on me to report to you that there are several authenticated 
cases of Leprosy in this part.  Recently, at least five labourers sent from here have 
been sent to Pretoria Leper Asylum and there are 4 others whom Dr. Jamison 
reported on: another suffering from incipient Leprosy was sent back from the 
Mines some time ago, and there are 2 other men who appear to me to be Lepers.  
1, at least, certainly looks like a leper.  As these different cases are scattered in 
various parts of the District, I would be glad to know if something cannot be done 
to alleviate the situation and prevent the disease spreading, as soon as possible.  If 
I may, I would like to point out that, besides the women belonging to these men, 
there is the question of other inmates of the kraals; whilst those sent to work are, 
in some cases, disposed off (sic), the danger still remains with those who have 
come into contact with them and who still remain at their kraals, and, although I 
have warned their respective Chiefs and relations to leave them isolated and not to 
have any intercourse with them, we cannot be sure of this being done when there 
is no one, officially, in charge of them.  There is another feature!  The collecting 
of Tax where the disease is, or has been, there is, I take it, always the danger of 
spreading the disease at such times, and there are no means of knowing who have 
actually been in contact with Leprous people or not. 	
1
Harvey’s letter communicates an intriguing personal urgency with regard to this public 
health concern, but the follow up to the letter did not match this apparent urgency.  
Harvey’s original letter was either never delivered to Mbabane or else was misfiled in the 
government’s correspondence files, and so it received no response.  It was another nine 
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months before Harvey wrote again, inquiring whether any sort of plan had been 
developed.  Only then did he learn that his letter could not be located, and so he 
forwarded a second copy of the original letter, which sparked a round of internal 
discussions among the colonial bureaucrats at work in Mbabane.  	

	
 Dr. Robert Jamison, Swaziland’s Principal Medical Officer and the doctor 
referenced in Harvey’s letter, took the occasion to opine that “...the natives have no idea 
of the serious nature of the disease and so no fear of it;” therefore, he concluded, “The 
only efficient method of dealing with this matter is to send all the Lepers to Pretoria 
Leper Asylum.”   This, in turn, resulted in letters of inquiry to government offices in the 2
Transvaal and Natal, the neighboring provinces in the Union of South Africa, regarding 
space available for Swazi leprosy patients as well as seeking advice about cost effective 
measures that might be employed to deal with leprosy internally.  But in the end, no 
specific actions resulted from this flurry of activity, and Harvey never received any 
satisfaction in his appeal for assistance.	

	
 The mostly innocuous story of Harvey’s letter and the response of the government 
to that letter nevertheless sheds light on the position of leprosy during the early years of 
British governance in Swaziland, following their assumption of power at the conclusion 
of the Boer War in 1902.  The same pattern of discussion and action, or inaction, that 
played out in 1918-1919 would repeat itself a number of times in the years prior to 1932, 
as the Swaziland government sought the proper course regarding leprosy yet often found 
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itself struck with indecisiveness.  This chapter contextualizes the problem of leprosy 
during the first three decades of British rule by exploring Swaziland’s leprosy problem 
relative to leprosy incidence in other African contexts as well as in relationship to other 
medical challenges of the time, such as syphilis and malaria. It will then outline the 
perspectives of the major parties influencing the treatment of leprosy in Swaziland, those 
being the colonial government, the local Swazis, and the missionaries from American and 
other Anglo missions.	

	
 Reliable statistics about the prevalence of leprosy in the African context in the 
early twentieth century are, unsurprisingly, more or less impossible to come by.  It was 
found in virtually every context, and case studies of leprosy work in many of them have 
proliferated in recent years.   Although the hard numbers are difficult to come by, the 3
anecdotal evidence does suggest that the prevalence of the disease in Swaziland was 
generally lower than in many other parts of Africa.  For example, Eric Silla has estimated 
that before 1950, Mali’s rate of infection was about forty cases per 10,000; even at its 
peak, it is unlikely that Swaziland’s rate was even a quarter of that.   And numbers similar 4
to those in Swaziland would have pertained to the wider context in South Africa.  Still, 
medical personnel working in the region at the time often expected leprosy to be one of 
the major scourges of the people they treated.  Take, for example, the case of Dr. Frank 
Drewe, a medical missionary sponsored by the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel 
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and founder of Holy Cross Hospital in eastern Pondoland.  Before his arrival in South 
Africa in 1920, Drewe had been led to expect that, along with syphilis and tuberculosis, 
leprosy would be one of the foremost diseases he encountered, yet the local leprosy 
institution housed only 42 leprosy cases in a population of over 70 thousand. 	
5
	
 Similar interest in a disease that had relatively low prevalence can be found in the 
records of the South African government.  For example, in the two decades of the 1920s 
and 1930s, the Official Year Book of the Union of South Africa published a brief synopsis 
of the history of leprosy care in South Africa as part of its general review of the history 
and prevalence figures for particular diseases.  The summary noted, among other things, 
that the so-called “Hottentots” of the Cape had leprosy prior to the arrival of Europeans 
and that the first case among Europeans was detected in 1756.  It went on to point out that 
the first institution for the segregation of leprosy patients, founded in 1818, was at 
Hemel-en-Aarde, some sixty miles east of Cape Town, where roughly 100 leprosy 
patients lived until 1845, when the government transferred those patients to Robben 
Island.  The Year Book reports also give some hint as to the intersections of social ideas 
with medical practice.  For example, in its comments about a leprosy institution in the 
Transkei, the report noted, “At first the inmates were accommodated in huts of the 
ordinary kaffir type, and the sexes mixed freely.  In 1896 the huts were demolished and 
separate compounds, about a mile apart, were established for male and female patients.”   6
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This language assured its largely white readership that the government was taking a firm 
hand in maintaining social and moral norms with regard to sexuality and gender in its 
efforts to care for these leprosy patients.  	

	
 The details of the report, however, are hardly as interesting as the simple fact that 
such a thorough report existed at all.  Despite the relatively low rates of infection, leprosy 
received the largest amount of space dedicated to any one disease, followed by smallpox.  
This disproportionate allocation of space suggests that leprosy had a special place in the 
consciousness of the medical personnel in the South African government or at least that 
they recognized that the disease was most likely to be of interest to their readership.   7
This situation stands in contrast to the one described by Barbara Cooper in her discussion 
of colonial-era Niger, in which she finds colonial officials notably lacking in concern for 
leprosy, especially as compared to the preoccupation of missionaries from the Sudan 
Interior Mission with the disease.  Although likely greater than that of South Africa, 
Niger’s leprosy case load did not compare in the minds of French colonial administrators 
with the challenges of yellow fever, smallpox, and other ailments that might constitute an 
immediate threat to life.  Leprosy fit into a lower priority category of illnesses 
characterized by their slowly debilitating effects, but one suspects that the greater 
secularity of the French administration also contributed to its relative lack of interest in 
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leprosy.  Interest in leprosy increased, Cooper suggests, when one viewed the illness 
through a Christian lens, as a consequence of sin and an ailment whose long treatment 
process provided ample opportunity for exposure to Christian teaching.   Southern 8
African governments under British influence, whether in the Union of South Africa, 
Basutoland, or Swaziland, were more likely to be sympathetic to missionary 
preoccupations with leprosy, but the attention of the Year Book report to leprosy is also 
indicative of the cumulative impact of nearly a century of carefully crafted government 
policy aimed at dealing with leprosy.	

	
 This public fixation with leprosy, the emphasis on maintaining order, and the 
unique access to financial resources that characterized the South African state of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century combined to produce a distinctive trajectory for 
leprosy care in that country.  In 1891, the British administration in the Cape had made 
segregation of leprosy patients  in a colony compulsory, a policy that would eventually be 
extended over the rest of the country until the 1920s.   South Africa and Basutoland were 9
among the few states in Africa that attempted compulsory segregation, but in Basutoland, 
the effort was, in practice, short-lived.  The costs of such unpopular policies were simply 
too great for most colonial states to bear.   The South African state, buoyed by the advent 10
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of the diamond and gold mining economy and committed to a view of the world that 
emphasized racial difference, had both the resources and the determination to try to enact 
its vision of public health by social control. Yet, although it had better developed 
economic resources than many others, the South African state’s vision was not its own 
invention.	

	
 Rod Edmond’s recent work on the place of leprosy in Western empires explores at 
length the shifting ideas reflected in the uses of the word colony at the end of the 
nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century.  Building upon the work of Michel 
Foucault, Ann Laura Stoler, Paul Gilroy, and others, Edmond points out that, in this era, 
the uses of the word “colony” proliferated.  Unmoored from its original Latin roots, 
which suggested the linkage between a parent state and a new, agrarian settlement, the 
term was regularly applied “to any group or concentration of people living in some way 
separate from the rest of society.”   For some, as in the artistic, socialist, or utopian 11
communities that took on the name, the  separation was a voluntary one as individuals 
sought to remove themselves from a dominant culture.  But, in other places, such as penal 
colonies and institutions for leprosy care, the separation was generally one orchestrated 
by authorities “for the purposes of containment and segregation.”   Beyond these 12
expanded uses, the term also found application in the natural sciences, most importantly 
from Edmond’s perspective, in reference to the collections of micro-organisms being 
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observed for the first time under microscopes at the end of the nineteenth century.  For 
Edmond, the laboratory preoccupation with the prevention of contamination that led to 
the development of plate culture techniques for the isolation of colonies of micro-
organisms offered a telling parallel with the attitudes of empire builders.  “Isolation is 
essential if the purity of the culture or colony is to be secured.  Contamination is the 
worry.  Bacterial and imperial colonies are homologous.” 	
13
	
 Edmond argues that the idea of the colony, therefore, reflects “a cultural 
preoccupation with drawing lines, establishing boundaries, and constructing enclosures to 
separate different kinds of people from each other.”   Difference could be construed in 14
various ways, but was usually encapsulated in the idea of isolating “the primitive, the 
diseased, and the backward.”  In Edmond’s analysis, the concentration camps of the 15
South African War and Nazi Germany, the Native American and Australian Aboriginal 
reservations, and tuberculosis sanatoria are all representative of the same kind of thinking 
that lay behind the efforts to isolate people afflicted with leprosy.  It was, in one sense, a 
reversal of the mandate found within the Levitical law which kept those with leprosy 
“without the camp.”   Instead of pushing those with leprosy outside the boundaries 16
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within which people free of the disease lived, the representatives of Western empires in 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries pursued solutions based on the “construction of 
camps within which lepers could be concentrated.”   Prescribing isolation for leprosy 17
patients was not the invention of this time period, but the idea of creating institutions for 
the purpose of strictly enforcing that isolation was notably intensified. The institution that 
best represented the full flowering of the South African state’s vision, as well as the one 
that intersected most directly with developments in Swaziland, was the Westfort Leper 
Institution, opened in 1898 in the latter years of Paul Kruger’s Boer Republic of the 
Transvaal.	

	
 Simonne Horwitz has argued convincingly that Westfort was a logical 
manifestation of the South African state’s policies, both in its prioritizing of public health 
in sequestering patients afflicted with leprosy and in its own internal racial segregation.  
As the largest of South Africa’s leprosy institutions and the only one serving a multi-
racial population after the closure of Robben Island as an asylum in 1931, Westfort 
embodied racial segregation “...not only in physical terms, but also in the way patients 
were cared for, their access to facilities, clothing allowance and even their rations, as well 
as how food was prepared and where it was eaten.”   Constructed 10 miles outside the 18
city of Pretoria, with a 12-foot barbed wire fence around its perimeter, Westfort was an 
institution focused on exercising control over the people who entered and exited.  Long 
before Bantustans entered the South African lexicon via apartheid, patients were 
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separated along the lines defined by the state.  Africans and Coloured patients from 
Pondoland, Zululand, or Transkei were sent to other state-run facilities in their respective 
areas, while those from Western Cape, the Orange Free State, and the Transvaal were 
kept at Westfort in facilities physically separated from units that housed South Africa’s 
Europeans and Indians afflicted with the disease.  	

	
 The evolution of South African policy towards leprosy was of direct relevance to 
Swaziland, whose political and economic fortunes were closely tied to developments in 
South Africa from the mid-nineteenth century forward.  On the economic front, Swazi 
labor was regularly drawn into the migratory patterns that drew Africans from all across 
the region to the gold mines of the Witwatersrand and the diamond mines at Kimberly.  
The report from deputy assistant commissioner Harvey with which this chapter opened 
hinted at this reality; Harvey’s language leaves room for interpretation, but his reference 
to “five labourers sent from here” almost certainly refers to Swazi men who had gone to 
work on the gold mines, from which they had subsequently been sent to Westfort for 
leprosy treatment.  It is not possible to know, unfortunately, whether those men had 
contracted leprosy in Swaziland or upon arrival at the mines, as Harvey provides 
inadequate information with reference to the timing of their diagnosis or departure from 
Swaziland.  But their story was not an entirely irregular one for Swazi men.  Salakwanda 
Zulu, an unusually prominent case of leprosy in Swaziland, whose story is a focal point 
of chapter 4, also first received a leprosy diagnosis while living and working on the 
Witwatersrand.  The cramped spaces of mining compound quarters may well have 
facilitated the spread of leprosy among workers, but the ability of the mining supervisors 
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weakness or contagion certainly played a role in directing Swazi laborers towards 
treatment regimes at Westfort. 	
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 The presence of Swazi men among the laborers at South Africa’s mines was not, 
of course, merely a result of the economic pull of wage labor. It was also tied directly to 
the political evolution of the Swazi state and intentional efforts by its European rulers to 
direct Swazi labor into their preferred channels.  Swaziland was one of many pawns in 
the late nineteenth century struggle between the British and the Boers that climaxed in the 
South African War of 1899-1902.  At the end of that conflict, Swaziland, along with 
Basotholand and Bechuanaland, became a British possession under the supervision of the 
British High Commission, seated in Pretoria and Cape Town.  In the first decades of their 
rule, British authorities commonly assumed that the High Commission territories, 
particularly Swaziland, would eventually be united with the South African state, and the 
structures they implemented reflected that assumption.  In the most dramatic example of 
the extension of South Africa’s racialized politics to the Swazi context, Lord Selborne, 
the High Commissioner, issued the 1907 Partition Proclamation, which by 1914 had 
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allocated two-thirds of the land in Swaziland to white settlers of both British and Boer 
descent.   	
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 Beyond this, the legal code in effect in the Transvaal was transferred more or less 
wholesale to the Swazi context, meaning that laws regarding the isolation and 
compulsory segregation of leprosy patients were in effect in Swaziland.   Ordinance no. 21
23 of 1904 granted the government wide ranging powers in the establishment of asylums 
for the “treatment or detention of persons affected with leprosy” and required the internal 
segregation of patients along both racial and gender lines, though the law did make 
provision for “...married persons over the age of fifty years both of whom are persons 
affected by leprosy to live together in any asylum.”   Presumably, this exception existed 22
only because such patients would be beyond the years of procreation, and as long as they 
remained confined within the institution, there was no danger of them spreading their 
contagion.  This exception aside, the law essentially transformed leprosy institutions into 
prisons, and a confirmed diagnosis of leprosy was effectively the same as a criminal 
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conviction in that refusal of detention and isolation was not an option available to persons 
receiving the diagnosis. Ordinance no. 23 remained on the books in Swaziland until at 
least 1959, meaning that in theory the High Commission government there had the power 
to pursue an approach to leprosy control that would have rated among the world’s most 
coercive at the time, but in reality, with one notable exception discussed in chapter three, 
no such policy was even seriously discussed, primarily as a function of Swaziland’s small 
size and limited colonial infrastructure.	

	
 By any measure, Swaziland was a tiny outpost of the British Empire, with an 
estimated population still under 150,000 as late as 1934.  In any British colony, one could 
expect to find a strikingly spare colonial bureaucracy, a manifestation of Britain’s 
preference for indirect rule.   Swaziland’s small size, its inclusion under the umbrella of 23
the High Commission, and the assumption that it would eventually be transferred to the 
South African state helped insure that no more than the minimally required staff received 
assignments to Swaziland.   As a consequence, the limitations of its resources became the 
overarching narrative in discourse about the provision of medical care in general, a 
narrative that persisted well into the 1940s.  Outside observers and colonial officials alike 
had little difficulty identifying the vast range of public health needs that existed in 
Swaziland, a roster of ailments that went far beyond leprosy.  In the decades of British 
rule leading up to 1930, malaria, syphilis, epilepsy, and measles feature most 
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prominently, while tuberculosis emerged slowly into view.   The problem was not in 24
identifying threats to public health; the trouble was whether anything could be done about 
them.  The language of government medical officers commonly sounded the theme of 
government inability:	

• From 1913, regarding a serious outbreak of malaria: “It seems almost impossible to get 
the natives to believe in the preventive and curative properties of Quinine, even those 
who have been in contact with civilization for a long time prefer to the (sic) treated 
with native remedies by native doctors.” 	
25
• From 1928, highlighting the incidence of epilepsy: “Epilepsy is most extraordinarily 
prevalent all through the country.  It is not possible to get at any figures, but the large 
number of out-patients who come to be treated for this complaint, the number of cases 
one finds in the gaols and the number of offences directly traceable to the effects of this 
disease dealt with in the courts of the Assistant Commissioners point to a very high 
incidence of the malady.  No feasible explanation of this has been put forward.” 	
26
• From 1930, regarding a significantly delayed annual medical report for 1929: “... the 
Medical Department, in common with others in this country, lacks vision and its 
activities have been confined to the daily treatment of illness rather than an attempt to 
control the incidence of disease.  Lack of staff and funds have been responsible largely 
for this inertia and I hope that the increase sanctioned for 1930/1931 will result in a 
marked change in Government Medical activity before the next annual report is 
written.” 	
27
	
 Each of these different examples points to the varying contributing factors that 
signaled the inability of the British administration to attain its public health goals 
Whether because of the refusal of local peoples to cooperate, the lack of reliable data, the 
absence of visionary leadership, or more simply because of their small numbers and 
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scanty budgets, the agents of British rule in Swaziland, as elsewhere in the world, 
regularly found themselves, as Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper have recently 
declared, forced “... to be more realistic about the limits of their own power.”  What they 28
wished to attain, as suggested by the language of the final quote, was not just to treat 
illnesses but to “control” them, a somewhat ambiguous term that referred to any and all 
efforts to identify and eliminate the sources of diseases. But, as Randall Packard has 
illustrated in the case of malaria, administrators often misdiagnosed the situation quite 
significantly, blaming malaria outbreaks on heavy rainfall, for example, even in years 
when rainfall was below average, while overlooking entirely the contributions of their 
own economic policies to creation of famine that likely had a much more direct influence 
on the malaria outbreaks.  Whatever their motives, the British could not simply will 29
Swaziland or any other place in their global empire into fitting their prefabricated vision 
of a world living under British order.  These limitations were felt acutely at times by 
agents of British colonial rule, because, as Helen Tilley has argued, the early twentieth 
century was a period of optimism about the possibilities of besting various infectious 
diseases, and many “metropolitan scholars and critics ... viewed health conditions as a 
litmus test for how well or badly specific colonies were being managed.” 	
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 Despite their frustrations over these limitations, the infrastructure for the delivery 
of health services in Swaziland grew slowly but steadily during these decades.  The 
Annual Medical Report for the financial year that ended March 31, 1911 recorded that 
only 65 patients had been admitted to Swaziland’s lone hospital, a government institution 
located at Mbabane.  According to the Government Medical Officer, many of those had 
been admitted as a result of “wounding at beer drinks by either knob sticks or spears.”   31
By the 1930s, Swaziland had two government hospitals, two more hospitals run by 
missionaries, and 5 additional dispensaries.  And, perhaps most importantly from the 
perspective of the government, tens of thousands of Swazis were visiting these 
institutions for outpatient and inpatient medical care.  The 1930 Annual Medical Report 
estimated attendances at hospitals and dispensaries at 25,000, an indication to the report’s 
author that “...European doctors and scientific methods of treatment are increasing their 
hold on the natives every year.”   	
32
	
 If, in fact, Swazis were making increased use of Western medical facilities during 
these decades, then it was due in some considerable measure to the efforts of its 
“extremely capable and sympathetic Principal Medical Officer,” Dr. Robert Jamison.   33
Originally from Belfast, Jamison completed his medical training in 1910 as a Fellow of 
the Royal College of Surgeons of England and received an appointment as the Medical 
Officer for Swaziland’s Hlatikulu district in June of that same year.  Within just a few 
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short years, Jamison had moved to Mbabane and become the government’s Principal 
Medical Officer, a position he held continuously until his retirement from government 
service in 1937.  Even after his retirement, he remained in Swaziland, taking on private 
employment as the Medical Officer for the Havelock Mine, where he and his wife Isabel 
remained until his death in 1945.   With nearly three decades of government work that 34
stretched across the administrations of five different Resident Commissioners, Jamison 
was an unusually steady voice in matters related to the provision of medical care in 
Swaziland.  Clearly well-liked by members of the expatriate community in Swaziland, 
Jamison’s correspondence and annual reports also reveal him to be, on the whole, an 
empathetic voice for concerns about the well being of the Swazi people.   In the end, his 35
retirement from government service came about in no small part because of chronic 
conditions contracted while paying frequent home visits to patients at all hours of the 
night or in inclement weather.  Whatever the shortcomings of Swaziland’s medical 
services, they were not the consequence of a failure to invest on the part of Jamison.	

	
 While all observers of the situation agreed that increased Swazi access of Western 
medical care signaled their appreciation for its benefits, careful observers recognized that 
this did not necessarily imply a corresponding decrease in Swazi reliance upon their own 
traditional medical practitioners.  In the mid-1930s, for example, the anthropologist Hilda 
Kuper observed repeated instances in which Swazis sought out dual diagnoses for their 
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conditions, relying upon both the Western expertise of Dr. Jamison and an inyanga 
(traditional healer) for counsel on how to treat their illnesses.   As illustrated by Kuper’s 36
observations and in the above quote from the 1913 Annual Medical Report, Swazis were 
clearly not anxious to abandon indigenous ideas about illness and wellbeing in favor of 
Western ones, a situation that frustrated the practitioners of Western medicine, who would 
have much preferred that Swazis develop exclusive reliance upon their techniques.	

	
 The annual medical reports from Swaziland’s principal medical officers  during 
the years prior to 1932 communicate similar themes with regard to the perceived leprosy 
problem.  And the notion of leprosy as a “perceived problem” was significant, because 
although leprosy was commonly referenced in annual medical reports, no one had any 
firm numbers about the prevalence of the condition.  According to R. Clark Perkins, the 
Government Medical Officer who filed the 1911 Annual Report, it was “impossible to 
estimate the number of lepers, the very few cases seen are discovered by accident, but I 
have no doubt many exist.”   Why exactly was Perkins so certain that “many” cases of 37
leprosy could be found in Swaziland, even in the absence of any firm numbers?  Probably 
because, like Dr. Drewe on his way to Pondoland nearly a decade later, he had been led to 
expect that leprosy would be a serious problem in the African context, and the fact that 
Swaziland’s health infrastructure remained in its infancy excused him from needing to 
amend his prior assumptions based on his own experience.  But the hospital records for 
the years after 1911 show that it was a rare year indeed when Swaziland’s doctors 
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diagnosed more than one or two cases of leprosy.  Nevertheless, leprosy continued to 
interject itself into government discussions about health concerns in Swaziland, although 
the correspondence from these years suggests the rather drifting approach of the medical 
services.	

	
 The first recorded instance of serious government conversation about how to deal 
with leprosy in Swaziland came in September, 1916.  Dr. Jamison and Allen G. Marwick, 
a future Resident Commissioner of Swaziland but at this time the Assistant 
Commissioner for Mbabane, visited the kraal of Chief Dinabantu in the Dlangeni area to 
the east of the administrative center.   Here, Jamison examined six men and women, 
ranging in age from 16 to perhaps 70, each of whom he confirmed had contracted leprosy.  
Two other cases were also described to Dr. Jamison but not examined because they were 
unable to travel to the previously established meeting spot; at least one of those cases had 
previously been diagnosed with leprosy by a Dr. Anderson three years earlier.  The report 
Marwick filed the day after making this visit to Dlangeni centered around isolation of the 
patients as the only reasonable measure to take.  Marwick had communicated to 
Dinabantu before his arrival the instructions of the Resident Commissioner, Sir Robert 
Coryndon, that an area be set aside for these patients where they could be safely 
segregated but “... with sufficient ground to cultivate and yet sufficiently near their 
relatives for the latter to come to the boundary of the area to see the patients.”   38
Dinabantu had cooperated by identifying a kraal on land along the northern bank of the 
Black Mbuluzi River, which had belonged to the late husband of one of the patients, who 
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was now under the care of a household from which three of the other patients had come.  
Since this household already had four patients in it and an extra kraal already constructed, 
this seemed a logical solution to Marwick, particularly if clear boundaries, both physical 
and social, could be delineated to ensure adequate food resources and adequate isolation 
from uninfected neighbors.	

	
 However, other problems had quickly emerged.  Dinabantu informed Marwick 
that, although the families of the leprosy patients were prepared to cooperate with the 
authorities, each of them had some special pleading to offer, particularly regarding the 
patients whose families believed them too old or too weakened by their condition to 
effectively care for themselves.  Marwick himself quickly arrived at the conclusion that, 
if all the patients were moved to one location, there was little chance that they could be 
self-sufficient in basic matters of food and shelter and that, unless some sort of regular 
provisioning could be arranged, many of the patients would soon abandon the settlement 
in favor of returning to their kraals.  Given that government attendance to such a 
settlement was not an option anyone was prepared to seriously discuss, he concluded that 
the best course of action would be to leave the patients essentially where they were along 
with instructions from Jamison on how to avoid spreading their illness.  In Marwick’s 
judgment, “I think that they are likely to obey such instructions because they do realize 
the awful nature of the disease.” 	
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 In 1916, Jamison may or may not have shared Marwick’s optimism about the 
likelihood of his instructions being followed; perhaps he simply felt it better to defer to 
the judgment of his more senior colleague.  In either case, there certainly appeared to be 
little choice in the matter.  An internal memo scrawled across the front of the folder 
containing Marwick’s correspondence about the Dlangeni patients declared in no 
uncertain terms that the government was “... not in a position at present to remove these 
people & others out of the country or to a local asylum but it is desirable that such 
measures of segregation (illegible) be adopted in the meantime as can be carried out 
without undue hardship or considerable expenditure.”   Financial considerations always 40
exercised a shaping influence on the decision making about provision of care.  The 
archival records confirm that Jamison made at least two additional visits to Dlangeni to 
check on these patients in 1917, during which time he diagnosed one additional case in 
the area and two of the original eight patients died, but beyond that, there is little to 
indicate whether or not any of the patients received any benefits from his attentions.  	

	
 Having made its first halting steps towards engaging the leprosy issue in 
Swaziland, the following decade in Swaziland produced a shifting set of strategies 
framed by both a cautious yet persistent optimism about the possibility of doing 
something medically effective for people living with leprosy and, more prominently, the 
perpetual search for the most financially expedient method of addressing leprosy.  In 
Jamison’s case, he apparently lost faith in Marwick’s solution relatively quickly, 
dependent as it was on the willingness of the Swazis to impose isolation upon the 
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members of their own homesteads. It was less than three years after Marwick’s original 
report, in response to D.H. Harvey’s letter about leprosy patients in Mankaiana and in 
direct contravention of the opinion of his senior colleague, that Jamison expressed his 
view that the Swazis “have no idea of the serious nature of the disease and so no fear of 
it.”  In Jamison’s assessment, effective measures required a more tangible intervention.  	

	
 By 1919, Jamison was increasingly an advocate for responding to Swaziland’s 
leprosy problem by sending patients to institutions in the Union of South Africa, a 
strategy also employed for dealing with “lunatics.”   By the time Harvey’s long-delayed 41
letter about known leprosy cases in the Mankaiana District came under discussion in 
Mbabane, Jamison was aware of a total of forty-two cases of leprosy in Swaziland, more 
than half of them located in the Mbabane and Mankaiana Districts.   He encountered 42
some resistance to the idea, as sending these patients to Westfort would be no small 
matter from the financial perspective.  The Union government charged 3 shillings/day or 
£54.15.0/year for the maintenance of Swaziland’s leprosy patients at Westfort, a sizable 
expense for a department whose annual budget only reached £14,000 in 1938.   Despite 43
the expense involved, Jamison was convinced that this was the only available option, and 
he pressed his case at every opportunity.   In the first draft of his 1923 annual report for 
the League of Nations, for example, Jamison wrote: 	
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Now that Leprosy has at last become amenable to treatment more provision 
should be made for dealing with it.  The cost of building, equipping and 
maintaining a Leper Asylum would be so great it could not be considered, 
consequently the Lepers must be sent away for treatment.  Arrangements have 
been made under which not more than five Lepers at a time will be maintained in 
the Union Leper Asylum.  This number is much too low, and if it could be 
increased to twenty the Leper problem in the territory would soon be solved. 	
44!
	
 Jamison’s confident, albeit mistaken, assertion that leprosy was, in 1923, 
amenable to treatment reflects the optimistic spirit of the times in terms of the ability of 
medical science to deal with infectious disease, as does his contention that all it would 
take to solve leprosy was the provision of adequate care for twenty leprosy patients.  This 
latter claim, which can also be seen in retrospect to have been too optimistic, was likely 
based on Jamison’s growing confidence that most cases of leprosy in Swaziland would 
eventually self-arrest, a relatively common phenomenon in tuberculoid leprosy patients, 
or what Jamison referred to as “nerve type.”   But Jamison’s misplaced optimism in the 45
report about the possibilities of resolving Swaziland’s leprosy problem was not in the 
least troubling to his superiors, who likely appreciated an optimistic tone in the report.  
What concerned them was the relatively mild criticism of their policies when Jamison 
opined that five was far too small a number of patients to effect any remedy.  Jamison 
received a confidential, firmly-worded reproof from the High Commissioner’s office, 
cautioning that these reports to the League of Nations should be of a sufficiently 
innocuous and inoffensive nature as to be “...suitable for communication to the 
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League.”   As a consequence, Jamison had to amend his final report to expunge several 46
statements criticizing the inadequacy of Swaziland’s health care provision.  Regarding 
leprosy, Jamison’s final statement in the amended report noted vaguely that, 
“Arrangements have been made under which a limited number of lepers will be sent for 
treatment to the Leper Asylum in the Union of South Africa.” 	
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 It is unclear from the surviving records precisely when the first Swazi leprosy 
patients arrived at Westfort or how they came to be there.  As noted above, Harvey’s 1918 
letter suggested that some Swazis were already at Westfort, but likely had come there via 
their employment in the mines of the Witwatersrand.  In 1920, Government Secretary B. 
Nicholson responded to an inquiry about Swazi leprosy patients by claiming that, “Lepers 
from this Territory are usually isolated in Asylums in the Union and there is no intention 
of erecting an Asylum at present.”   This, however, reads like an attempt by the 48
Government Secretary to put the best possible face on the situation, since there is no 
evidence that the Government had actively pursued sending any cases of leprosy to 
Union institutions before 1920, and the language Jamison used in his 1923 report for the 
League of Nations strongly suggests that the arrangements for sending leprosy patients 
from Swaziland to Westfort was a new one.  That Nicholson was aware of Swazi patients 
at Westfort is undoubtedly true, but mostly a reminder of the relatively blurry boundaries 
that existed between Swaziland and the Union during this time period.  	
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 A turning point of sorts came in April of 1925 when Dr. Jamison oversaw the 
transportation of five Swazi leprosy patients to Westfort, including a woman named 
Madolwane Maziya whose story makes up the heart of chapter two.  By Jamison’s own 
account, the effort barely amounted to even a token effort.  Writing in January of 1926 to 
Dr. David Hynd, the Scottish-trained medical doctor who had arrived in Bremersdorp the 
previous year as a missionary for the Church of the Nazarene, Jamison noted that upon 
receiving funding to send five patients and in the absence of any more systematic plan for 
prioritizing leprosy care, he simply “had a whip round this area and collected five in 
fairly early stages, filled in all their papers, explained to them that they had to undergo 
special treatment, to which they agreed & sent them off last April.”   	
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 The relatively benign tone of Jamison’s wording to Hynd is belied to some degree 
by other correspondence from the period that indicated the government was prepared to 
consider coercive measures in the event that patients did not agree to be sent to Westfort.  
On January 6, 1925, Government Secretary Nicholson wrote to the Assistant 
Commissioner in the Mankaiana District, most likely still D.H. Harvey, with instructions 
regarding a certain Madhlebe Nzima, suspected of having leprosy: 	

Please find out whether Madhlebe is prepared to submit himself voluntarily for 
treatment.  There is no danger in the treatment, I understand and a cure may be 
effected within six months.  There will be other Swazi lepers going up with him.	

	
 Madhlebe would have to be sent here (to Mbabane) for examination by 
two medical officers. 	
50!
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The examination by two medical officers was a requirement of Ordinance no. 23 of 1904, 
adopted from the Transvaal, and Nicholson makes it plain in his letter that he intends to 
employ the coercive “alternative procedure” contained within the ordinance “(i)f 
Madhlebe is not prepared to submit himself voluntarily for treatment.”   This could 51
ultimately mean police detention and removal for uncooperative men or women 
diagnosed with leprosy.  Perhaps Nicholson handled the situation in this fashion because 
he knew that Harvey had some personal interest in proper leprosy control, but the 
approach in this case is notably more assertive than had been the case in previous years. 
Ultimately, however, these sorts of instances stand as outliers to a more general pattern of 
government equivocation and compromise; even after two complete decades of British 
oversight in Swaziland, the administration’s efforts to assert its authority still came in fits 
and starts at best.	

	
 The level of concern for enforcing leprosy control was certainly unevenly felt 
throughout the layers of government bureaucracy.  In his 1926 letter to Hynd, Jamison 
described himself as “in a deuce of a Quandary at present about Lepers.”  On the one 
hand, Jamison wrote, “The Medical Advisory Council of the Colonial office has been 
after us about Lepers...” while at the same time the Swaziland Advisory Council had, just 
the week prior to his writing to Hynd, recommended that money designated by the 
administration for sending twenty additional patients to Westfort out of the proposed 
financial estimates for 1926 instead be used for more actively pursuing and treating cases 
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of syphilis.  Jamison was not happy with this recommended course of action, feeling that 
“The end of the whole thing will be that we shall have only the five lepers treated, and 
only a few more syphlitics,” but, by his own estimate, syphilis was a greater public health 
threat in Swaziland “...to the individual both white & native and a greater danger to the 
race than is Leprosy.”  Presumably because he assumed that Hynd would understand the 52
reasons for his assessment, Jamison offered no elaboration on the reasons why syphilis 
constituted such a serious “danger to the race” (nor did his language even make it 
precisely clear to which race he was referring), though the fears of infertility and the 
degeneration of British ideals of manhood and racial superiority loomed large in such 
discussions. Karen Jochelson has argued convincingly that such sentiments were not at 
all uncommon among whites living in this region at the time, for many of whom the 
spread of ailments such as syphilis was simply an expression of “wider anxieties about 
the instability of the social, political, and moral order.” 	
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 Aside from his conclusion that syphilis constituted the more serous issue, by the 
time Jamison wrote to Hynd, the Westfort experiment had begun to go awry.  Just eight 
months after sending the patients to Westfort, Jamison noted that he had word from 
Pretoria that although they were doing well, the Swazi patients were refusing treatment 
for reasons unknown to him, and he planned to go to Pretoria as soon as he could “to go 
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into the matter.”  The situation of the leprosy patients at Westfort is a central element of 54
chapter two; for now, it will suffice to say that by 1929, Jamison was of the opinion that 
the arrangements with Westfort had “proved very unsatisfactory,” stressing that “Some 
time ago the Administration decided to cease sending Lepers there.”  It’s not clear how 55
much the administration knew about these unsatisfactory arrangements with Westfort, 
though they would soon know a great deal about them thanks to the extended letter 
writing campaign of the patients there, but for once, this opinion seems to have been 
generally shared among government officers, because not only was it relatively expensive 
to maintain the Swazi patients at Westfort, there seemed to be little point in doing so if 
they were not receiving beneficial medical treatment.  Two years earlier, in 1927, the 
Swaziland government had investigated the possibility of having the Westfort patients 
transferred to the Amatikulu Leprosy Institution in Natal, a move that J.W. de Vos, the 
Medical Superintendent at Westfort, thought the Swazi patients would find “more 
congenial.”   This move, however, was apparently meant mostly as a cost saving 56
measure, because when the government of Swaziland learned that the cost of patient 
maintenance at Amatikulu were being raised to the same rate of 3 shillings/day as at 
Westfort, they let this proposal, as so many others before it, drop.   	
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 Having witnessed the failure of his previous recommendation and just as 
convinced as ever that local quarantine within communities would never be effective, 
Jamison concluded that the best and most cost-effective measure in the long run would be 
to construct a leprosy colony inside Swaziland, but not an elaborate one with a Medical 
Officer or large buildings.  Rather, they should aim to find a piece of land where the 
patients could “live under conditions approximating as closely as possible to those they 
have been accustomed to.”   Despite this recommendation, three more years of inactivity 58
followed, inertia finally broken by the unexpected interventions of Madolwane Maziya 
and her fellow patients at Westfort.	

	
 In summary, the first three decades of British rule in Swaziland produced a set of 
shifting policies and strategies for handling leprosy, shaped primarily by their optimism 
about the power of science as a transformative force and also by the realities of their 
finite sociopolitical power and financial wherewithal.  Like their counterparts in other 
outposts of the British Empire, Swaziland’s colonial officials on the whole wanted to 
“treat leprosy as a dangerous epidemic;” think again of the words of Deputy Assistant 
Commissioner Harvey, with which this chapter opened.   But the management of leprosy 59
patients had to be kept in balance with other concerns about malaria, measles, syphilis, 
epilepsy, and tuberculosis, none of which was receiving all the attention that the 
Swaziland administration might have liked.   The administration’s financial calculations 60
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were generally a zero-sum game, and additional expenditures in one area were likely to 
mean cuts in another.	

	
 The frustrations of balancing their vision of healthcare with the constraints of 
finances led the British to turn to partners outside the colonial administration; in 
Swaziland, as elsewhere, this meant missionaries.  In contrast to the French in Niger, the 
sympathies of the British to a certain kind of spiritual outlook were evident: 	

While the crusading spirit is absent from government officials, who do not force 
Christianity on the Swazi nor strive directly at conversion, they indirectly exercise 
a proselytising influence.  The administration which they serve is the organ of a 
“Christian” country, and a number of its laws ... regulate behaviour in accordance 
with “Christian” ethics.  The officials inevitably have an egocentric evaluation of 
their own religious beliefs and practices. 	
61!
The generically Christian ethos that Hilda Kuper detected in Swaziland’s colonial 
hierarchy rarely broke through in their internal discussions, but in Kuper’s assessment, 
the administration’s decision to subsidize missionary schools and health institutions 
“...helps maintain towards them a religious rather than a scientific attitude.”   And if any 62
condition lent itself particularly to this religious attitude, it was surely leprosy.	

	
 Although missionaries of more than a dozen denominations were working in 
Swaziland by the 1930s, only one of them had developed a substantial medical work: the 
Church of the Nazarene, a denomination organized in the United States in 1908 and 
therefore a relative newcomer to missionary work in Africa. In one sense, the birth of 
Nazarene missions was part of a larger wave of new Protestant missions that appeared out 
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of the West at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century, animated 
especially by the growth of premillenial dispensationalism, which held that the return of 
Jesus Christ to earth was an imminent event and the only sure hope of improving the 
world or humanity’s condition.  Most of these new missions fit the category of “faith 
missions,” enterprises driven by individuals who could not gain employment with 
mainline denominational missions but who entered the mission field on the strength of 
pledged support from individuals and churches in their home country.  Because of their 
premillenialist views, they were generally very focused on matters of evangelization, 
rather than on building institutions or engaging in humanitarian work.   The Nazarenes, 63
however, did not fit neatly within that model.  	

	
 The Church of the Nazarene represented a new and relatively conservative branch 
of denominational missions and was not necessarily strongly premillennial, although 
some influential leaders in the church subscribed to that particular view.  However, 
because the Nazarene Church itself had developed out of a union of several different 
church bodies with their own particular cultures and points of emphasis, it had developed 
a noteworthy emphasis on unity in essential matters and freedom in non-essentials, and 
the question of premillennialism fell into the latter category.   Instead of understanding 64
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the imminent return of Jesus Christ as the driving force behind missionary work, 
Nazarenes emphasized the one essential doctrine that formed the basis of their 
denominational unity and distinctiveness, the idea of holiness and the need for the 
spiritual transformation of entire sanctification which followed conversion and 
transformed a person’s life on this earth.  It was a sort of modified version of the 
Christian civilizing vision passed down from the Nazarenes’ mostly-Methodist roots. 	
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 The theological language of the Church of the Nazarene regarding entire 
sanctification was relatively unchanged throughout the twentieth century.  The Articles of 
Faith explained that entire sanctification was an “act of God, subsequent to regeneration, 
by which believers are made free from original sin ... and brought into a state of entire 
devotement to God ...”  Entire sanctification was something distinct from the decision to 
convert to Christian faith (described as regeneration) and an event that Nazarenes and 
others in the Holiness tradition expected to occur at some later point in a person’s life.  
The purpose of this event, particularly noteworthy in considering the missionary work of 
the church, was to “(empower) the believer for life and service.”  The change in one’s 66
life, in other words, was not an abstract or purely spiritual concept; it should be clearly 
evident in the way a person lived. Indeed, the church had quite a specific list of evidences 
in mind, especially with regard to things that its members should not do. The church’s 
General Rules for membership clearly stated that those who desired membership in the 
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Nazarene church should  avoid “evil of every kind,” which included things such as taking 
the Lord’s name in vain, profaning the Sabbath, quarreling, and dishonesty but also 
included specific prohibitions on the consumption or trafficking of alcohol and tobacco, 
the indulgence of outward pride in dress or behavior, and any participation in the theater, 
dancing, lotteries, or any oathbound secret societies.  Missionaries for the church were, 67
and still are, expected to give clear testimony to this experience of deepened spiritual life 
by way of entire sanctification and to endorse the church’s universal prohibitions against 
“evil.” The fact that they did so, as we will see especially in chapters three and four, often 
created tension between the missionaries and both the people they hoped to win as 
converts and, at least in Swaziland, the British administration under which they operated.	

	
 Swaziland was one of the very first mission fields where the Church of the 
Nazarene opened work.   In fact, the 3 missionaries who founded the work in Swaziland 68
traveled to South Africa in 1907, as representatives of churches that subsequently joined 
the Church of the Nazarene at its establishment in 1908.  In 1910, Harmon 
Schmelzenbach, his wife Lula, and their co-worker Etta Innis opened the work of the 
Church of the Nazarene at Ndzingini in northern Swaziland.  Like the faith missions of 
the same era, the Church of the Nazarene officially eschewed humanitarian or 
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civilizational mission work in favor of preaching a message of repentance, conversion, 
and sanctification.  Consider, for example the position expounded in the 1928 Report of 
the Department of Foreign Missions:	

Your Department of Foreign Missions has never undertaken, in its work among 
the heathen people, to spread Western civilization as such, nor to preach through 
its missionaries the modern gospel of sanitation, soap and water, and other 
modern reforms.  It has consistently insisted on spreading regeneration and entire 
sanctification at its mission stations, where they have been planted.  ‘Tis true, that 
where the real gospel goes, there also go all its by-products, of enlightenment, 
sanitation, and civilization, but your Department has faithfully devoted itself to 
the main current of personal salvation, and the generation of the experience of 
holiness, as a second definite work of grace, and allowed the by-products to enter 
in as they would. 	
69!
	
 Such language may have articulated official priorities, but the reality on the 
ground in Swaziland and in the subsequent work in the Union of South Africa and 
Portuguese East Africa that developed out of it was starkly different. Any careful 
examination of the activities of the missionaries in these areas demonstrates that 
endeavors in health care and education, which would undoubtedly have fit under the 
banner of “Western civilization” described above, could hardly be described as “by-
products” following the “real gospel.”  In fact, seven years before the declaration above, 
the Nazarene missionaries in Swaziland had already identified education as a critical 
need:	

While we are convinced that the education of the native is not his greatest need, 
yet we realize that our educational work is of very great importance.  We have 
passed the days of pioneer work ... today we are entering into the second stage, 
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the building must be erected and as to what kind of structure it will be, will be 
largely dependent upon our educational work. 	
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Preaching, education, and eventually health care became interchangeable pulpits for the 
same goal - conversion and sanctification of Swazis, with the concomitant 
transformations of their social life, the necessity of which was a point of agreement 
among all Nazarene missionaries whatever their proposed methods.	

	
 The surest evidence of the Nazarene’s impulse towards mission as civilization 
came in August of 1925 with the arrival of a Scottish medical doctor named David Hynd, 
who would live out the remaining 65 years of his life in Swaziland exercising 
unparalleled influence over the development of the Church of the Nazarene in Swaziland.  
Today, Hynd’s gravestone lists among his accomplishments his role as the “pioneer and 
founder” of the Manzini Nazarene Mission, Raleigh Fitkin Memorial Hospital, Clinics,  
the Nazarene Nursing College, the Swaziland Leprosy Programme, Schools and Teacher 
Training College, the Swaziland Conference of Churches, the Bible Society of 
Swaziland, Baphalali Swaziland, and the Red Cross Society.  Hynd’s work, more than 
that of any other Nazarene missionary in Swaziland (and perhaps anywhere in the world), 
pushed the construction of institutions that sometimes concerned other missionaries.  
From his very earliest days in Swaziland organizing the construction of the Raleigh 
Fitkin Memorial Hospital, Hynd had to pay careful attention to the attitudes of other 
missionaries and to what exactly got reported back to mission leadership back in the 
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United States.   Conflict certainly existed, but it was rare that other missionaries 71
expressed outright disapproval of medical work; in fact, there had been an earlier attempt 
to get such work started under an American medical missionary stationed at Pigg’s Peak.  
But when the failure of the doctor to obtain British recognition of his medical credentials 
led to his reassignment, the door opened for Hynd to come to Swaziland.  As a British 
citizen and a man of extraordinary vision and energy, Hynd was well positioned to 
exercise considerable influence over the direction of the work.	

	
 For Hynd, there was no distinction between the medical work and the evangelistic 
work of the church; in fact, he was convinced that the hospital itself constituted perhaps 
the most effective tool available for the mission:	

Perhaps the greatest single factor that God has used to help on the work has been 
the influence of the hospital and medical work.  One has to realise what witchcraft 
means to appreciate what a hold it has upon the native mind.  The greatest wedge 
for prying into the stronghold of witchcraft is medical missionary work.  I wish I 
did not have a host of medical duties awaiting me now, so that I could tell you of 
how in places scattered throughout the country the contact with the hospital has 
made its definite contribution to the salvation of the people, and to the propping 
up of the faith of our native christians when during their sicknesses they were 
assailed by the old dread of witchcraft.  Apart from these results, of course, there 
is the great contribution which the hospital has made towards the relief of the 
great sea of suffering amongst the people. 	
72!
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Hynd understood the curing of physical ailments to be a secondary benefit of medical 
missionary work, following the primary commitment of evangelical work aimed at 
conversion.  But because Hynd understood the worldview of the Swazis to be one shaped 
primarily by witchcraft, it was necessary to use medical work to break the strength of that 
older set of cultural norms.  In holding to such ideas, Hynd was following in the 
established footsteps of other medical missionaries at work throughout the African 
continent.   One could also suggest that Hynd is merely using the language he knows is 73
necessary when communicating to missions supporters abroad, but there is a consistency 
about his articulation of this idea over time that suggests he truly embraced it as his 
personal philosophy.	

	
 Hynd’s views on leprosy stemmed from this same wellspring of concern for 
overcoming the influence of witchcraft on the Swazis and turning them towards Christian 
faith.  Barbara Cooper has argued that Hynd’s contemporaries in the Sudan Interior 
Mission at work in Niger believed that leprosy was an incurable illness except by means 
of spiritual intervention, and that its cause was likewise rooted in the spiritual rather than 
the biological.   There is little evidence to suggest that Hynd believed that leprosy’s 74
cause was somehow spiritual in nature, but he, much like Dr. Drewe in Pondoland, was 
interested in the leprosy situation right from the beginning.  The letter from Dr. Jamison 
referenced above was almost certainly a reply to a specific inquiry from Hynd about the 
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leprosy situation and came just five months after the first face to face meeting between 
the two men and more than a full year before Hynd had finished building the Raleigh 
Fitkin Memorial Hospital, which opened in Bremersdorp in July of 1927.   Hynd may 75
well have regarded leprosy as a kind of low-hanging fruit that might give the medical 
work of the mission a relatively easy but particularly resonant victory.  By 1930, Hynd 
was confident that leprosy was not “a very prevalent disease” in the area, but rather than 
seeing this as a reason for neglect, he saw this as an incentive to action as it opened the 
possibility “that with proper measures the Territory might ultimately be rid of the disease 
after a number of years.”  In making such declarations, Hynd imbibed the same 76
optimistic spirit that Jamison and his successors would articulate in steadily increasing 
ways during the years that followed, but beyond his scientific confidence, Hynd also drew 
motivation from leprosy’s spiritual significance. With its biblical connections, Hynd 
likely understood caring for leprosy patients as an important intersection of interests, for 
his overseas church supporters and the Resident Commissioner’s government that wanted 
to bolster the evidence of its modern medical services.	

	
 Hynd’s vision for leprosy work coalesced conveniently with the position that 
Jamison had assumed in light of the failed Westfort experiment.  In his report for the year 
ending December 31, 1929, Hynd reported having seen a few cases of leprosy, and even 
the arrest of the disease in one case under treatment, though it is unclear what sort of 
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treatment Hynd might have offered.  He did also note that he and the Deputy Assistant 
Commissioner for Bremersdorp, Mr. S.B. Williams had successfully germinated seeds of 
the hydnocarpus tree that produced chaulmoogra oil.  The seeds had been provided by the 
nascent British Empire Leprosy Relief Association (BELRA) out of Siam, and as far as 
Hynd knew, it was the first time anyone had attempted to grow the tree in South Africa.   
Hynd clearly envisioned leprosy care as a long term project, which brought him to his 
core recommendation:	

Attempts have been made to isolate these cases at their kraals but this is, at best, 
an unsatisfactory method of control.  A well-regulated leper colony in which all 
lepers could be segregated would seem at once to remove a menace to public 
health and provide comfort, treatment and spiritual solace to those much in need 
of such ministrations. 	
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Hynd’s words seem carefully calibrated to align with the thinking of Dr. Jamison, with 
whom Hynd had been building a relationship for nearly five years by the time he wrote 
this report.  The only thing that separates Hynd’s recommendation from Jamison’s own 
views at this time is his inclusion of “spiritual solace” among the needs of the leprosy 
patients.	

	
 Hynd used similar language regarding leprosy in his annual reports for the years 
1930 and 1932, as he worked steadily to position the Church of the Nazarene as the 
natural partner for the government of Swaziland in relationship to leprosy care.  
However, likely understanding the inevitable slow movement of the government, Hynd 
also took steps to seize the initiative with regard to leprosy.  On the one hand, he was not 
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above subtly increasing pressure on the government by suggesting that their efforts 
compared poorly to other colonies, as he wrote in his 1932 report: “From both a public-
health and humanitarian point of view an early attempt should be made to stamp out this 
disease as is being done in other parts of the Empire.”   Hynd was also actively reaching 78
out to other organizations concerned about leprosy work, such as BELRA and the 
Mission to Lepers, which would eventually come to play a very significant role in 
Swaziland’s leprosy program.  In March of 1930, Hynd received word that £100 had been 
donated by the American Mission to Lepers, meant to serve as seed money to aid the 
Church of the Nazarene in starting a colony for leprosy patients.   With money in hand, 79
Hynd even began actively investigating a site just two miles from the RFMH, going so 
far as to informally discuss the matter with Sobhuza II, the Swazi Paramount Chief, who 
had responded favorably.  Hynd’s proposal got as far as being endorsed by Jamison in his 
financial estimates for 1931/32, as well as site inspections by Mr. Williams, the D.A.C., 
Bremersdorp, a representative of Sobhuza, and the Resident Commissioner, but no 
further. 	
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 The existing correspondence does not make entirely clear why the proposal died.  
The most likely explanation is that the item was cut out of the estimates at a higher level 
of the colonial bureaucracy, particularly considering the onset of the Great Depression.  
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But other local factors may have intervened as well.  Hynd himself departed the country 
in 1931 for a year long furlough, and although he dedicated some of that furlough time to 
contacting BELRA, the Mission to Lepers, and other interested parties about supporting 
leprosy work in Swaziland, his absence may have contributed to a loss of momentum for 
the project on the ground.  It is also possible that Sobhuza never gave his final approval to 
the proposal.  The land Hynd wanted to use had no kraals on it, though it did have some 
cultivated fields, so he saw it as relatively convenient for his purposes. But the plot in 
question was Native Area land under the terms of the 1907 Land Partition Proclamation, 
and Sobhuza was in no mood to cooperate with any proposal that might result in further 
reductions of land under Swazi control.   	
81
 	
 By 1932, the missionaries of the Church of the Nazarene, led by Dr. Hynd, had 
done their best to position themselves as the natural partners for the Commissioner’s 
government in the project of leprosy care for Swaziland, but despite their efforts, they 
also had failed to overcome the logistical obstacles involved in starting a work that would 
adequately fulfill their vision of what should be done.  The initiative then was left in the 
hands of Swazi people, whose voice and agency were noticeably lacking in the 
developments outlined so far.  It is, of course, difficult to surmise the views of Swazis 
about leprosy from a period beyond the recovery of individual memory and in a largely 
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non-literate culture.  But drawing on the observations of parties both within Swaziland 
and in neighboring contexts, we can sketch out a reasonably clear picture.	

	
 The crucial point is that there is little evidence to suggest that Swazis had any 
long-standing prejudices against people suffering from leprosy.  In fact, they may have 
had relatively little experience of the disease prior to the twentieth century.  In 1938, 
Sobhuza told Walter Johnson, the Medical Superintendent of Basutoland’s Botsabelo 
Leprosy Hospital that he believed the disease to be a recent introduction into Swaziland, 
because there was “no native name for it.”   My own research in Swaziland largely 82
supports this assertion, as the only commonly used word for the condition was bulephelo, 
clearly a derivative from English.  I asked missionaries, local leprosy workers, traditional 
healers, and many of my interview subjects about other names for the condition, and none 
were offered.  In the Swaziland National Archives, the file that contained correspondence 
about the Dlangeni leprosy cases had a note scribbled on the front suggesting that, in 
isiZulu, the word for leprosy was ucoko and that, in siSwati, the word used was 
mdilikana.   A number of people with whom I spoke had encountered the isiZulu word, 83
and it can commonly be found in isiZulu Bible translations, but it was not commonly 
used in Swaziland, nor had anyone I spoke to ever used the word mdilikana.	

	
 According to the note on the file, the word mdilikana was used because it referred 
to a practice of leaving the body of a leprosy patient unburied inside a hut, which was 
then allowed to decay until it collapsed upon that body.  But again, no one in Swaziland 
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recalled any such custom, nor have I found any other references to it.  The only close 
parallel to this practice I have uncovered was Henri Junod’s description of Tsonga burial 
practices for people who died of leprosy.  In the first volume of his ethnography, Junod 
asserts that the Tsonga would bury a leprosy sufferer in a hut, but no one else.   In the 84
second volume, he elaborates on this practice by explaining that a grave would be dug 
right outside the hut, a hole made in the wall, and the body dragged through that hole and 
deposited into the grave without further ritual.  All of this work would be done by people 
who were not blood relatives of the deceased, for people related by blood were 
particularly vulnerable to the contagion associated with the condition.  After the burial, 
Junod continues:	

 All the implements are broken in the depth of the forest, at a great distance, for 
fear that a relative may touch one of them and die.  Or they are left in the hut, and 
the whole village at once removes.  Leprosy is called nhlulabadahi, the disease 
which is stronger than the doctors.  It is very much dreaded; however lepers are 
not segregated; they live in the village with other people and even attend beer-
parties, but they bring their own mug, whilst every other guest receives a drinking 
utensil from the master of the village. 	
85!
All in all, Junod perceived significant social stigma surrounding leprosy in Tsonga 
communities, and given that he published his two volumes just three to four years before 
Allen Marwick and Robert Jamison visited the Swazi leprosy patients in Dlangeni, it is 
conceivable that his work influenced their thinking, particularly that of Marwick, who 
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seemed convinced that the Swazis understood the nature of leprosy in similarly awful 
terms to those of Europeans.	

	
 Despite Junod’s assertion of Tsonga fears of leprosy, he did not believe that the 
Tsonga regarded the illness as one that required recourse to explanations dependent upon 
the actions of unhappy ancestors or evil spirits.  On this point, there was much wider 
agreement around the region.  A.T. Bryant, for example, had a similar assessment of 
leprosy among the Zulu, claiming that “Leprosy and venereal diseases were absolutely 
unknown among the Zulus...” until sometime after the arrival of Europeans in the 
region.   In both cases, some traditional healers could offer specialized herbal remedies, 86
but these were not necessarily dependent on spiritual interventions.  A similar pattern 
appeared to be at work in Swaziland.	

	
 When Allen Marwick’s nephew, Brian A. Marwick who would himself give 
nearly 40 years of service to the Swaziland colonial administration, published his 
University of Cape Town Master’s thesis as an ethnography of the Swazi in 1940 (after 
15 years in Swaziland), he declared that leprosy, along with epilepsy, venereal diseases, 
and a few other ailments such as a toothache or a boil, was not believed to result from 
witchcraft.  Indeed, he argued, “Natives do not even take the trouble to send these people 
to the doctors.”   In this case, Marwick’s use of the term “doctors” refers to both 87
practitioners of Western medicine and the Swazi’s own traditional healers; unfortunately, 
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Marwick offered little further elaboration, except to state that leprosy belonged to a class 
of “ordinary diseases” that “are known to everyone and are regarded as having natural 
causes.”   Marwick’s views are also generally in agreement with the explanations given 88
to me by multiple Swazi traditional healers, although they were all in agreement that in 
the past, Swazis had regularly consulted certain traditional healers who specialized in the 
treatment of leprosy, who employed a variety of herbal remedies to assist those with the 
disease. 	
89
	
 In total, the evidence suggests that Jamison and Hynd were quite correct in their 
conclusion that isolation of leprosy patients within their own kraals was a strategy 
unlikely to be followed with the strenuous rigor they felt was necessary.  Swazis simply 
were not inclined to treat people affected by the illness as social outcasts or imminent 
dangers to their own well being.  Megan Vaughan has asserted that missionaries who 
encountered this absence of stigma surrounding the disease elsewhere in Africa 
responded with “deep horror,” as it affirmed their convictions about the “‘primitiveness’ 
of such societies.”   Horror is probably too strong a word to use in describing the 90
reaction of Hynd or Jamison, but they did seem to see it as a sign of Swazi backwardness 
that they could not recognize the dangers of the illness.  The irony is that, in retrospect, it 
is now clear that the views of the Swazi people were much more in line with the realities 
of leprosy and its potential dangers than were the inflated fears of the Europeans who 
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criticized them.  The extent to which some Swazis really did understand both the illness 
itself and the nature of the state under which they lived would become clear in the years 
following 1932, as a consequence of the extraordinary actions of Madolwane Maziya and 
her fellow Swazis at Westfort in Pretoria.	

!
 81
Chapter 2 
“We are thrown away”: Swazi and Missionary Views on Disability at the Ncabaneni 
Leprosy Settlement, Swaziland, 1932-1948	
!!
Leprosy as an illness may not have been, on the whole, a major concern of Swazi 
society in its own right, but this did not mean that those select few people who suffered 
from the disease consequently became passive objects upon which Westerners could 
simply enact their visions of disease control and/or spiritual transformation. In fact, the 
opposite was true. In this chapter, I argue that Swazis in various contexts managed to 
decode Western language about leprosy and then repurpose it for their own ends. I do this 
chiefly by examining closely the lives of two women, Madolwane Maziya, a female 
Swazi leprosy patient whose letter writing campaign to the Swaziland colonial 
government led directly to the founding of the Ncabaneni Leprosy Settlement, and 
Elizabeth Cole, an American missionary nurse for the Church of the Nazarene who 
arrived in Swaziland in 1935, pursuing what she understood as a divine calling to work 
with people suffering from leprosy. 	

Although the existing documentation is inadequate to demonstrate this 
conclusively, there is a reasonably strong chance that these two women met each other at 
least once in late 1935 or 1936 at the recently established Ncabaneni settlement. It is an 
apt illustration of the power dynamic at work on that day that we must imagine the 
presence of Maziya; although she, more than any other individual, was responsible for 
the existence of this settlement, we do not know if or when she ever left that place. In 
contrast, Elizabeth Cole, a newly arrived American missionary, left multiple written 
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accounts of her first visit to Ncabaneni, and for her, we know that the day was a crucial 
one. In 1937, she published an article in her denomination’s missions periodical, The 
Other Sheep, pleading for support to start work among leprosy sufferers in Swaziland.  
Under the headline, “Swazi Lepers. Nobody Cares!!” Cole summoned the dramatic 
language and pathetic imagery commonly associated with leprosy to frame her appeal: 	

‘We are thrown away and nobody cares.’  There was hopelessness in the speaker’s 
voice.  He was a leper; just a leper in Swaziland and nobody cared.	

	
 For fifty years the gospel of Jesus Christ has been preached in 
Swaziland… Still there are many, very many, who have never had the opportunity 
of hearing the Good Tidings of salvation.  Among those who have never been 
reached are the lepers.  
	
 A number of lepers are locked in a small enclosure near the center part of 
Swaziland.  Here they pass through a living death – no hope, no Christ, no 
anything.  Others are left to spread their sickness.  They are left to wander about 
the country as diseased and loathsome beggars; left alone in their sufferings – left 
alone outside the camp, left alone without Christ; downtrodden and outcast and 
Jesus still saying, ‘Heal the sick, cleanse the lepers… freely ye have received, 
freely give.’ 	
1!
Cole’s words and the image accompanying the article illustrate the mission 
mentality towards leprosy work, demonstrating what Vaughan has called a “powerful 
Christian disease symbolism,” in which leprosy patients were “simultaneously ‘damned’ 
and ‘saved,’” while the disease itself was to be heroically “combated with Christian 
compassion.”   For Cole and her supporters, the work with leprosy patients was a sacred 2
duty, an explicit act of obedience to Christ’s command to “cleanse the lepers.”  Given the 
pervasiveness of such pathos-laden imagery in Western Christian discourse about leprosy, 
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few of her readers would have thought twice about Cole’s implication that these leprosy 
patients endured profound isolation as a consequence of having been “thrown away.”  
They expected leprosy sufferers to endure social rejection from all but the most heroic of 
Christian workers.  Though it is absent in this case, Cole and her fellow missionaries 
often asserted that the settlement’s name, Ncabaneni, should be translated as “the place of 
suffering/quarreling,” a name that confirmed a particular image of the suffering of 
“lepers.”   	

Evocative as they are, Cole’s words disguise almost as much as they reveal about 
the position of the men and women of the Ncabaneni Leprosy Settlement and the means 
by which they came to be in that place. The name, for example, had no specific 
association with the leprosy settlement; in fact, the word “incaba,” the siSwati word at 
the root of the name, means something more like “fortress, stronghold, refuge.”  My 3
interview subjects who lived in the area confirmed that the name predated the settlement 
and referred to nearby caves where Swazis had historically fled during times of war.  In 4
other words, the name could be reasonably understood to imply “the place where people 
went during times of suffering/quarreling,” which bore some relationship to the idea that 
missionaries communicated but which put the idea of protection or refuge at the center, 
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rather than the ideas of suffering and quarreling that the missionaries made central. 
Furthermore, both written records and oral accounts make it far less clear that those 
“hopeless” and apparently uncared for leprosy patients would have readily accepted 
Cole’s characterization of their condition.  This chapter attempts to recast the story of the 
Ncabaneni settlement in light of both Swazi and missionary language about leprosy in the 
years between 1932 and 1948 when the Mbuluzi settlement’s opening led to the closure 
of Ncabaneni, highlighting the connections and the discrepancies between the missionary 
narratives and those derived from other sources. In so doing, I aim to uncover the pattern 
of Swazis who cannily repurposed Western language and ideas to negotiate a more 
favorable position for themselves. 	

From the perspective of the British colonial state in Swaziland, the very existence 
of the Ncabaneni Leprosy Settlement was something of an historical accident to begin 
with.  As explained in chapter one, the British had pursued a series of shifting strategies 
with regard to leprosy, all of which they had largely come to regard as failures.  The 
reasons for this were twofold.  First, the limited financial resources of the state 
perpetually stymied their efforts to invest in the medical infrastructure necessary to fulfill 
their vision of a modern system of healthcare.  Secondly, Swazis had generally proven 
quite unwilling to adopt the pathological fears and social stigmas of Westerners with 
regard to leprosy and so had proven unwilling to impose upon their own family members 
and neighbors the kinds of solutions that colonial agents and missionaries recommended.  
The combined result of these two factors was that, although Principal Medical Officer 
Robert Jamison had settled on a vision of establishing a settlement where the patients 
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could “live under conditions approximating as closely as possible to those they have been 
accustomed to,” very little had been done in bringing this vision to fruition. 	
5
	
 The inertia of the British colonial government was finally broken in surprising 
fashion in April of 1932 when a man named Mpetsa Dlamini, the brother of a Swazi 
leprosy patient at the Westfort Leprosy Institution, handed a letter to Brian A. Marwick, 
at this time a deputy assistant commissioner in the colonial administration.  Madolwane 
Maziya, one of the female Swazi patients originally sent to Westfort in 1925, had 
composed the letter addressed to Swaziland’s Resident Commissioner, writing on behalf 
of herself, Mpetsa’s brother, and two other Swazis at Westfort.  It was to be the first in a 
long series of ten letters written over the course of two years, the ultimate result of which 
was the repatriation of the Swazis at Westfort and the establishment of the Ncabaneni 
Leprosy Settlement.  The letters reveal a portrait of an intelligent and forceful woman 
who possessed an extremely sophisticated understanding of Western patterns of thought 
and styles of governance.  Their combined effect is a resounding affirmation of William 
Beinart and Colin Bundy’s assertion, derived from their Eastern Cape case studies, that 
“...local struggles constantly threw up intellectuals: individuals capable of expressing the 
economic, social and political interests of a social group.”   But it was not just the 6
interests of  a group that Maziya represented; she was undeniably a capable, compelling 
advocate for herself, determined to bring about changes in her circumstances that aligned 
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with her own sense of her needs.  Aligned with the more indirect sources discussed in the 
first chapter, the letters give us an exceptional window into Swazi thinking about leprosy 
and also about the lived experience of leprosy patients.  For all these reasons, the letters 
warrant considerable unpacking.	

	
 Writing on March 27, 1932, Madolwane Maziya and her fellow patients stated 
their case in brief but direct fashion:	

We report ourselves to you so that you may lift up your eyes to see where we are.  
We Swazis here are oppressed because the Union people say, when we complain, 
that they have no concern with us, that we should complain to you to build a 
hospital for this disease (which causes spots), further they exemplify the Xosas 
who are sent to their homes and Moshesh’s Basuto who are sent to theirs and the 
Zulus who are also sent to theirs.  So that when we complain they refer us to you 
and the doctor at Mbabane, and say it is your concern.  We close, Sir, Sympathize 
with us. 	
7!
	
 Intentionally or not, this first appeal from the patients reminded the administration 
of their comparative failure to do anything about the leprosy issue in Swaziland.  They 
certainly recognized the truth of the Maziya’s claim that areas populated primarily by 
Xhosa, Zulu, or Sotho speakers had their own leprosy hospitals.  Jamison, the “doctor at 
Mbabane” to whom the letter refers, was sympathetic to an extent, and his comments on 
the letter indicated both his frustrations with the inadequacy of the approaches attempted 
in Swaziland, as well as the larger reality that there was little that anyone could do to 
effectively aid patients like Maziya.  The Swazis at Westfort had, in his assessment, never 
been happy, even after he had personally visited them some years prior in an effort to 
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ameliorate their unhappiness.  In light of this, Jamison concluded that the benefits of their 
course of treatment at Westfort were inadequate to justify the expense; the logical next 
step was for government to pursue repatriation.  Interestingly, Jamison did not take this 
opportunity to press again for his desired leprosy settlement, rather suggesting simply 
that there be some “attempt made to have them isolated at their kraals.”   Jamison likely 8
knew that trying to secure additional funding for such an endeavor outside the annual 
budgeting process was a fool’s errand.  	

	
 But Jamison’s sympathetic response was not enough to bring about a change of 
course by the administration.  When the Swaziland administration received a negative 
response to their inquiry about whether the patients could be safely repatriated to 
Swaziland, they dropped the matter.  The word from the Medical Superintendent at the 
Westfort Hospital was that 3 of the 4 patients responsible for the letter, including Maziya, 
were too contagious to be safely released from the hospital, and the other was nearing the 
end stages of his treatments and could expect release, on the hospital’s terms, within the 
year.   Even Dr. Jamison apparently agreed that this scientific judgment of the Medical 9
Superintendent  trumped the plea of native patients for a change of circumstance, and no 
response of any kind was sent to the Swazi patients.   	
10
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 Maziya, however, was not prepared to accept the lack of response.  On February 
13, 1933, she wrote again: 	

We are again appealing to you this year to ask you to raise your eyes and look to 
where the Swazis are who have been appropriated by the Union people.  We are 
the food of the Union people, and their sheep from which they get their Wool 
every month, and yet there are some whitemen in Swaziland who should support 
themselves with the Wool and the lands that are reapped (sic) every month.  We 
say that if our Government is not able to put up a Hospital for people who are 
suffering from these marks, so that they could be injected there, the Government 
should fetch us back to our homes.  We do not think it is necessary for the 
Government  to look after us.  The Government should look after orphans and 
people who are not able to look after themselves, by reason of not having any 
stock.  We request the Government to send our Doctor up from Mbabane so that 
we can speak to him, and so that he could see the medicine with which they inject 
us.  We say that we could live at our kraals, and the authorities could tell us when 
to go in for injections.  That is our request to our Chief the Commissioner for the 
Swazis.  Answer please Sir. 	
11!
	
 This second letter repeats many of the same requests heard in the first letter, but 
with some notable elaborations.  The petition for attention from “our Doctor” is more 
specific; he should come in order to assume responsibility for their treatments, which the 
patients do not accept require their continued presence at Westfort.  The language 
suggests that the patients believed Dr. Jamison could be a significant ally for them, if  
they could successfully appeal to his sense of responsibility for them.  The fact that 
Jamison himself had directly overseen the process of sending Maziya and one other of 
these patients to Westfort in 1925 and that he had visited them there at least once in the 
intervening years probably gave these patients enough personal interaction with him to 
increase their confidence in the strategy of appealing to him for help.   One does not 12
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have to read much into Dr. Jamison’s correspondence to think that this was a strategy 
with a high probability of success, given Jamison’s generally conscientious manner. 	

	
 The letter also articulates more clearly the nature of the oppression the patients 
have experienced at Westfort through the vivid metaphors of themselves as the food and 
sheep of the Union people. Maziya’s choices in imagery, particularly in regard to her 
reference to sheep, are intriguing and suggestive of the patterns of thinking that framed 
her letters of appeal, drawing upon elements of both Swazi and Western culture. On the 
one hand, Swazi praise poems (tibongo) and clan praises (sinanatelo) frequently draw 
upon references to animals as metaphors for human behavior and experience. Vail and 
White, for example, discuss the imagery of the elephant, the mamba, and the black bull as 
symbols of the “uncomplicated celebration of military ferocity” in the praise poem of the 
nineteenth century Swazi Ngwenyama Mswati II.  Sheep, however, do not often appear 13
in these kinds of sources, nor were they a significant a part of the traditional Swazi 
economy, especially by comparison to cattle.  Why then did Maziya reach for the 14
metaphor of wool sheared from a sheep rather than the readily available image of milk 
drawn from a cow? I would argue that it may well have been because sheep were more 
naturally associated in her mind with the behaviors of white South Africans exploiting the 
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resources of Swazis. Sheep were a sizable part of the larger South African economy, and 
every year, approximately 250,000 sheep owned by South African farmers of European 
descent would enter Swaziland for winter grazing, with negligible economic benefits to 
the local economy.  Given the severe land shortages characteristic of the Swazi 15
experience since the 1907 Partition, the metaphor of herself and her fellow patients as 
sheep to be sheared evoked a rich image of oppression and exploitation.	

	
 To this point, the mechanisms of this oppression are as yet unnamed, but it is clear 
that the patients felt that they were experiencing economic exploitation. The agents of the 
colonial state, with the possible exception of Dr. Jamison, likely had little idea what that 
looked like, but subsequent correspondence revealed that Maziya and the other patients 
were routinely assigned work for “white people” at Westfort, such as laundry.  We will 
return to the nature of that work in greater detail below, but in this letter, the interesting 
thing to note is the way that the imagery employed by Maziya turns her exploitation into 
a disadvantage for the colonial state in Swaziland.  This was clearly another intentional 
part of their strategy of appeal, as the closing of their first letter had contained a similar 
brief comment: “We hope that you will take heed, also the doctor at Mbabane who is 
deprived of his bread by the people here.”   Jamison may have felt that the patients at 16
Westfort were always unhappy, but they have ingeniously inverted the situation by 
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suggesting that the people who should be most unhappy about this situation are the agents 
of Swaziland’s colonial government.	

	
 But the assertion that might have attracted the most attention and that sets up the 
most obvious contradiction with Western conceptions of leprosy is Maziya’s claim, “We 
do not think it is necessary for the Government to look after us.”  The statement 
adamantly denied the disability that Westerners tended to automatically assign to those 
who suffered from leprosy and forcefully challenged the paternalistic tendencies of a 
colonial administration steeped in the ideology of a civilizing mission.  The Swazi 
patients at Westfort clearly did not perceive their condition as a cause for hopelessness, 
nor did they concede that it relegated them to dependency upon the state.  Such status 
belonged to orphans or people who had no access to cattle, the most basic unit of the 
Swazi traditional economy, particularly with regard to perpetuating the household by way 
of marriage exchange.   Significantly, Maziya and her fellow patients also did not 17
express any uncertainty about the willingness of their communities to allow their return.  
Their confidence apparently confirms what Jamison and other Western observers had 
believed about Swazi attitudes towards leprosy for some time, that they did not regard the 
disease as particularly contagious or dangerous.  If one of the patients at Ncabaneni did 
report to Elizabeth Cole in 1937 that the people at the camp were “thrown away,” it was 
apparently not the Swazi people who bore that responsibility.  	
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 It was not entirely inconceivable that this second letter might have produced a 
different reaction from the administration than the first.  In the intervening months 
between Maziya’s two letters, Dr. David Hynd of the Nazarene mission had returned to 
Swaziland from his furlough with promised support from interested parties overseas and 
had approached the government to revisit his plan for a site near the Raleigh Fitkin 
Memorial Hospital in Bremersdorp.   The government also was apparently pursuing 18
some plans of its own, as Allen Marwick had written to Sobhuza II around the same time 
that Maziya had composed the second letter with reference to a possible leprosy site 
opening on mission land in another region of the country.   And when Maziya’s second 19
letter arrived on his desk, J.R. Armstrong, the new Government Secretary, inquired with 
Jamison about whether it would be worthwhile to see if anything had changed in the year 
since the last report.   If Jamison did make any further inquiry, there is no record of it.  20
In the end, Armstrong wrote to the Union’s Secretary for Public Health and asked that a 
reply be relayed to the Westfort patients totally in line with the prior year’s 
recommendations of the Westfort Medical Superintendent.	

	
 Armstrong was undoubtedly following standard diplomatic protocol in relaying 
the administration’s response through Union channels, but doing so only caused the 
intensity and breadth of this clash of perspectives to grow.  The patients at Westfort were 
disinclined to place their faith in the Medical Superintendent’s report, and their 
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subsequent response introduced a new theme into the dialogue between themselves and 
the commissioner’s government in Swaziland:	

We are pleased to hear that you received our letter, but we are disappointed 
because you did not reply to us direct, but you sent your reply to the person from 
whom we asked to be released.  We feel sorry about you not informing us that we 
now belong to this place.  The gentleman here informs us that you say we must 
remain here with him, as you have no place there for sick people.  We would have 
understood better if you sent us a letter written in the Native language.  We think 
that this gentleman is not telling us what you say but what he says himself. 	
21!
	
 The Swaziland administration was not prepared to violate diplomatic procedure 
by writing directly to Maziya, but they did show some limited responsiveness to this new 
criticism.  J.R. Armstrong relayed a letter, translated into siSwati and addressed to 
Maziya, via the Union’s Secretary for Public Health and the Westfort Medical 
Superintendent.  The message, however, was unchanged, as Armstrong informed the 
patients that since most of them had leprosy in a “highly infectious stage,” it was in their 
own best interests, as well as the best interests of the territory that they remain where they 
were.   The apparent alignment of the commissioner’s government in Swaziland with the 22
medical staff at Westfort provoked a forceful reply from Maziya:	

I thank your kindness to reply to me.  You state that the Government is looking 
after me but I say not at all, I am looking after the Government because since I 
came to Pretoria I am working hard doing washing for white people.  I am really 
tired as I have been doing this for the last nine years.  You have never seen a 
person working so many years without rest like me.  Though you say I am still 
sick I think that should not debar me from returning home.  It seems our 
Government does not wish me to look after my children but instead that I should 
look after the white people... I can assure you that this disease is not infectious at 
all because we mix together with people who have not got the disease but they do 
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not get it besides that many of the Native Police have wives who have the disease 
but they do not get it, and how then is the disease infectious. 	
23!
	
 Maziya’s distrust of the authorities at Westfort was further highlighted later in her 
letter, when she noted that the letter from the Swaziland government had come to her 
without an envelope, leading her to petition again for a direct reply from the government.  
Furthermore, she expressed doubt regarding the news found in the government’s letter 
that one of her fellow Swazis at Westfort was soon to be released, noting, “I doubt if he 
will be released soon because he is also working like us.”  In this assertion, she would 24
prove mistaken, as the man in question received his discharge during the following 
month, but even this did little to reduce Maziya’s distrust.  She credited his discharge to 
the action of visiting doctors “from Cape Town” rather than to Westfort’s own staff, her 
exploiters. 	
25
	
  This fourth letter is the most impassioned and intensely personal of the ten letters 
that come from Maziya’s hand; it is telling that this is the only time that she speaks in first 
person singular rather than plural.  The letter finally makes plain the nature of the 
oppression Maziya had referenced since her first letter, and at the center of that complaint 
is the notion of work done for white people.  This is telling because in all likelihood, 
those “white people” believed that this work would be crucial in effecting a cure for 
Maziya’s leprosy.  For despite Jamison’s confident claim back in 1923 that leprosy had 
“at last become amenable to a cure,” the reality was that no effective treatment for 
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leprosy existed until the advent of sulphone therapies in 1948.  The only treatments 
regularly used at Westfort or any other leprosy hospital in the world were injections of 
chaulmoogra oil, and these treatments were often painful and of questionable efficacy.   26
Maziya herself, went on to comment in her letter that “...ever since I arrived here I have 
not had a drop of medicine in my mouth and besides this we are fed up with these 
injections.”   There is no evidence that the practice of traditional medicine would have 27
inclined Maziya or the other patients at Westfort to prefer oral remedies over the available 
injections; both Hilda Kuper and Brian Marwick describe Swazis taking medicines by a 
variety of means, including oral ingestion, inhalation, and scarification/tattooing.   It 28
seems reasonable to conclude then that Maziya’s frustration with the injections and the 
refusal of many Swazis at Westfort to cooperate with the treatment regime are linked 
solely to the discomfort associated with them and their ambiguous effectiveness.  	

	
 In the absence of truly effective medical remedies, Western doctors often stressed 
that the key to curing leprosy was found in improvements in diet and in carrying on 
significant physical labor.  For example, at the same time as Mazyiya’s correspondence 
with the Swaziland administration, R.G. Cochrane, the Medical Secretary for the British 
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Empire Leprosy Relief Association (BELRA) wrote to David Hynd, advising him to 
remember in his plans for a leprosy settlement that “... the average case is not an ill man 
and that he can do quite active work;”  therefore, Cochrane suggested, Hynd “... should 
choose a place where there is plenty of land for cultivation, so that you would ensure that 
the patients get enough exercise and have sufficient ground so that they may grow their 
own produce and become as near self-supporting in that line as possible.”   It was 29
guidance that Hynd fully embraced, and his concern for providing leprosy sufferers with 
suitable employment as therapeutic remedy persisted even after the advent of sulphone 
therapy in Swaziland.  Even in 1957, Hynd still felt that although 
Diaminodiphenylsulphone (usually shortened as D.D.S. or “dapsone”) was the main 
chemotherapy employed in leprosy treatment, “... of great importance in the rehabilitation 
of the patients is the improved and good hygienic conditions under which they live, 
together with the occupational and recreational activities in which they are encouraged to 
engage.”   Jamison was of much the same mind in this regard.  Having obviously soured 30
on the remedies employed at Westfort, he wrote in his annual report for 1933 that the 
“essential factors” in bringing about a cure for leprosy were, “cleanliness, good feeding, a 
moderate amount of work and a contented frame of mind.”   The productive labor of 31
leprosy sufferers served as both an economic efficiency and a mode of therapy that 
sought to improve the overall condition of the afflicted.  In this sense, the idea was 
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undoubtedly a holdover of what Peter Gay calls the Victorian bourgeoisie’s “problematic 
gospel of work,” in which “work was a prophylactic against sin.”   	
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 Far from being a path to moral rightness or physical wellbeing, Maziya clearly 
experienced her work assignments at Westfort as exploitation, a feeling not unique to her.  
In the context of hardening lines of racial segregation that characterized 1930s South 
Africa, Maziya and other patients like her could readily interpret the expectation that 
African leprosy patients perform labor in compliance with the orders of white doctors as 
an extension of the racial inequality of the wider society.   Simonne Horwitz’s work 33
further reveals that African patients at Westfort were assigned to work as the domestic 
servants of white patients as early as 1916, and she also recounts a 1939 sit-down strike, 
led by four African female patients in protest of the poor living conditions and the abuses 
of African patients at the institution.  What makes the picture even more complicated, 
however, is Horwitz’s assertion that all patients were paid for their work, albeit at a lower 
wage than would have been given to someone from outside the institution.   Did Maziya 34
feel exploited because she knew that her wages were lower than those of “clean” persons 
performing the same tasks?  Her insistent denial of physical disability certainly makes 
this a viable explanation for her dissatisfaction.  Or is it possible that, because the Swazi 
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patients were being supported by an outside government, that no wages were paid to 
Maziya and her associates?  Was their labor an expected contribution to the maintenance 
of the Westfort Institution on top of the money paid by the government of Swaziland for 
their care?  This possibility cannot be dismissed outright, as Maziya never references 
receiving any pay, but it seems unlikely, as this fourth letter and subsequent 
correspondence revealed that Maziya and her fellow patients had accumulated some 
personal cash savings.  In this letter, Maziya offers Jamison £1 for petrol if he will come 
and visit them; future letters would offer even larger sums as the Swazi patients worked 
to secure their return home.	

	
 Maziya’s forceful arguments and continued insistence that her condition posed no 
threat of contagion were still inadequate to  change the views of the Swazi government.  
On May 30, 1933, Armstrong wrote again noting summarily that the Resident 
Commissioner “...wishes me to say that in view of the medical opinion which has been 
given to him, he is unable to alter the decision which was conveyed to you on the 2nd 
May, nor does he consider that it would do any good to send a Medical Officer to Pretoria 
to see you.”   Armstrong’s letter, like all previous communication with the Swazis at 35
Westfort, passed through the offices of the Secretary for Public Health and the Medical 
Superintendent at Westfort before delivery, and the language he used communicated an 
air of finality about the subject.  The government clearly did not intend to alter either its 
practices or its attitudes in light of arguments made by its subjects.	
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 But even prior to receiving Armstrong’s reply, Maziya and her fellow patients at 
Westfort had written again.   Perhaps suspecting that their May 13 letter would not 36
receive a sympathetic response from Armstrong, they appealed once again directly to the 
Resident Commissioner, introducing yet another new argument in favor of their 
repatriation:	

Father of the Swazi Nation, we appeal to you as a father.  We understand that you 
love us but that you have no money with which you can build a suitable Shelter 
for us.  We therefore beg to request the authorities to build a place for us at our 
own expense of £15, each of us to contribute £5.  Susipisi will arrive there, as he 
has been discharged by the Doctors from Cape Town.  We are sorry because our 
Government is paying money to this whiteman here, for keeping us, and yet we 
are made to work.  If you agree to have a place built for us we would be glad if it 
could be made now in the winter so that we could commence our ploughing with 
the other Swazis, at the place where our Shelter is going to be built. 	
37
  	

	
 At this point, it seems plain that these Swazis at Westfort had a thoroughly 
sophisticated understanding of Western views of leprosy and the nature of the colonial 
state, an understanding they had used to gain the upper hand in the conversation by 
effectively anticipating and/or nullifying every argument that could possibly have been 
made against their appeal for repatriation.  The patients clearly recognize that in terms of 
relative power, the government holds all the cards, but even so, they understand how to 
make that same hegemonic power work in their favor.  Having anticipated that their 
common sense arguments about the contagiousness of leprosy would not succeed and 
doubting whether their pleas on humanitarian grounds for relief from oppression would 
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lead to a change of circumstance, the patients now turn directly to money.  Since 
Armstrong had insisted in his May 2 letter that the government could not afford to 
construct an institution for leprosy sufferers, the Westfort patients offer to use their own 
resources for the construction of a shelter.  More subtly, the patients also point out the 
inconsistency they perceive in the way the government’s own money is being used.  Why, 
they wonder, should they be made to work at Westfort when the Swazi government was 
paying the institution for “keeping” them?	

	
   This fifth letter finally began to tip the scales in favor of repatriation for the 
Westfort Swazis.  Whether from exhaustion, embarrassment, or simply because they 
recognized the strength of the arguments Maziya and her fellow patients made, the 
internal correspondence of the government officials began to shift.  The patients’ key ally 
within the administration was the Principal Medical Officer Jamison, whose voice had 
been noticeably absent in the correspondence since his comments on the original letter in 
April, 1932.  When asked to comment on this most recent of Maziya’s letters, Jamison 
pointed to the injustice created by the original decision to send such a small number of 
patients to Westfort.  Conceding that an institution may be the best place for infectious 
cases, Jamison pointed out that, “While a number of lepers at least as infectious as these 
are going about free in Swaziland it is unfair that these few should be segregated so far 
from their homes.”   Jamison even suggested, contrary to the views of the Resident 38
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Commissioner expressed in the previous month, that it might be beneficial for him to visit 
the patients personally, given that the logistical arrangements for their repatriation were 
likely to require that they remain at Westfort for at least an additional year, and that 
verbal assurances would probably be more helpful than further written communication.  	

	
 Jamison’s proposed personal visit never came about, and it is unclear what 
decision might have been reached solely on the basis of the last letter and Jamison’s 
renewed call for repatriation.  The wheels of government bureaucracy were turning too 
slowly for Maziya, who wrote yet again after she realized that the government’s last letter 
of May 30 and hers of June 12 had crossed in the mail.  This sixth appeal sounded 
familiar themes:	

We beg to request that our Chief should have mercy on us.  We bring our humble 
request to you because there is no one else that can take us out of the fire besides 
our Government; even those in charge of this Institution state that they can do 
nothing for us because it is at the request of our Government that they detain us 
here; but we wish you to know that our detention here is worrying us very much.  
We ask that the Government should not look at the expense of feeding us if we 
have to return to Swaziland as we think we can feed ourselves until next autumn 
when what we would plant during the next plough season would then be ripe.  We 
ask for direct reply to us.  We are your children. 	
39
A postscript to the letter reiterated the offer of using the patients’ own financial resources 
for the creation of a place where they could live.  That the letter contains no new 
arguments or information is interesting in its own right.  This letter was addressed 
directly to J.R. Armstrong, the Government Secretary whose signature had appeared on 
the government’s May 30 letter, rather than to the Resident Commissioner.  The letter 
seems to have been written primarily as an expression of protocol, a way of 
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acknowledging received correspondence, but it was also a way of ensuring that the 
patients had the last word on the subject.  They wanted there to be no confusion about 
their refusal to accept the government’s logic.	

	
 Because of the overlapping timetable of correspondence at this moment in the 
story, it is impossible to say how much impact this sixth letter had, but by July 12, T.A. 
Dickson, the Resident Commissioner, had signaled that he was ready to go ahead with 
plans for repatriation.   Dickson credited his decision to the change of views expressed 40
by Jamison, but it can safely be said that none of this would have come about were it not 
for the persistence of Madolwane Maziya and the others at Westfort.  Even so, the 
government still responded without any particular urgency waiting until August 8 to 
compose a letter to the Westfort Swazis, expressing their consent to the idea of 
repatriation but indicating only that they would send word when the Resident 
Commissioner had “determined upon a plan.”   	
41
	
 The problem was that the various schemes for an institution devoted to the care of 
leprosy patients had gained no traction whatsoever.   As a consequence, the preparations 
took another 15 months to carry out, during which time Maziya wrote at least four more 
letters in which she continued to stress the ability of the leprosy patients to care for 
themselves and to strenuously object to every minor obstacle that the government in 
Swaziland mentioned as an impediment to progress towards the founding of the 
settlement.  Although the correspondence generated during that time period focuses on 
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logistical matters, there are fascinating pieces that continue to emerge and illuminate 
further the interactions of Swazis and the colonial state.	

	
 For one, the decision to repatriate meant that the administration needed to consult 
with Sobhuza’s parallel Swazi government, as they did on all questions that had any 
bearing on the question of land use.  Even before he wrote to the Westfort patients, 
Armstrong had written to Sobhuza inquiring whether he would favor an option in which 
the patients were each sent back to their own homes or one in which “some small portion 
of Native Area” would be set aside for this purpose.   Notably, there is no mention of 42
possibly acquiring land under European ownership, by far the larger portion of the 
country.  Doing so, however, would most likely have required the colonial administration 
to purchase land with money that it did not have, and one suspects that most Europeans 
would have been hesitant to have any portion of land adjacent to their own used for 
housing people with leprosy, a disease they feared.  	

	
 Sobhuza’s response on July 31 has the feel of a masterful piece of political foot-
dragging:	

I have consulted my councillors on the proposals laid down in your letter under 
reply and their opinion is that whilst they highly appreciate His Honour the 
Resident Commissioner’s sympathy for our people who unfortunately have fallen 
victims to this disease, a much wider survey of the position from a critical point of 
view should be taken into consideration, namely, that before a proper 
establishment which should satisfy both the Government and the people 
(Europeans not excepted) no step should be taken to return the lepers already in 
the Union Asylum, and that those who may be infected while the matter is under 
consideration should be detained where they are until a solution is arrived at. 	
43
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What exactly is going on in this evasive reply?  Christopher Lowe has argued that by the 
1930s, Sobhuza had adopted a strategy in which he “temporized endlessly about taking 
practical actions to implement British desires.”   The point in doing so, according to 44
Lowe, was to exploit the weakness of the colonial state in order to gradually shift the 
terms of political debate to suit Sobhuza’s own agenda.  And while the discussion of how 
to deal with a few leprosy patients living in the Union may not have been a top priority 
for Sobhuza, the question of land use was.  In 1933, Sobhuza and his council were merely 
seven years removed from the final defeat of their legal petitions to have the 1907 Land 
Partition Proclamation reversed and the concessions upon which it was based declared 
illegitimate.  In all likelihood, Sobhuza’s hesitation to support immediate repatriation of 
the Westfort patients had more to do with his desire to protect Swazi land from further 
encroachment by Europeans than it did with his professed desire to ensure a “proper 
establishment.”  In this particular instance, Sobhuza did not get his way, as the Ncabaneni 
site was a piece of Native Area land, but Sobhuza’s intervention is a good reminder that 
Maziya’s ability to employ effective argumentation in pursuit of aims that did not align 
with the colonial agenda was not unique to her. 	
45
	
 It was only after agreeing to repatriation that the administration finally began an 
inquiry into the identity of Maziya (and to a lesser extent, the other Swazis at Westfort).  
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In early September, Armstrong instructed the Deputy Assistant Commissioner for 
Swaziland’s Central District (so-called even though it was headquartered at Siteki, along 
Swaziland’s eastern frontier) to investigate Maziya’s age, marital status, and whether 
there might be anyone among her relatives who would come to the leprosy settlement and 
care for her, if necessary.  The brief reply, sent a month later, sheds the only sliver of light 
still perceptible to us regarding Maziya’s family background.  The D.A.C. estimated her 
age to be between 35 and 40 years of age and reported that she had been married to the 
late Chief Sibhamu Matenjwa of Zululand but had left him when her sister (an Mbulawa 
Maziya) had died of leprosy.  It was the D.A.C.’s opinion that both Mbulawa and 
Madolwane must have contracted leprosy in Zululand, and he reported that there was 
“nobody suitable or prepared to go into the leper settlement to look after her.”   	
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 This brief summation is the only known record of the life of Madolwane Maziya, 
and it is a frustratingly slim written record when one considers the persuasive force of her 
letter writing campaign on behalf of the Swazi patients at Westfort.   We can deduce 47
from her literacy that she likely had some previous exposure to Christian missionary 
education, given that Swaziland’s first government school did not open until 1908 and 
was located at Zombodze, relatively far from the Maziya home area along the Lubombo 
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Mountains.   William Beinart, in a Transkei case study, has argued that women from the 48
Christian community were among those most adversely affected by things like the rising 
commodity prices in the 1920s, which in turn led them to very active political 
engagement in the form of strikes and boycotts.   Perhaps a similar dynamic is at work 49
in the case of Madolwane Maziya; unfortunately, there is inadequate evidence to answer 
the question decisively.  However slim the biographical record of these patients may be, 
we do know that on the night of October 30, 1934, three Swazis from Westfort finally 
arrived at their new settlement site at Ncabaneni.  Of the four patients represented in 
Maziya’s first letter, written more than two and a half years earlier, only two arrived at 
Ncabaneni.  One had been discharged in early June of 1933, and another had died on 
March 17, 1934 as a consequence of a sickness that had spread among many patients at 
Westfort.   The third patient to arrive at Ncabaneni had joined with the other Swazis in 50
their efforts to gain repatriation in September, 1933.    	
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 The settlement site itself consisted of four acres of ground, fenced in, and 
containing a few homes constructed in the traditional Swazi style and a small allocation 
of land for the raising of food crops.  The government had arranged to have the farming 
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acreage plowed and fertilized before the patients arrived and had hired a man to serve as 
custodian of the property; beyond that, they were reluctant to invest much more.  The 
provision was hardly lavish, but it in most ways fulfilled Jamison’s 1929 vision of a 
facility where the patients could, “... live under conditions approximating as closely as 
possible to those they have been accustomed to.”  Jamison had chosen those words 
carefully; they reflected the most common discourse in Western medical circles of the 
time.  It is interesting, then, to acknowledge that it took only a few short years before 
missionaries and government medical staff alike had taken to describing Ncabaneni as a 
completely inadequate situation, a theme that will be more thoroughly explored later in 
this chapter and in chapter three.	

	
 It is unfortunate that we have only indirect testimony about the responses of the 
leprosy patients who arrived at Ncabaneni on that Tuesday night in October of 1934.  But 
what we do have provides some telling, and more than a little amusing, insights.  The 
deputy assistant commissioner for Mankaiana district who oversaw their arrival reported 
to his superiors the next day that the patients, upon arrival, had made three requests.  
Their first was for a daily meat ration and tea twice each day, the same ration they had 
received at Pretoria.  The D.A.C. advised them that this would not be possible, because in 
this new situation, they were intended to “...live as they would at their own kraals.  One 
of the patients stated that he had always had tea even at his own kraal.”  The second 
request from two of the patients was to continue receiving the same injections about 
which Maziya had been so fed up while at Westfort.  And, finally, the patients requested 
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that they be provided with “writing material for writing letters, and for posting 
facilities.” 	
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 In short, the patients’ requests reinforce the heart of their original complaints and 
demonstrate how acutely they felt their alienation from home and the oppression of work 
done for white people.  Freed from those complaints, the Westfort Swazis could readily 
identify key components of their life at Westfort which were beneficial to them.  One can 
imagine Armstrong and Jamison shaking their heads somewhat ruefully upon reading of 
these requests.  Jamison managed to be reasonably conciliatory in his reply, conceding 
that some quantity of tea might be possible and that it might also be possible to increase 
the quantity, if not the frequency, of an already planned twice weekly meat ration.  The 
request for injections was more complicated, though it might be possible to administer 
them once a week; more often would simply not be practical, “...especially as the benefit 
she (and it seems evident that he must be thinking of Maziya here) derived from the 
injections is problematical.”  Regarding the request for writing material and postal 
facilities, Jamison simply noted that he saw no reason to object, though it must surely 
have crossed his mind that granting such a request meant running the risk of continuing 
to receive still more strongly worded letters of complaint!   	
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 If Madolwane Maziya ever wrote further letters to the government in Mbabane, 
they have either not survived or simply eluded my searching in the archive.  But for the 
most part, it is clear that she had attained her primary objectives, and so it seems most 
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likely that she found no further reason to write.  Her story is an extraordinary one in 
many ways, one that requires us to reach well outside of her gender and socioeconomic 
circles to find parallels.  One notes in Maziya’s letters hints not just of Sobhuza’s strategy 
for dealing with the Swazi colonial administration, but also of the strategic maneuvering 
of Sebele, Khama, and Bathoen, the three Tswana chiefs who journeyed to the United 
Kingdom in 1895, seeking protection from the aggression of Cecil Rhodes’s British 
South Africa Company.   But these parallel cases of Africans maneuvering effectively in 54
a political context center around the lives of men. Other links might be made to the work 
of Jonathan Crush who found evidence of Swazi labor migrants whose “aversion to wage 
labour” found expression in sporadic work performed as near to their home state as 
possible and who tended to desert quickly when conditions were not to their liking.  55
Though still centered on the experience of men, this link is interesting, yet the situation 
described by Crush pertained chiefly to the era prior to the 1907 Land Partition 
Proclamation; perhaps Maziya’s situation hints at the persistence of these cultural 
attitudes beyond the period of capitalist penetration that followed after 1907.	

	
 One can also find parallels for Maziya’s situation in stories that reflect deeply on 
the resourcefulness of women in this region during the twentieth century.  In this genre, 
Mpho ‘M’atsepo Nthunya’s autobiography of her life in Benoni Location and rural 
Lesotho stands out, as does Belinda Bozzoli’s work, aided by Mmantho Nkotsoe, 
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exploring the lives of migrant Tswana women from Phokeng.   These works amply 56
demonstrate that women were active agents in shaping their social environments, but they 
are also dependent on the reconstruction of memory and the necessary process of self-
representation that it entails.  Maziya’s case is extraordinary precisely because it allows 
us to hear her voice in that moment in time so clearly.  This is not to argue that Maziya’s 
voice is, therefore, preferable to those found in other works; there are, of course, plenty 
of interpretive pitfalls in this method of historical reconstruction, as with any other.  I 
simply want to stress the unique nature of her voice and the remarkable clarity with 
which we hear her.	

	
 The most direct parallel to Maziya’s situation and a source from which she likely 
drew some sort of inspiration was that of the former Ndlovukazi (Queen Mother) 
Labotsibeni Mdluli (c.1858-1925). In the Swazi system of monarchy, the Ndlovukazi 
wields significant ritual power, especially in connection with her rain making powers, and 
political influence, and Labotsibeni was, without any question, the most influential 
Ndlovukazi in Swazi history.  Some of this was the consequence of simple endurance; her 
time in office lasted more than thirty years between 1890 and 1921. Some was also 
circumstantial; because her son, Bhunu, died in 1899, Labotsibeni was the chief political 
power in Swazi society through the long regency of her grandson, Sobhuza II. But the 
chief reason why Labotsibeni is regarded as having had so much influence was because 
of her impressive record of standing up against the encroachment of both Boer and 
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British settlers, a reputation reflected in her more popular name, Gwamile, which 
connotes the idea of standing firm or unshakeable. Her resolute defense of the institution 
of the Swazi monarchy and skillful political negotiations to protect the integrity of the 
Swazi kingdom played a pivotal role in shaping the modern state of Swaziland. But, 
beyond being a strong defender of traditional Swazi culture and authority, Labotsibeni 
was also an advocate of spreading European style education in order that Swazis, who 
could no longer hope to win their security and independence by military means, could 
effectively negotiate with Britain and other European powers.  A young woman like 57
Madolwane Maziya, who grew up in the household of a chief during the years when 
Labotsibeni’s struggle with the British administration of Swaziland was at its peak, might 
very well draw upon the Ndlovukazi’s example in her own struggles to make her voice 
heard.	

	
 As we listen to Maziya speak, we hear a great deal about Swazi conceptions of 
wellbeing, as related to leprosy as well as other illnesses.  But what we do not hear is any 
sentiment that might parallel the key emotions and images of Elizabeth Cole’s 1937 
account of her visit to Ncabaneni, with which this chapter opened.  How can we reconcile 
this discrepancy in language about leprosy?  In order to do so, we need to balance our 
understanding of Maziya’s claims with deeper knowledge of the perspective from which 
Cole viewed the encounter. Getting to this perspective requires us to first understand 
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something of the life story of Elizabeth Cole, particularly the ways in which she herself 
constructed a narrative about her own life.  In reconstructing this narrative, I am leaning 
heavily on the application she submitted to the Church of the Nazarene in 1934 for 
appointment to missionary service, as well as later narratives to which she contributed 
directly as either author or interview subject.   Doing so helps us understand Cole’s 58
perspective and manner of representing the leprosy work, but the views she expresses in 
these texts are very much in harmony with the oral testimonies of people I interviewed, 
both Swazis and Westerners, and represent a larger narrative about leprosy work, most 
particularly propagated by missionaries.	

	
   Born January 15, 1911, Cole lived most of her early life on a ranch in eastern 
Montana, the eighth of eleven children in her Methodist family.  Cole grew up as a self-
described cowgirl who loved horses and the relative isolation of the Montana range 
where she herded cattle, two relatively innocuous passions that would later become 
linchpins in the narrative of her life leading towards leprosy work in Swaziland.  Cole’s 
conversion to Christianity came at 13 years of age, though her religious fervor cooled 
considerably during her high school years.  But after graduation from high school in 
1929, Cole felt led by God and her mother’s encouragements to enroll in nurse’s training 
at Deaconess Hospital in Billings, Montana.  There, under the influence of a Dr. A.J. 
Movius and his wife, Marion Murray Movius, Cole joined the local Church of the 
Nazarene in 1931.  In this context, Cole began to contemplate for the first time the idea of 
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work with people affected by leprosy: “A short time after (joining the Church of the 
Nazarene) the Lord let me see that poor patients with foul diseases and diseases that 
could not be cured had very receptive hearts.  I thought of the leper people and wondered 
if Jesus would ever let me go to them.”   Feeling the need to prepare for a life of 59
Christian service among leprosy sufferers, Cole enrolled in a Bible Training School in 
neighboring Washington state where, in April 1934, she experienced what she would later 
identify as her definitive call to missions and specifically to work with leprosy patients:	

I was having my quiet time when suddenly the room seemed light and light went 
clear through my whole body.  I knew that Jesus was beside me - that I was His 
child - that he wanted me to go to the lepers - that He would go on before - and 
that I need never doubt again.	

	
 This was not a dream, imagination, or fanaticism.  I know even plainer 
than I know I’m writing that Jesus called.  Again and again since that evening 
tests have come.  people have said that it would be impossible for me to go and 
have begged me not to even think about it.  They have offered me permanent 
positions with high wadges (sic); but always when I look through and behind 
these things to Jesus they are small. 	
60!
	
 Within a year of having received this vision, Cole had applied for missionary 
service and been assigned to the work in Swaziland, with the clear understanding that she 
would be set apart for work with leprosy patients just as soon as possible. The visionary 
experience of April 1934 was neither the first nor the last time she would report 
experiencing supernatural intervention in her own life. But this particular experience 
remained central to her identity and serves as a powerful indicator of the ways in which 
Cole felt that her own call to work among people affected by leprosy was more than just a 
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practical or medical endeavor. It was an explicitly spiritual work, motivated by an intense 
piety, not altogether uncommon for early twentieth century women in American Holiness 
circles. 	

	
 Like other holiness missionaries before her and yet still in the notably dramatic 
and specific fashion of her reported vision, Cole’s sense of a calling to leprosy work 
became central to her identity and direction in life.  Although she performed her general 61
nursing duties at the RFMH conscientiously, it was always clear that her singular passion 
was to develop and expand the Nazarene work among leprosy patients.  For example, 
during her furlough of 1950-1951, less than two years after having assumed full time 
leprosy work at the Mbuluzi Leprosy Hospital, Cole was already talking to church 
members and leaders about her conviction that “... it is God’s will that our church have 
leper colonys (sic) in other places in Africa and in other parts of the world ----- I believe 
that the God who helped us in the little leper colony in Swaziland is able to help us in 
other leper colonies.”  Even after her retirement in 1972, Cole was still emphasizing the 62
leprosy calling.  Claudia Stevenson, Mbuluzi’s last nurse matron, told me that her own 
calling to leprosy work, which climaxed during a furlough bus ride to Kansas City when 
Jesus came and sat in the empty seat next to her and called her to work with leprosy 
patients, had come about in part because of the prayers of Elizabeth Cole that someone 
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would take up the call to leprosy work in Swaziland.  In her zeal, Cole apparently tried a 63
number of times to convince David Hynd and his wife that they should be the ones 
leaving Swaziland and spearheading the expansion of Nazarene leprosy work around the 
African continent.  But, as discussed in chapter one, Hynd’s burden was for medical 64
missionary work as a whole and not for one individual facet, as was the case for Cole.	

	
 This understanding of her work among leprosy sufferers as explicitly spiritual 
persisted for many years, and indeed the spiritual framework applied by the mission was 
perhaps the key distinction between it and the colonial government of Swaziland.  One 
gets a clear indication of how significant this issue was for Cole in a letter she wrote to 
Marjory Burne in 1950, explaining why she felt that she could not participate in a project 
aimed at telling Cole’s story to missions supporters in the United States:	

I can not feel clear about telling to the outside world anything regarding the leper 
work - myself included - unless we see the lepers turning to God.  I mean really 
turning to God (underlining in the original).  I am to the place where I feel that 
everything else has been in vain and is in vain unless that comes to pass. 	
65!
	
 Cole represented a larger vein of women missionaries who were filling the ranks 
of holiness church missions during the early twentieth century.  Dana Robert describes 
the holiness avenue as a parallel to the faith missions of the same time period in terms of 
their attraction for pietistic women, marked by their specific beliefs in “a process of 
spiritual development by which they could live on an elevated plane of Christian spiritual 
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life, following the direct leading of God through the power of the Holy Spirit.  Coming 
originally from Methodism, holiness thought pervaded denominational missions as well 
as emboldened women to set out on their own.”   	
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 Women, both married and unmarried, played a significant role in the work of the 
Church of the Nazarene from its beginnings in Swaziland.  In this sense, according to 
Robert, the church departed significantly from the movement within mainline 
denominational missions in the first half of the twentieth century, as the women’s 
missionary movement was subsumed within denominational missions and as the rise of 
fundamentalism created greater emphasis on the subordination of women to men.  
Although not entirely free from these influences, the holiness theology of the Church of 
the Nazarene left a distinct sphere of activity and leadership for women in missions.  	

	
 As explained in the previous chapter, anyone who could attest to the experience of 
entire sanctification could exercise a measure of leadership within the holiness tradition 
of the Nazarenes.  Indeed, Cole is remembered to this day as an esteemed missionary and 
a model of Christian compassion, although her testimony about her experience of entire 
sanctification shifted somewhat over the course of her life.  In her application for 
missionary service with the Church of the Nazarene, Cole indicated that she had 
experienced both conversion and sanctification in May of 1924, when she was only 
thirteen years of age and prior to what she described as her “fall from grace,” during her 
later teen years.  In a later account of her life, Cole related that she believed “she was 
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sanctified at the time she was definitely called to the lepers.”   This comment is 67
somewhat ambiguous; it could mean that Cole thought of herself as “already sanctified” 
at the time she received the vision calling her to leprosy work, but I would argue that the 
much more likely reading of the statement is that Cole believed that her call to leprosy 
work represented the moment when her life truly entered the “state of entire devotement 
to God” referred to in the Nazarene Manual.  The significance of this association between 
the central religious experience of her life and the call to leprosy work should not be 
missed.	

	
 In light of all this, I want to return at this point to Cole’s story with which I began 
this chapter.  It had been something of a disappointment for Cole that the Nazarene 
mission was unable to assign her directly to leprosy work upon application; it had been a 
specific point of inquiry during her interview process whether she would hesitate to 
accept assignment in general medical work, with only the promise of hoped-for 
involvement with leprosy work at some future point.  Cole, after praying on the matter, 
had consented to be sent to the Raleigh Fitkin Memorial Hospital in Bremersdorp to work 
alongside David Hynd, but the chance to interact with leprosy patients at Ncabaneni was 
of great significance to her.  In a later retelling of the same event described earlier, Cole 
provided an even more elaborate picture of her first encounter at Ncabaneni:	

When the service was over, a man whose face showed the scars of deep suffering 
stood in the midst of his people and made motions that he wished to speak.  With 
the aid of a stick he hobbled forward on his ulcerated feet.  “We are thrown-away 
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people and nobody cares.”  He spoke on and on telling of tragic separations: little 
children taken away from their parents, husbands from their wives, and wives 
from their husbands.  He then told of sufferings and sorrows unbelievable.  
Afterwards, he pleaded for help.  In closing he repeated his cry, “We are thrown-
away people and nobody cares.” 	
68!
	
 The notion of Swaziland’s leprosy sufferers as “thrown-away people” became a 
sort of motif in Nazarene language about leprosy in Swaziland that persisted throughout 
their work; one of Elizabeth Cole’s successors in leprosy nursing care used the phrase 
when speaking to me in 2008.  But the image barely corresponds with the evidence from 
this period that Swazis in general did not seriously stigmatize people with leprosy.  
Certainly, there is nothing about the words of Madolwane Mazyia that suggests 
victimhood.  So what do we make of the apparent discrepancy between the language of 
the man described by Elizabeth Cole and the letters of Madolwane Maziya?  	

	
 On the one hand, it would be easy to suggest that Elizabeth Cole simply 
misunderstood what she was seeing and hearing at the leprosy settlement.  We do not 
know the exact date of this encounter, but we know that Cole was a new missionary in 
Swaziland, having just arrived in the country in August of 1935.   She was listening to a 69
man speak a language that she did not understand, and it would not be surprising at all if 
she merely interpreted what was happening or the words that were being related to her 
via translation through her own particular lens of leprosy as among the very worst 
manifestations of both physical and spiritual suffering.  The story could easily have been 
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given an interpretive gloss in order to align it with the expectations of her Western 
Christian readers.  In this vein, of course, one might also suggest that Cole either 
fabricated the story or at least exaggerated the drama involved in the petition.	

	
 However, I would argue that something else may very well have been happening 
here, a process at work similar to the one that allowed Maziya and her fellow leprosy 
patients at Westfort to successfully motivate the establishment of the Ncabaneni 
settlement.  Perhaps the man appealing to Cole and the other Nazarene missionaries 
present understood that his petition to a Western missionary needed to be framed in a 
particular fashion, just as Maziya clearly understood that her petitions to the Resident 
Commissioner needed to be framed in a particular fashion.  Indeed, there are noticeable 
parallels between these historical accounts and my own experience in interviewing Gogo 
Shiba, the former leprosy patient I referenced in the Introduction.  Gogo Shiba informed 
me, in a speech laden with obvious pathos, that “No one cares for leprosy patients 
anymore,” as she explained to me the consequences she had suffered as a result of the 
functional ending of the leprosy program in Swaziland in recent years. There is, I think, 
no question that she understood very well the potential power of her very dramatic story 
to effect some change in her situation. In the case of the man Cole describes, we must 
concede, of course, that we know even less about his background than we do about 
Maziya’s. Yet even if the man in question had never previously encountered missionaries 
and their teachings, something that seems unlikely, there were clues in the very events of 
that day that might have helped him understand the language of Christian missionaries 
surrounding leprosy.  According to Cole, Dr. David Hynd had just concluded a message 
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to the leprosy patients centered around the text in Matthew 8:1-4, in which Jesus 
immediately follows up his delivery of the Sermon on the Mount with the healing of a 
man with leprosy who kneels before him petitioning for a cure.  Such a sermon would 70
have revealed much to a careful listener.	

	
 The man’s petition, however, was not solely a calculated act intended to  
manipulate Westerners by deploying language they could understand; rather, it clearly 
bears the imprint of core ideas rooted in Swazi culture. The act of petitioning in 
Swaziland is a dramatically performative one, and if the man in question desired help 
from someone in a superior socioeconomic position, he would readily have reverted to a 
very pathetic physical posture as well as using language that suggested extremity. In this 
way, he could communicate not just his own need but also his respect (inhlonipho) for the 
superior status of the other, a crucial organizing principle in Swazi society. Although she 
does not describe it in terms of inhlonipho, Hilda Kuper has described the creation of a 
system of social rank in the formation of the nineteenth century Swazi state, during which 
time the expanding power of the Dlamini clan during the reigns of Sobhuza I and Mswati 
II brought large numbers of other clan groups into relationships of dependent subjection. 
In Kuper’s assessment, as long as they accepted their inferior position with the expected 
humility, “Loyal subjects could anticipate protection from external foes and a limited 
security of person and property within a system of law.”  As we shall see below, this 71
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pursuit of “limited security” was likely an important consideration for Swazis living at 
Ncabaneni as members of a nation dealing with severe land shortages during this period.	

	
 Political relationships between clan groups are, of course, an inexact parallel to 
the situation Cole described at Ncabaneni, but Casey Golomski’s recent anthropological 
work on Swaziland on Swazi cultural responses to the crisis of HIV/AIDS highlights the 
persistence of this concept of inhlonipho or moral subjection, as he has termed it, at a 
more interpersonal level. In particular, he highlights the ways in which young people, 
especially in religious institutions such as Sunday schools, are firmly instructed to show 
deference to both God and their elders within their communities as a means growing 
towards adulthood and attaining their full social status.  In conjunction with Kuper’s 72
work and James Ferguson’s recent work on the concept of dependency throughout the 
region, we can begin to identify the contours of a Swazi strategy for dealing with the 
confounding social inequalities instituted by European rule in this region, one firmly 
rooted in their own cultural habits.  In chapter four, we will see this strategy come even 73
more fully into practice at the Mbuluzi Leprosy Hospital.	

	
 In saying this, I do not mean to suggest that everything happening at Ncabaneni 
on the day in question was somehow entirely an artificial construction.  Instead, I see 
what happened on the day Elizabeth Cole first visited Ncabaneni as a demonstration of 
the dynamic and adaptable nature of human culture.  Swazis like Madolwane Maziya and 
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the man appealing to Elizabeth Cole remind us that, even as they encountered a new kind 
of modern/Western existence with its particular expectations and understandings of the 
world, they quickly mastered those concepts and developed the intellectual and cultural 
tools necessary to make this new world livable and even beneficial for themselves.	

	
 This chapter has focused very narrowly on a few years surrounding the opening of 
the Ncabaneni settlement, between 1932 and roughly 1936.  Two remaining points are 
necessary regarding the subsequent twelve years of its existence.  The first is that the 
small settlement grew quite rapidly after 1934, reportedly without much encouragement 
or incentive from the British government.  One year after the arrival of the first patients, 
Jamison reported that, “three further Swazi lepers have at their own request been sent to 
this settlement and that others have been making enquiries about it.”   By July of 1936, 74
the number had grown to fifteen total patients at Ncabaneni, not including two of the 
original patients who had been discharged.   Two years later, the number was twenty-75
one, and by October of 1939, almost exactly five years after its opening, the number had 
reached forty-three.   All of this growth apparently took place in the absence of any 76
further efforts on the part of the government to identify or isolate Swaziland’s leprosy 
population, though one suspects that many of the new patients may have heard about the 
settlement from European doctors.  	
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 If there is little reason to suspect that these men and women were being pushed 
out of their homesteads because of their illness and if there was no organized strategy for 
gathering them, why did so many Swazi leprosy patients come to Ncabaneni?  One 
explanation might be perceived optimism about a cure.  In 1937, Swaziland’s 
Government Secretary wrote to the High Commissioner, Sir William Clark, explaining, 
“Jamison says that the results of treatment at the present small settlement near Mankaiana 
... have exceeded his expectations and some cases which made no improvement at the 
Pretoria Asylum have apparently been cured.”   It was Jamison’s hope that discharging 77
some patients as cured would lead others to come in, and perhaps this was the case for 
some of those new arrivals.  Unfortunately, the government’s minimal investment in 
Ncabaneni meant that they were keeping no records of case histories which might answer 
that question definitively.  	

	
 But 1937 is the last mention in government correspondence about patients being 
discharged from Ncabaneni, and the optimism about providing cures via treatment seems 
to have waned quickly, a subject we will return to in a moment.  But if optimism about a 
cure was short lived, why did patients come?  The other explanation might be that the 
quick growth of the Ncabaneni settlement was a sign of land pressure elsewhere in 
Swaziland.  Relatively little land was available to Swazis in their own country as a result 
of the British Partition, and the pressure on that land seems to have been increasing 
steadily during this time period. In fact, Hamilton S. Simelane has identified the 
mid-1930s as a period during which the number of Swazis evicted from European-owned 
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land was growing measurably.  It is probable that some of the patients who came to 78
Ncabaneni were individuals with few other alternatives who believed that the settlement 
represented a kind of social and economic security, even for their dependents.  In 1946, 
there was one known case of an uninfected woman whose husband had leprosy moving 
into the Ncabaneni settlement along with her husband and their five uninfected children.   79
Even when government offered her a social welfare subvention to support her family 
outside the settlement, she refused to leave, a decision that regrettably resulted in two of 
the children contracting leprosy.  For a woman such as this, reportedly destitute and 
lacking other relatives to fall back upon, the settlement at Ncabaneni was not a panacea, 
but it offered basic security.   If the men and women there could not necessarily control 
the land themselves, they could at least hope for some access to land for gardening and 
feel confident of receiving a regular ration of meat from the government.  The 
correspondence from this period suggests that only a minority of the patients suffered 
noticeable physical disability, which suggests that many of these patients were, in fact, 
seeking some kind of opportunity or security.	

	
 The relatively rapid and apparently unexpected growth in patient numbers 
undoubtedly caused some deterioration of the living conditions at Ncabaneni, though the 
few oral testimonies I collected from people with memory of Ncabaneni do not suggest 
anything like the abject squalor that Cole and Hynd depicted in their correspondence, 
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particularly not at such an early stage in the life of the settlement.  But this brings me to 
my final observation about the Ncabaneni settlement, which will help set the stage for 
chapter three.  Even as Ncabaneni grew, Westerners, both missionary and government, 
quickly turned on it as an unsatisfactory solution to the leprosy situation in Swaziland, 
primarily because the infrastructure and staffing in place at Ncabaneni did not permit 
them to exercise adequate supervision of the patients’ lives and behaviors.  In 1939, for 
example, Dr. D. Drew, who had replaced Jamison as Principal Medical Officer in 1937, 
and the Resident Commissioner had to ask Sobhuza and his council to intervene at the 
settlement because of reports about male and female patients living together, which 
violated both British moral and medical sensibilities.  When Sobhuza had his local chief 
investigate, an even longer list of complaints emerged from the patients and the Swazi 
supervisor at the site, including complaints that men were asked to bury the bodies of 
deceased female patients, a task which they felt belonged to members of the same gender 
as well as to close kin of the deceased.   Drew resolved this issue by having bodies 80
buried by prison labor, but it was clear that Ncabaneni had become a place of clashing 
cultural expectations. 	
81
	
 Even Jamison himself had passed judgment on Ncabaneni as an inadequate step 
prior to his retirement.  As early as 1935, he had taken to declaring Swaziland as “... one 
of the few countries in the world where practically no attempts are made to deal with 
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Leprosy.”   In light of this and other similar declarations, it is apparent that Jamison’s 82
optimistic 1937 assessment of the benefits patients received at Ncabaneni was intended to 
help persuade his superiors in the government to stay invested in leprosy work in 
Swaziland and to further the chances of its financing the construction of a larger leprosy 
colony that could adequately house and treat the sixty to one hundred patients that 
Jamison had come to believe needed it.  Jamison continued to press for this even though 
he himself recognized that there had been little in the way of medical advancement for 
treating leprosy.  In 1936, he argued that the main reason why it was important to 
continue providing Swazi leprosy patients with injections was their “great psychological 
effect on the native.  It gives him the belief that practical interest is being taken in his 
case and without it the chances of prolonged voluntary stay in a settlement are remote.” 	
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 This, in the end, represented Jamison’s final assessment of what was necessary to 
aid leprosy patients.  They needed to be removed from the context of their homes in order 
to improve their access to good food and sanitation, as well as a psychological shift in 
their thinking about their illness.  Ncabaneni could not provide this because it so quickly 
became overcrowded, but also because the buildings on the site were of the traditional 
Swazi type, which Jamison and others believed were quite unhealthy because they 
provided inadequate light and fresh air.  The arguments Jamison made were almost 
enough to accomplish his aims.  In the end, two things seem to have prevented the 
government from proceeding with plans to build a new leprosy settlement.  The first was 
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Jamison’s own retirement in 1937, which caused High Commissioner Clark to postpone 
one proposed version of the settlement, presumably to let Jamison’s successor have a 
voice in such a significant expenditure.  The second, and ultimately much more 
significant obstacle, was the onset of World War II in September of 1939, which caused 
money set aside in the budgets for 1940 for the new leprosy settlement to be cut 
completely.  Ultimately, Ncabaneni would remain Swaziland’s only leprosy settlement 
until 1948.  The story of how that new institution finally came into existence and the 
cultural tensions that it embodied make up the subject of chapters three and four.  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Chapter 3 
Leprosy and Modernity : Western Visions of Institutional Medicine at the Mbuluzi 
Leprosy Hospital	
!!
The Mbuluzi Leprosy Hospital’s relatively short life in Swaziland from 1948 to 
1982 corresponded closely with the critical transformations in the medical treatment of 
leprosy. Previously perceived by many as a sinister, disfiguring, easily transmissible, and 
difficult to treat disease whose victims had to be excluded from the daily activities of 
their own societies, the year 1948 saw the introduction of sulphone therapies, the first 
routinely effective treatment for leprosy sufferers.  Mbuluzi, thus, was largely planned 
and built as an institution that fulfilled a vision outdated almost as soon as it became a 
reality.  Though the linkage between Mbuluzi’s founding and the advent of sulphone 
therapy was entirely coincidental, the same cannot be said for Mbuluzi’s closing in 1982.  
In 1981, the World Health Organization recommended a course of treatment known as 
Multi-Drug Therapy, which is now used around the world and has rendered leprosy 
routinely curable; furthermore, Western medical doctors had finally become convinced 
that leprosy is relatively difficult to transmit, which made isolation in specialized 
treatment institutions such as Mbuluzi unnecessary.  	

	
 This chapter analyzes the competing visions of medical care that lay behind the 
founding of Mbuluzi and the way that vision was enacted in light of developments that 
the founders could not have anticipated, including the dramatic shifts in medical 
knowledge, the World War II-era adjustments to the British philosophy of imperial rule  
especially as represented by the Colonial Development & Welfare Acts, and the steadily 
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growing influence of missionaries for the Church of the Nazarene.  Mbuluzi was a 
community shaped by Western scientific values and norms, but challenges to those ideals 
inevitably came from both within and without.  My argument through this chapter and the 
next is that, over the course of its life, Mbuluzi became steadily less and less an 
institution of Western medicine and increasingly a site of Christian pilgrimage, a place 
defined more by its spiritual resonance than by its medical work.  In this chapter, the 
focus will be on the creation of an institution of medicine; in the subsequent chapter, I 
will explore more thoroughly the emergence of the spiritual.  In both cases, I want to 
explore the ways in which Swazis responded to the efforts of Westerners to establish their 
idealized vision, despite the fact that their participation was often consciously excluded 
from key decision-making processes.	

	
 Although the institution established at Mbuluzi formally bore the title of a leprosy 
hospital, it was rare indeed for the term “hospital” to be applied to the institution 
anywhere save in the titles of annual reports submitted by the supervising medical officer.  
Instead, people more commonly referred to the institution as “the settlement” (the 
preferred word of British administrators) or “the colony” (the word used more commonly 
among the missionaries).  Even within their annual reports, medical supervisors like Dr. 
David Hynd would use this language to distinguish between the “hospital,” the one 
building at the site where inpatient treatment could be delivered to particularly acute 
cases, and the “colony,” which generally referred to the much larger range of buildings, 
people, and activities connected to the maintenance of community life at Mbuluzi.  But, 
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in most circumstances, words like “colony” simply became a shorthand reference for the 
entire institution and its medical, social, and spiritual functions.	

	
 In this way, Hynd and his contemporaries followed closely the common practice 
of people throughout the British Empire and the rest of the English-speaking world.  As 
explained in the first chapter, Rod Edmond’s recent work highlights the proliferation of 
this term in Western society and helps us understand better the particular visions of 
control and containment that lay behind the use of such a word.  Understanding this 1
perspective helps explain why Ncabaneni was not in any way the sort of institution that 
would fit a Western vision of leprosy care, and why the various people who commented 
upon the situation at the settlement were so ready to condemn it, even if their narrative of 
misery and rejection had to be forced.  There was little hope that the settlement, with its 
small size and immediate proximity to the road connecting Mbabane and Mankaiana, two 
seats of the British administration, could ever provide the kind of isolation envisioned for 
the prevention of contamination.  	

	
 In 1938, Sir Walter Johnson, the Superintendent of the Botsabelo Leper 
Settlement in Basutoland and a future Director of Medical Services for the High 
Commission Territories, confirmed this judgment of Ncabaneni.  Invited to Swaziland to 
advise the administration with regard to its leprosy situation, Johnson spent four days in 
mid-July, 1938, visiting the country to survey the needs.  In his report back to the 
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Resident Commissioner, Johnson characterized Ncabaneni as “very unsatisfactory from 
every point of view,” particularly as it had “no room for expansion and very limited 
ground for growing crops.”   Johnson’s declaration may have overstated things; he 2
himself conceded that the settlement’s patients, as far as he could judge, “seem to be 
quite reasonably happy.”  The site had virtues from other perspectives as well; as High 
Commissioner Clark had written the year before, the government’s overall aim was to 
avoid building an institution that would require a resident doctor or European nurse, 
rather than just a Swazi supervisor.  This was, of course, chiefly in order to address 
concerns regarding funding. 	
3
	
 Johnson’s relatively extensive report on Swaziland’s leprosy situation went on to 
define the contours of the approach that the government would pursue in the years ahead, 
though the onset of World War II would lead to significant delays in bringing it to reality.  
Johnson, concluded from his investigation that leprosy was a relatively rare condition in 
Swaziland, which suggested there was a unique opportunity to eradicate the illness before 
it had the opportunity to spread significantly, a conclusion very much in keeping with 
those reached by others such as Hynd and Jamison.  Pursuing this aim of eradication 
required a two-pronged approach in Johnson’s estimation: first, the gathering of more 
concrete data about the extent of Swaziland’s leprosy situation, and second, the 
development of institutional resources for providing care to all identified cases of leprosy 
in the country. The implementation of each of these strategies warrants careful review 
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and reveals a great deal about the vision of the British government and others of what a 
proper institution for dealing with leprosy should be.	

	
 Regarding his first recommendation, Johnson acknowledged that the most 
thorough way of gathering the necessary information would be to conduct a full leprosy 
survey, which would mean hiring a trained medical officer and a team of trained Swazi 
assistants to visually inspect as many as possible of Swaziland’s estimated 130,000 
inhabitants.  This possibility, however, he discounted for several reasons: the considerable 
expense involved, the inevitable slow progress of the survey given the dispersed nature of 
Swazi homesteads, and finally, the unnecessary alarm he believed would be caused by 
carrying out the relatively invasive, full-body inspections that a survey would require.  	

	
 Instead of a survey, Johnson suggested that the Swaziland administration emulate 
a model currently in use in Basutoland: the hiring and training of one or two Swazis to 
serve as leprosy inspectors, charged with the responsibility of identifying additional 
leprosy cases by examining family members of known patients and other cases reported 
by chiefs to the authorities.  During his visit, Johnson had discussed this proposal with 
Sobhuza II, who had approved of the idea and indicated that he could help “find a reliable 
man who would have authority.”   The “authority” to which Johnson refers here is a good 4
deal more than just the medical knowledge to identify a leprosy case; the man in question 
would need to wield sufficient social influence to be able to persuade identified leprosy 
cases to enter the leprosy institution without compulsion.  It is telling that Johnson and 
the rest of the British administration apparently believed that the best way of investing 
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such authority in a person was via the assistance of Sobhuza, a tacit, and perhaps not 
entirely conscious, recognition of the limits of their own legitimacy in Swazi eyes.  
Whatever the case, Johnson’s recommendations clearly acknowledged that for any 
method of information gathering to be an effective tool in leprosy control, it would 
require the consent and cooperation of local people. Johnson recognized that it could not 
be assumed that such consent and cooperation would be a foregone conclusion, and as the 
case turned out, he could scarcely have been more correct.	

	
 It was not until 1946 that the Swaziland administration got around to pursuing this 
information gathering work, and when they did, the wisdom of Johnson’s suggestions 
was rather heartily affirmed, though chiefly in the breach.  By 1944, Swaziland had 
finally received the large cash infusion that it needed to deal with leprosy, by way of a 
£27,300 grant out of the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund.  As Hamilton Sipho 5
Simelane has pointed out, CD&W money was the “most important innovation in the 
relationship between the metropolis and the colonies” during the 1940s (and probably 
before or after), in that it vastly increased monies available for development in Africa.  6
The purpose of the money, first disbursed in 1940, was twofold: to stave off criticism of 
empire and calls for decolonization, voiced by Americans and others around the world, 
 134
 Walter Johnson, “Report on the Visit of the Director of Medical Services for the High Commission 5
Territories to Swaziland, 3rd-26th February, 1944,” File 674, SNA.
 Hamilton Sipho Simelane, Colonialism and Economic Change in Swaziland, 1940-1960 (Kampala: 6
JANyeko Publishing Centre, 2003), 9.
by fostering a more philanthropic image of the British Empire and to mobilize colonial 
resources both for wartime and for the postwar recovery process. 	
7
	
 Although Simelane argues convincingly in favor of the latter purpose as the 
primary motive overall, the philanthropic purpose seems more apropos in the case of 
Swaziland’s grant for leprosy work, which could hardly be expected to have a significant 
economic effect. The primary purpose of the CD&W money was for construction of a 
leprosy hospital, but it also prompted the hiring of Albert John Sowden, a leprosy field 
worker for BELRA.  Sowden brought with him 7 years of prior experience in leprosy 
work, having worked for BELRA in both Nigeria and Sudan before coming to Swaziland 
in November of 1944.  The transition to Swaziland was not an entirely smooth one for 
Sowden: he had agreed to the transfer in large part because an illness to his wife had 
prompted the decision to leave Sudan, and then word had come less than six months after 
arrival in Swaziland that his mother in the U.K. had only a few months left to live, which 
caused him to depart suddenly for six months of leave in March of 1945.  In the 
meantime, there had been significant delays in getting the road to the site of the new 
Mbuluzi settlement built, as well as a seemingly endless round of negotiations related to 
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Sowden’s compensation, as a result of his secondment from BELRA to the Swaziland 
administration. 	
8
	
 It was out of those protracted negotiations that the decision to have Sowden carry 
out a full leprosy survey emerged, contrary to Walter Johnson’s earlier cautions.  Johnson 
and the Swaziland administration still seemed to intend to follow the basic outline of 
information gathering by means of Swazi leprosy inspectors and saw Sowden as a 
welcome addition because he had experience in supervising construction work and would 
play a long term role in the development of the work at Mbuluzi.  But Sowden’s superiors 
at BELRA felt that “it would not be the most profitable use of an experienced and 
efficient worker ... if Mr Sowden’s activities were confined to looking after a home for a 
small number of lepers while nothing was done regarding those, possibly many more, 
who were outside it.”  Such demands for a broader range of activity were part and parcel 9
of BELRA’s approach to leprosy at this time; John Manton, for example, has identified 
the implementation of a leprosy survey as one of the conditions of assistance associated 
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with a grant it was considering for the Ogoja Province in Nigeria, although in that case, 
that particular condition was eventually withdrawn. 	
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 BELRA further pressed the point by soliciting the opinion of Dr. Ernest Muir, 
BELRA’s Medical Secretary and at the time perhaps the world’s most influential voice on 
matters of leprosy care.  Muir, while admitting that he had no direct knowledge of the 
Swaziland situation, offered his assessment that it was Swaziland’s remarkable good 
fortune to be receiving a man as experienced as Sowden and that he ought to be put to the 
greatest use possible:	

It has been accepted generally in our Colonies that leprosy can never be 
controlled by segregation of known lepers alone.  Leprosy becomes infectious 
long before it becomes conspicuous and easily recognisable.  So the infection is 
spread before the leper is recognised and segregated.  Hence the need for 
following up contacts, examining school children, educating the public, etc.  
These are all things that Sowden is able and willing to do.  Of course if the 
Swaziland authorities wish only to provide a refuge for advanced cases, and have 
no desire to control the disease, that is a different matter. 	
11!
	
 Caroline Elkins has argued that the singular credo guiding the administration of 
the British Empire was “always to ‘trust the man on the spot,’” but this case illustrates the 
limits of that trust and the ways in which local officials could be influenced by expertise 
devoid of context.  Muir undoubtedly knew that his statement on the matter combined 12
with the desire of British colonial officers everywhere to ensure their efforts compared 
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favorably with those in other places meant that there was little chance Swaziland would 
explicitly commit itself only to constructing a hospital refuge for severe leprosy cases.  
Indeed, no one in the Swaziland administration offered any prolonged resistance to 
BELRA’s arguments, and by August of 1945, even Walter Johnson was referring to the 
“real need” for a leprosy survey in Swaziland.  The start of the survey work, however, 13
had to wait until after Sowden’s six month leave, which commenced in March, 1945, just 
four months after his first arrival in Swaziland.  In the end, the project did not begin in 
earnest until midway through the year 1946.  It would not be long before Sowden began 14
to encounter difficulties.	

	
 The first recorded step in initiating the survey was to have Mr. Sowden, backed by 
Swaziland’s new Director of Medical Services, J.C. Callanan, appear before a meeting of 
the Government Secretary with the Paramount Chief and his Councilors at Lobamba on 
August 23, 1946.  There, Sowden laid out his case for conducting the survey and the 
critical need for assistance from the chiefs in getting people to turn up for examination.  
Sowden couched the survey as part of a wider “system of control,” which would, if 
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properly carried out, “mean that at the end of 50 years there will be no leprosy in 
Swaziland.”  Sowden understood the survey as an essential component of that system of 
control, but he recognized also that it was quite invasive, as examinations required that he 
do more than examine hands and faces.  As he explained to the councilors, “It is no good 
just looking at hands because leprosy is not often first developed in the hands.  I want to 
see the whole body.”   In effect, Sowden’s request to the council was that he be given 15
their permission and support to visually inspect the nearly-nude bodies of almost 200,000 
Swazis in order to identify cases of an illness that, in the very same statement, Sowden 
himself had declared affected no more than 200 people in the country.  The strategy 
appears to represent, in nearly equal parts, the hubris of the colonial mindset rooted in 
scientific optimism and the grim determination of the British to exercise control over the 
contagion of leprosy.  No amount of effort seemed out of proportion with the perceived 
necessity of eradicating the disease as a medical threat to human wellbeing.	

	
 The councilors of Sobhuza II had words of both support and caution for Sowden 
at their meeting.  One of them had a wife who had been sent away from Swaziland, most 
likely to Pretoria, many years earlier in order to receive leprosy treatment, and he warmly 
welcomed news that promised the end of the disease in that country.  Several asked 
questions about the diagnosis and spread of the disease, which they regarded as a 
relatively new one in Swaziland.  When one of them suggested that they would need time 
for discussion about a course of action, Sowden informed them that he had already 
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decided on a strategy, as he planned to travel with District Commissioners on their tax 
tours to various parts of the country, starting the very next week at Piggs Peak.  Most of 
the councilors immediately saw problems with this strategy, as the elderly, women, and 
children did not commonly turn up at these tax camps and doubted whether a special 
appeal for their attendance would be adequate.  However, sensing that Sowden was not 
anxious to change his plans, one of the councilors simply observed that the plans he had 
already made for visiting Piggs Peak should proceed, as they would undoubtedly “... 
enable Mr Sowden to get useful experience of the difficulties he will have to face.” 	
16
	
 The existing files do not tell us whether Mr. Sowden actually did go to Piggs Peak 
or whether he shifted his strategy after the meeting.  We do know, however, that Sowden 
soon began working on arrangements for the leprosy survey to be conducted at the royal 
kraal in Lobamba, which he hoped would elevate the public profile of the survey and 
increase the level of cooperation that he received. What ensued was something of a 
comedy of errors.  The government’s First Assistant Secretary presented Sowden’s 
request to the Paramount Chief’s council on September 6, and the council passed on the 
request to the Ndlovukazi, the Queen Mother, who responded quite swiftly on September 
9.  The trouble was that her response indicated that Sowden should come to Lobamba the 
very next day, a logistical impossibility.  At the next meeting of the Paramount Chief’s 
council on September 27, the administration repeated the request, while stressing the 
need for adequate warning of a suitable date.  Sometime between the September 27 
meeting and a subsequent meeting on October 18, Sowden did visit Lobamba for the 
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purposes of conducting a survey of the inhabitants of the royal kraal.  The results had 
been exceedingly disappointing:	

(Sowden) had examined only 33 people and many people were away from the 
kraal.  There had been no discipline and youngsters had been peeping into the 
office while he was engaged in examining people. He would be prepared to 
arrange to come another day if he could be assured that the people would turn out 
properly and some order could be maintained. 	
17!
	
 Sobhuza reacted decisively to the news of this disappointment, directing most of 
his displeasure at one of his councilors, J.J. Nxumalo, who had been charged with 
facilitating Sowden’s visit.  Nxumalo protested that he had fallen ill on that day and been 
compelled to leave the survey site, though he acknowledged that the real trouble was that 
there had been inadequate attention to protecting patients from the inquiring eyes that 
routinely looked in through open office windows, which caused others to refuse to 
participate.  Another councilor added that there had been inadequate time to inform 
people of the need to turn out for the survey.  Sobhuza refused to accept any of the 
various excuses, specifically admonishing Nxumalo for trying to pass on the 
responsibility for organizing the survey to the Ndlovukazi instead of seeing to matters 
himself.  He ordered that another date be arranged, yet a virtually identical scene played 
out at the council’s meeting on November 15, when Sobhuza “enquired whether 
arrangements had yet been made for a second visit by Mr. Sowden and took Councillor 
J.J. Nxumalo to task when he found that nothing had been done.”  One week later, 18
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Councilor Nxumalo’s absence from the meeting made it impossible to fix any date for a 
follow up visit.   By February of 1947, Sowden had made two additional visits to 19
Lobamba, but the turnout apparently continued to be unimpressive. 	
20
	
 The inauspicious beginnings at Lobamba proved a relatively accurate indicator of 
the progress of the leprosy survey throughout the country more generally. Sowden 
continued the survey work through the opening of the Mbuluzi Leprosy Hospital in 
September of 1948 and into 1949, but the results rarely varied.  By the end, Sowden had 
developed a remarkably disdainful attitude towards the people of Swaziland.  His 1949 
report on work done in the southern region of the country encapsulates his frustrations:	

The people of this area are typically bush veldt indigents; indolent and inert, the 
male population seem to have no apparent respect for their Chiefs or the 
Administration.  A comparison between the number of Tax-payers on the register 
and attendances at the Tax Camp will justify this criticism.  Despite this, I have no 
doubt that the attendances would have been improved upon had the Chiefs and 
Ndunas passed on to their people the information given them concerning the 
Survey.  I personally spoke to two Ndunas and arranged to visit their area four 
days later, when I arrived there I found that, despite their insistence that they had 
called their people, kraals within shouting distance of the Nduna’s were ignorant 
of the purpose of my visit.  Dates and times seem to have no significance for the 
inhabitant of the bushveldt and the kraal to kraal search for “utshwala” (kaffir 
beer) seems to be the full time occupation for the majority. 	
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 The problems forecast in Sowden’s first conversation with Sobhuza’s councilors 
had proven to be just as troublesome as they had predicted.  Sowden had attempted to use 
the Tax Camps for the survey, but had learned relatively quickly that it was nearly 
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impossible to get entire households to turn up for inspection there, as the payment of 
taxes required only the presence of chiefs and headmen from surrounding communities.   22
And concerns about the privacy of the inspections continued to crop up.  In September of 
1948, when Sobhuza’s councilors heard complaints from the administration about the 
lack of cooperation given to Sowden in the Stegi district, including the assertion that 
there was some evidence of people with leprosy being intentionally concealed, the 
councilors noted that “the lack of cooperation on the part of the Chiefs might in part be 
due to the fact that Mr Sowden had not made arrangements in past surveys for the 
examination of womenfolk in private.” 	
23
	
 The assertion that he had paid inadequate attention to issues of privacy provoked 
a rather forceful reply from Sowden, defending the steps he had taken to address the 
issues. Sowden acknowledged that problems had existed in early stages of the survey, but 
protested that this was chiefly because he had been working “...single-handed - and that 
when engaged in the examinations one is intent on the work in hand with no time to 
observe the wilful activities of the umfaans or those of the would-be ‘peeping Tom.’”   24
Sowden had attempted to amend his strategy in later surveys by employing a policeman 
at the survey site, whose job was to monitor the orderliness of those waiting for 
examinations and to help keep members of the opposite sex apart from one another.  
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Furthermore, whenever possible, he made sure that women were examined in the 
presence of the chief’s head wife, or her appointed substitute, and more recently he had 
been accompanied by Nora Earnshaw, the Coloured nurse from the Nazarene mission 
who was now part of the staff at the Mbuluzi Leprosy Hospital, which had just opened 
the previous month.  Meanwhile, examinations of men took place in the presence of the 
chief and often the Assistant District Commissioner, and all examinations took place 
indoors or in a Bell Tent that Sowden carried with him on his survey visits.  He had 
endeavored to “observe any tribal custom” of which he was aware and had attempted to 
accommodate those who requested private examinations or who were denied access to 
the chief’s kraal for any reason.   Women wore their skirts during the exam and men a 25
loin cloth.	

	
 The accumulated list of defensive declarations in Sowden’s letter clearly 
demonstrates his exhaustion with the questions about his concerns for people’s privacy, 
as well as his frustrations with the work in Swaziland.  Nor did his protest have the 26
desired result.  At the following meeting of Sobhuza’s council, Sowden’s letter was read 
in full, only to have one of the council members explain that, “...their main objection had 
been to the fact that groups of women had been examined at one time, instead of 
singly.”   Whether Sowden made any attempt to accommodate this additional 27
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prescription for solving his problems with the survey is not clear, but if he did, it is 
extremely unlikely that it made any measurable difference in his results. 	

	
 Certainly, in terms of the lived experience of the majority of the people Sowden 
reached in the survey, there was nothing about the way in which he had carried it out that 
would have been recognizable as a means of addressing health concerns. Nowhere in the 
literature on traditional Swazi healing practices will one find descriptions of people being 
examined en masse in search of illness; rather, individuals or family units would seek out 
a healer with a reputation for skill in dealing with particular complaints. A consultation 
with a Swazi traditional healer might involve diagnosis by a wide range of methods, 
including trance-induced divination, the throwing and reading of bones, or the oral 
rehearsal of symptoms by the patient. What particular methods the healer employed 
would depend upon the particular complaint and/or the training of the traditional healer in 
question.  Yet none of this makes up the substance of the council’s complaints against 28
Sowden; instead, they repeatedly focus on the issue of the privacy of women during their 
examinations. This complaint makes relatively little sense coming from a council that 
even in these years had actively initiated a national umcwasho, a chastity rite for women 
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in which participants wore no more clothing than they did during Sowden’s examinations 
and whose general attitudes towards the female body and female sexuality could only be 
regarded as considerably more relaxed than those of the British.  This, perhaps, was yet 29
another example of Swazis making use of Western language and norms to accomplish 
their own ends, as discussed in the previous chapter. Whatever the case, it seems evident 
that the endless debates about the privacy of patients were actually an indirect way of 
communicating to Sowden that the Leprosy Survey was simply not a priority. 	

	
 From the Swazi perspective, Sowden was pouring a relatively immense amount of 
energy into addressing an illness that had never affected very many people and that had 
never been a source of special concern. Sowden and the administration’s failure to align 
their priorities with the social, cultural, and economic concerns of Swazis undermined 
any chance they might otherwise have had of obtaining necessary local cooperation.  
What Sowden and Callanan critiqued as apathy on the part of Swazi leadership regarding 
the wellbeing of their people was more likely the result of a simple calculation of the 
benefits of the survey as compared to the effort involved in making it succeed.   This sort 
of failure of alignment when it came to the priorities of people was certainly not a 
problem uniquely confined to Swaziland’s administration.  Melissa Graboyes’s work on 
medical research in East Africa demonstrates that the failure to align priorities and values 
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often frustrated medical researchers who found that living, breathing Africans 
consistently refused to accept objectification in the way that photographs and cadavers 
had during the researchers’ training. 	
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 Despite the problems, the Leprosy Survey was not a complete failure as a tool for 
information gathering.  For one thing, it had not become, as Walter Johnson feared it 
would be back in 1938, the cause of unnecessary alarm among Swazis.  The full-body 
inspections that Johnson thought might be the cause of this alarm had been a bone of 
contention, certainly, but there is nothing in the records of the Swaziland Leprosy Survey 
to suggest that these inspections caused people to feel anything stronger than annoyance 
or embarrassment.  Swazis were apparently not quite as ready as Johnson expected to 
take on Western stigmatization of the disease.  Secondly, the survey did uncover some 
additional cases of leprosy, many of whom became patients at Mbuluzi and underwent 
successful treatment. One of my informants in Swaziland was a student at the South 
Africa General Mission’s high school just a mile removed from the site of the Mbuluzi 
Leprosy Hospital.  Diagnosed by Sowden as a part of his survey work, she became one of 
the first patients at Mbuluzi, where she met her eventual husband. After completing their 
treatment, the two of them married at the hospital’s church; he eventually became 
hospital chaplain, and she worked there as a teacher for many years afterwards.  Finally, 
the survey work convinced Sowden that leprosy’s distribution in the country was 
essentially nodal, with the greatest concentrations in the northern and western highveld 
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regions of the country.   This observation held up reasonably well during the following 31
decades of leprosy work in Swaziland; even as Swaziland’s public health system grew, 
few cases of leprosy came out of the lowveld regions that dominated the country’s 
southern and eastern portions. 	

	
 These modest victories, however, were inadequate to counteract Sowden’s 
conviction that the Survey had been a failure.  In his final report from the Hlatikulu 
District, he wrote, “I am convinced that no Survey has yet given the true picture of the 
incidence of leprosy - it has been only too obvious that a number of cases have evaded 
examination.”  During the three years of the Leprosy Survey, Sowden had accumulated a 32
long list of explanations for its failures to achieve his vision of success.  Each of them 
placed the blame squarely on other people, primarily on the Swazi people.  Aside from 
his earlier comments about the laziness of the people (especially in the lowveld) and the 
disregard of their leaders for timeliness or communication, Sowden had blamed the 
“Swazi’s fear of witchcraft,” which prevented people from giving “any information 
freely.”  On this point, he enjoyed considerable support from Callanan, the Director of 33
Medical Services, who thought Swazis compared poorly to other African peoples whom 
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he judged as having a “more enlightened attitude ... towards measures designed for the 
general welfare of the community.” 	
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 But Sowden also found fault with the actions and policies of his fellow British 
officers in Swaziland, arguing, for example, that the policies followed in the 
establishment of the Ncabaneni settlement had naturally led to a situation in which the 
“fear of segregation for life is ever-present” for Swazis affected by leprosy.   Sowden 35
was also not overly impressed with the initiative shown by government officers in 
supporting his survey work, though he was always careful to tread cautiously around this 
subject.  For example, in his year end report on the Leprosy Survey for 1947, Sowden 
had gone to great lengths to praise Mr. Fanin, the Assistant District Commissioner for the 
Mankaiana District.  Although given only a few days notice, Mr. Fanin had personally 
accompanied Sowden to the kraals of many chiefs in his district, a task that had required 
the two of them to walk nearly 60 miles in a week by Sowden’s estimate.  Fanin’s 
personal engagement was important not just to Sowden but also reportedly to the chiefs 
they visited; many of them indicated that Fanin was the first A.D.C. to visit their kraals.  
The end result had been perhaps the most successful local survey in terms of cooperation 
in Sowden’s entire experience.  The positive depiction of Fanin’s engagement and effort 
stood as a tacit critique of other officer’s who did not invest the energy and time that 
Fanin had. 	
36
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 In light of these failures, Sowden favored a shift in strategy, particularly with 
regard to the leprosy situation in lowveld areas where incidence appeared to be quite low.  
Instead of relying upon the survey, with its obvious dependence on local cooperation, as a 
primary instrument for identifying new cases, the administration now puts its faith in 
something that offered them a greater sense of certainty and control: an institution 
grounded in science. The objective would now be to use the anticipated positive 
testimonies of patients discharged from the new Mbuluzi Leprosy Hospital as inducement 
to motivate other potential cases to come to Mbuluzi voluntarily.   This view enjoyed the 37
full support of the administration’s Principal Medical Officer, J.C. Callanan who felt that 
in light of the survey’s manifest failures, “The propaganda results of treatment must be 
our sheet-anchor in the attempt to eradicate the disease.”  In suggesting this change of 38
strategy, Sowden and Callanan in essence affirmed the position that Sir Walter Johnson 
had suggested for Swaziland back in 1938 when he argued that a full scale leprosy survey 
was unlikely to produce satisfactory results and favored instead the concentration of 
energy on the construction of a new hospital facility for leprosy patients, as the most 
important step in remedying Swaziland’s leprosy situation.	

	
 In laying out this second facet of his strategy for leprosy control, Johnson had 
focused most of his report on describing the kind of institution he felt Swaziland needed, 
as well as the costs associated with operating such a facility.  At the time, there were 
essentially two options under consideration.  One site was in the Mankaiana District, just 
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a few miles from the site of the Ncabaneni settlement, and the other was a site near 
Bremersdorp, which had been proposed as the site of  a joint venture between the 
missionaries of the Church of the Nazarene and the government.  Johnson saw virtues in 
both proposals, but ultimately favored the government site near Mankaiana.  His 
reasoning was relatively straightforward: the Manakaiana site offered appropriate 
isolation, located more than a mile off the road between the government station for that 
district and Piet Retief; it was native land which the Paramount Chief was apparently 
prepared to yield for this purpose; it offered reasonably suitable ground and water supply 
for agricultural production; and its supervision could be readily taken over by Mr. Lunnis, 
the Mankaiana hospital assistant who was already responsible for visits to the patients at 
Ncabaneni.  The only significant drawback of the site, in Johnson’s estimation, was that 
its isolation was almost too complete.  Mankaiana was a tiny administrative station, well 
off the main roads between Mbabane, Bremersdorp, and Hlatikulu, the economic centers 
in Swaziland.  Johnson anticipated that this would make it difficult to provide the “social 
service for the patients which is a valuable asset in their treatment.” 	
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 The Bremersdorp proposal represented nearly the inverse problem.  Johnson felt 
that the site was too near the growing town, which would make appropriate isolation of 
the patients difficult, perhaps even impossible.  In that same vein, the proposed site 
already had a number of Swazi kraals located near it, and was on native land in a part of 
the country where higher population density meant that land was already quite scarce.  
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He also suspected that the geography of the area would require extensive anti-malarial 
measures, and had additional concerns about schistosomiasis.  But, more than any of 
these issues, the problem that Johnson gave the most emphasis was his concern that 
allowing a mission to operate the leprosy work would inevitably create more problems 
than it would solve.	

	
 On the one hand, Johnson was quite certain that the Nazarenes intended to use the 
leprosy work as an opportunity for gaining new converts to their mission.  This, he 
thought, was not a serious problem at the time of the report, when by far the largest 
portion of the Swazi population was still categorized in the census as “heathen.”  
However, “as the country becomes more christianised it may become important.”  The 40
problem, in other words, was not that the government was trying to discourage links 
between medical work and mission evangelization, as from their perspective the 
conversion of increasing numbers of people to Christian faith out of Swazi traditional 
religious life was nearly inevitable.  Rather, the problem came from the government’s 
need to avoid appearing to favor one mission’s activities over another and their 
conviction that the Nazarenes would likely use the leprosy work as an opportunity to 
poach converts from other missions.  It was not evangelizing that they wanted to prevent 
but proselytizing, the word that administration officials consistently used in discussing 
this particular issue and which implied the idea of taking people from one Christian 
denomination into another. At a leprosy colony operated by the government, there would 
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be opportunity for every mission to “make provision for the religious exercises of their 
particular converts,” while under Nazarene guidance, Johnson doubted “if any other 
church would be permitted to obtain a footing in the settlement.”	

 	
 The other problem in cooperation with the Nazarene mission was Johnson’s 
perception that the moral stringency of the Nazarene missionaries posed a significant 
challenge to segregation. Tensions already existed in Swaziland at this time between 
missionaries of many denominations and the Swazi state under Sobhuza II who, three 
years prior to Johnson’s visit, had reinstituted the umcwasho, the national reed-cutting 
rituals that marked a transition for female Swazis into maturity.  Because the ceremony 
involved costume that missionaries regarded as sexually provocative, they had vocally 
expressed their opposition to the event, which had compelled Sobhuza to make 
participation voluntary.  But if the missionaries in Swaziland more generally expressed 41
hostility to elements of traditional Swazi culture, the Nazarene mission stood out as being 
particularly conservative. As explained in chapter one, holiness denominations such as 
the Church of the Nazarene certainly had high expectations for members, relative to their 
lifestyle choices.  Of particular relevance in this case were the denomination’s 
instructions for church members to avoid the use of “tobacco in any of its forms” and 
“intoxicating liquors as a beverage.”   On the subject of alcohol, the Manual further 42
declared that, “The Holy Scriptures and human experience alike condemn the use of 
intoxicating drinks as a beverage... Total abstinence from all intoxicants is the Christian 
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rule for the individual, and total prohibition of the traffic in intoxicants is the duty of civil 
government.”  	
43
	
 Knowing how explicit the Nazarene prohibitions were, Johnson was concerned 
that the mission would try to extend such strictures to the leprosy institution.  Although 
he thought that medical staff should discourage the consumption of what he called “kaffir 
beer,” the traditional home brew of the Swazis and other neighboring African peoples, 
Johnson maintained on the basis of his experience at Botsabelo that, on the whole, its 
availability made for greater contentment among the patients, thereby more than 
compensating for the troubles that also resulted.  The prohibition on tobacco he found 
entirely unreasonable, and he feared that such restrictions would pose considerable 
obstacles to convincing patients to remain at the new institution for the lengthy period of 
time that would often be necessary.  As Johnson saw it, Swaziland’s new leprosy colony 
should employ a model of voluntary segregation, yet he believed that it would often 
require “considerable pressure on the part of the chiefs... to prevail upon patients to go to 
the settlement,” and in the case of highly infectious patients, “there must I think be a 
clause in the Public Health Regulations which will be required to allow for compulsory 
treatment.”  In other words, this vision of voluntary segregation was one that carried 
significant coercive power behind it, and Johnson feared that this combination of coerced 
isolation and mission morality would create a potent discontent among Swaziland’s 
leprosy patients.  Johnson’s priorities align well with Edmond’s analysis of the Western 
fixation with isolation as the chief purpose of a leprosy colony.	
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Johnson’s feelings on the problems of sharing the leprosy work with the Nazarene 
mission were not unique to him, nor even to the Swaziland administration. In many parts 
of the British Empire, colonial administrators dealt with rivalry and competition between 
missions.  This was particularly acute when Catholic and Protestant missions found 
themselves in proximity to one another, but even many Protestant missions struggled to 
cooperate well with other Protestants.   When Swaziland’s Resident Commissioner, C.L. 44
Bruton, wrote to Sir Edward Harding, the British High Commissioner, in 1940, regarding 
the plans for leprosy work, he echoed Johnson’s sentiments, referring to “a certain 
amount of antagonism between the various missions,” which he thought might lead to 
“reluctance on the part of other Missions to send their followers to an institution run by a 
rival mission.”  Bruton hardly felt the need to contain his disdain for this problem: “I 
appreciate it is incredibly petty but it nevertheless exists.”  Inter-mission rivalry, 45
however, was not the only factor contributing to Bruton’s disdainful attitude towards the 
Nazarene mission.	

Bruton further supported Johnson’s conclusion that the “rigid views” of the 
Nazarene mission on alcohol and smoking were likely to be a serious impediment to 
establishing an effective leprosy colony.   From the administration’s perspective, then, it 46
was clear that the first choice would be to go their own way rather than to cooperate with 
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the Church of the Nazarene.  This reality runs somewhat in tension with the dynamics 
described by other scholars regarding leprosy care in other African contexts.  Megan 
Vaughan describes leprosy as the “one medical problem of Africa” that remained a 
“missionary ‘baby’” late into the twentieth century, and Kathleen Vongsathorn has 
described leprosy as a natural point of cooperation between the Uganda colonial 
administration and both Protestant and Catholic missionaries because of the ways in 
which leprosy work made possible “enacting the ‘civilising mission.’”  The contrast 47
between the Swaziland and Uganda situation appears to be primarily a consequence of 
the fact that the Nazarenes were by and large an American mission with evangelical and 
holiness leanings, while in Uganda, the administration was dealing chiefly with Anglican 
missionaries from the Church Missionary Society. British colonial administrations may 
well have been open to sharing responsibility for leprosy care with missionaries, but this 
was apparently not quite as automatic a partnership as some scholars have assumed; it 
took a certain convergence of shared values, financial pressures, and personnel to bring 
these sorts of partnerships into existence.	

In the end, of course, the Swaziland administration and the Nazarene mission did 
join hands in a cooperative leprosy venture at Mbuluzi, but the sequence of events that 
brought this about was hardly straightforward, taking a full decade to play out in its 
entirety. Understanding the process of negotiation that created the eventual partnership 
provides some interesting insights into the limits of mission-government cooperation and 
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the seemingly slight but very real differences in their approaches.  From the mission 
perspective, the ultimate goal was connected to the spiritual resonance of leprosy work, a 
theme that will be explored more carefully in chapter four, but the limitations were 
related to financial resources and the necessity of receiving government approval from 
both the British and the Swazi administrations. From the perspective of the British 
administration, the goal was to build a modern colony that could maintain a level of 
isolation in keeping with their vision of controlling leprosy as a public health concern, 
but they likewise were limited, especially by the financial exigencies created by the onset 
of World War II.  These realities dictated the ebb and flow of negotiations towards 
mission/government partnership.	

The tensions inherent in the government position were visible in the very same 
1940 letter in which Bruton had informed Harding of the reasons why he thought that 
joining hands with the Nazarene mission was problematic.  For all his misgivings, he also 
had to concede that Hynd’s offer to operate a leprosy settlement merited consideration 
given that “Government funds are not available.”   Harding readily agreed to Bruton’s 48
suggestion, underlining the point that no additional money would be forthcoming from 
U.K. sources for some considerable period of time, but laying down the stipulation that 
the mission must agree not to proselytize among the patients and allow ministers of other 
denominations access to the members of their congregations.  In this way, the 49
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administration hoped to achieve the objective of opening an institution for leprosy 
treatment without stirring up what they saw as unnecessary trouble for themselves. 	
50
Fortunately for the government, in the intervening period between Johnson’s 1938 
report and this 1940 decision to revisit the idea of a partnership with the Nazarenes, the 
administration had been careful not to share any more information than was absolutely 
necessary with Hynd, who had maintained a keen interest in knowing the government’s 
plans with regard to leprosy but who knew nothing specific about their concerns 
regarding a possible partnership with the Nazarene mission.  As explained in the two 
previous chapters, Dr. Hynd had been working diligently for more than a decade to 
position the Nazarene mission as a natural partner with the government of Swaziland in 
leprosy work, an effort bolstered in 1935 by the arrival of Elizabeth Cole.  One of the 
chief reasons why Sir Walter Johnson had been invited to Swaziland, in fact, was that 
Hynd had initiated a conversation about leprosy with Dr. Drew, Swaziland’s principal 
medical officer,  in early May of 1938.  Still in his first year as the principal medical 
officer, Drew knew only that conditions at Ncabaneni had become “deplorable,” and 
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preferred to draw in outside expertise before committing to any additional course of 
action, which ultimately brought about Johnson’s visit in July of that same year. 	
51
Even as the government drew in Johnson’s expertise and planned its course of 
action, Hynd had not been passively waiting for their decision, though his interaction 
with government officers about the leprosy work had lulled considerably since the failure 
of his 1930 proposal, described in chapter 1.  Hynd seems, however, to have perceived 
that the late 1930s were the right time to revive his initiative regarding leprosy work.  The 
retirement of Jamison, the “failure” of the Ncabaneni settlement, and the addition of 
Elizabeth Cole to his nursing staff created a conjunction of events in which Hynd saw 
new opportunity.  So even before he reached out to Drew, Hynd was reaching out to his 
network of supporters hoping to find the resources to make the mission’s leprosy work a 
reality.  	

His first approach, in November of 1937, was to the Mission to Lepers, with 
whom he had initiated communication during his furlough of 1931-32.  Soliciting help 
from a Christian organization, Hynd emphasized the fact that Ncabaneni provided 
nothing from “the religious point of view” and appealed for their assistance in covering 
many of the startup costs, which he estimated at £400 chiefly for buildings, and the 
salaries of a native evangelist (£60/annum) and a nurse matron (£120/annum).  Hynd’s 52
request was a substantial, but not unreachable one, for the Mission to Lepers. The 
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proposed salary for the native evangelist, for example, would have represented a wage on 
the upper end of the pay scale for ordinary Swazis. By comparison, a Swazi miner in 
1940 received no more than about £12/annum, though they could also expect to have 
food and housing provided during their periods of employment. Closer in value, a driver 
in the Public Works Department would receive approximately £48/annum with quarters 
but no food provided.  The wages for the nurse matron, on the other hand, were modest 53
compared to rates for people in comparable positions; in the late 1940s, a European nurse 
working at one of Swaziland’s mines received £360/annum.  With this support in hand, 54
Hynd believed that he could persuade the government medical department to provide the 
funding necessary for general maintenance of the settlement.	

The initial response of the Mission to Lepers was receptive, but after their 
Executive Committee reviewed the proposal in early 1938, they decided not to support 
the Swaziland work, primarily because they saw signs of possible government reluctance 
in cooperating with a missionary society. This, they thought, might leave both the 
Nazarene mission and their own organization with too great a responsibility in terms of 
both financial contributions and personnel.  They advised Hynd that they would have 
preferred to see a situation in which the government was approaching Hynd about the 
partnership, rather than the other way around.   Word of this rejection would have 55
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undoubtedly been discouraging for Hynd, but, in a coincidence that would surely not 
have escaped the notice of the missionaries, on the very same day on which the General 
Secretary of the Mission to Lepers wrote to Hynd, May 23, 1938, another source of 
support materialized.  Hiram Haskin, a long time friend of Elizabeth Cole from Montana, 
wrote to Emma Word, the General Treasurer for the Church of the Nazarene, enclosing 
with his letter a gift of $500 intended to support the construction of buildings for a 
leprosy colony.  Haskin’s gift was further supplemented by his designation of an 
additional $2200 from his life insurance policy to be paid out upon his death.  Haskin’s 
letter indicated that his gift, given in memory of his late wife who had been “keenly 
interested in (Cole’s) chosen work among the lepers,” had already been discussed with 
Cole and Hynd, and the knowledge of Haskin’s support had surely played some part in 
encouraging Hynd to reach out to Drew earlier in the month. 	
56
Haskin’s support bolstered Hynd’s initiatives, but $500 U.S. was only £100, 
which brought the resources of the Nazarenes to about £200 on hold for leprosy work, 
only about half of the amount that Hynd had hoped to receive from the Mission to Lepers 
for buildings alone.  So while Hynd and his fellow missionaries may have been masters 
of stretching financial resources to the utmost, he knew that he needed to use this gift to 
leverage his position with the Swaziland administration.  To this end, he wrote to Drew 
on June 16, 1938, offering a detailed proposal for the Bremersdorp site and requesting a 
commitment from the government of £500 in capital expenditures for building 
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construction and an additional £500 per annum towards maintenance.   This proposal 57
would have constituted a significant savings for the administration; Johnson’s proposal 
following his visit the next month called for expenditures that at least doubled each of 
Hynd’s estimates. But by the time Drew received this proposal, he had already settled on 
a visit from Johnson as the next step in his decision-making process, and so made no 
formal reply to Hynd’s offer.	

The outcome of the report was, of course, not at all favorable to Hynd’s proposal, 
despite the potential financial savings, for all the reasons outlined above.  Nevertheless, 
neither Drew nor anyone else communicated anything about the results of the report to 
Hynd, which left him to initiate communication with the administration once again.  
Hynd first reached out to Drew and was told that Johnson’s report had been forwarded to 
the offices of the High Commissioner and that he would have to request details of the 
report from them.  Hynd wrote to the High Commissioner’s Office in November 
requesting “the privilege of seeing a copy of the report as we have many mission friends 
who are interested in doing something to alleviate the condition of the lepers in 
Swaziland...”  Hynd went on to indicate that he understood from Drew that Johnson had 
some reservations about the Bremersdorp site and went on to state, “If that were the only 
objection I am sure another site could be found.” 	
58
The reply to Hynd demonstrates clearly just how much the government wanted to 
avoid alienating Hynd.  H.E. Priestman, the High Commissioner’s Administrative 
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Secretary, explained to Hynd that Johnson’s report was classified as a confidential 
government document, but that he had been authorized to share the main objections 
Johnson expressed to the Bremersdorp proposal.  These, according to Priestman, were 
chiefly related to the concerns about malaria and schistosomiasis, the proximity to 
Bremersdorp, and the presence of Swazi homesteads around the site.  The letter omits 59
entirely any hint of Johnson’s more thoroughly elaborated concerns about the moral 
strictures of the Nazarene mission regarding tobacco and alcohol or the fear that 
missionary control would further the unseemly scramble among Swaziland’s Christian 
missions for converts, something that many administration figures seemed to accept as a 
near inevitability. It must surely have struck Hynd as incongruous that the one issue on 
which he had preemptively expressed flexibility, the question of location, was the only 
objection seriously raised in Priestman’s response, yet there was no opening for further 
discussions at this time.  The government clearly intended to go its own way.	

Though it had gone completely unmentioned in the correspondence to this point, 
all of this activity had been carried out in the shadow of growing Nazi power in Germany 
and looming fears of another major war for Great Britain.  Johnson’s visit to Swaziland 
came just four months after Hitler’s Anschluss, which united Germany with Austria, and 
just three months prior to the Munich Conference negotiations, which handed over 
Czechoslovakia’s Sudetenland to the Nazis.  The looming uncertainties about the 
intentions of the German state undoubtedly figured somewhere in the calculations of the 
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Secretary of State’s Office when, in January of 1939, they indicated to the High 
Commission government that, although they supported Johnson’s proposed Swaziland 
leprosy project in principle, they would need to see corresponding fiscal cuts in other 
areas since the proposed expenditures had not appeared in the initial estimates for 
1939-40.  Freeing up additional money was simply not in the equation.  Furthermore, 60
when Drew wrote to his Government Secretary in Swaziland indicating that he could not 
justify the kinds of cuts that would consequently be necessary to make the leprosy 
settlement a reality during the current fiscal year and acknowledging that it would, 
therefore, be necessary to delay action one more year, he coincidentally did so on the 
very same day in which Nazi forces completed the occupation of Czechoslovakia by 
seizing Prague.  And when David Hynd wrote to Hiram Haskin to inform him that the 61
Swaziland government had “not come to any definite decision yet about (a cooperative 
leprosy work),” it was six days after the Molotov-Ribbentrop Non-Aggression Pact 
between the Soviet Union and Germany, which opened the door to the invasion of Poland 
just three days after Hynd wrote. 	
62
The fear of war may not have directly entered into the correspondence of 
missionaries and government officials regarding the foundation of a leprosy work, but 
once it came, everyone recognized its decisive effect.  Drew’s plan to ask for additional 
money in the 1940-41 estimates never came about, as British resources were directed to 
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the war effort.   For Hynd’s part, he recognized that the redirection of material resources 63
to the war effort had reopened the opportunity for the Nazarene mission.  As he wrote to 
Hiram Haskin in February of 1940, “The Government has no more money to allocate 
than what they have been allocating, and with Britain at war there is not likely to be more 
money that they could spend on developing their present place, so that they should be 
more sympathetic to my proposal.”  And, as mentioned earlier, Hynd’s calculations were 64
precisely right.  His June 24 letter to the Principal Medical Officer revisiting his earlier 
proposals and once again reaffirming the Nazarenes’ flexibility with regard to location 
was ultimately the impetus for the exchange of letters between Resident Commissioner 
Bruton and High Commissioner Harding in which they agreed that, subject to their 
specific conditions, a partnership with the Nazarene mission was the best approach for 
dealing with Swaziland’s leprosy situation.	

As a consequence of this exchange, Drew wrote to Hynd on November 27, 1940 
requesting the specific terms under which the Nazarenes “would be prepared to take 
charge of the leper patients of the Territory,” especially the 52 cases housed at Ncabaneni 
at the time of Drew’s writing.  In turn, Hynd responded with a burst of letter writing a 65
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week later on December 5, attempting to seize the opportunity that now presented itself.  
In his response to Dr. Drew, Hynd readily accepted the conditions of the government: the 
Nazarenes would not proselytize among the patients, nor would they deny clergy of other 
denominations access to their own converts.  He also agreed to abandon his original 
proposed site near Bremersdorp and submit alternative proposals for Drew’s approval just 
as soon as possible.  Interestingly, there was no mention in any of this communication 66
about the government’s concerns regarding the moral stringency of the Nazarene mission 
and the possible negative effects that this might have on the willingness of patients to 
stay at a leprosy institution.  The government’s concerns in this regard certainly did not 
go away; reference to these issues continued to crop up in internal correspondence and 
personal conversations in the years leading up to Mbuluzi’s opening in 1948.  However, 67
the government never openly pressed this issue in its correspondence with the Nazarene 
mission, a sign of the particularly pragmatic spirit that prevailed on this issue.	

Hynd’s other letters on that day were focused on the core issues he now needed to 
address: raising adequate money for the startup costs and finding an alternative piece of 
land.  For money, Hynd wrote to two supporters, Hiram Haskin back in Montana and a 
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Dr. Stauffacher, whom he knew as the representative of the American Mission to Lepers 
in South Africa. For land, he turned to his missionary colleagues in the South Africa 
General Mission (SAGM) whom he felt to be interested in leprosy work but also non-
competitors in this area, as they had no medical mission in Swaziland.   Hynd knew that 68
the SAGM had just recently completed a new church building at a large mission station 
called Bethany, located about 8 miles west of Bremersdorp and not far from the main 
road running from there to Mbabane. Would the mission, Hynd wondered, consider 
donating the 500+ acres of land surrounding the old church building as a contribution to 
the development of leprosy work in Swaziland? 	
69
The request was a bold one, but the SAGM responded sympathetically, though it 
took some time for them to clear the decision through the church hierarchy.  In fact, they 
seemed happy to cooperate.  The official reply, dated June 27, 1941, indicated that “the 
disposal of so much of the Bethany property in this way has given very real pleasure 
throughout the Mission.  We are glad that this property now that it is longer (sic) required 
by our Mission, is to be put to such blessed service and ministry.”   The only conditions 70
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attached to the grant of the land were that SAGM representatives would have the 
opportunity to visit the leprosy patients at the new institution, that any transfer and 
surveying fees would be the responsibility of the Nazarene Mission, and that, should the 
land ever cease to be a leprosy colony, the SAGM Executive wished to be consulted 
about its future use.	

Thus, June of 1941 was probably the moment when Hynd, Cole, and the Nazarene 
mission came closest to establishing a leprosy institution on more or less their own terms, 
and the tenor of Hynd’s correspondence from the period suggests his excitement and 
confidence in the emerging possibilities.  But questions of land were always tricky at best 
in Swaziland, and the momentum swung quickly in another direction.  Sometime in late 
July or early August, Hynd met the Resident Commissioner, the Principal Medical 
Officer, a representative of Sobhuza II, and the European settler whose farm was closest 
to the Bethany Mission on the site of the proposed new leprosy hospital to discuss the 
proposal.  At the meeting, the farmer and the representative of Sobhuza, whose royal 
kraal at Lobamba was nearby, both raised concerns about the use of the site.  Hynd 
initially felt that these concerns had been adequately addressed during the meeting, but by 
the middle of September, he had received word from Drew that the High Commissioner 
had vetoed the use of the Bethany site, primarily in response to these concerns.   	
71
Hynd refused to accept defeat and continued to correspond with Drew and others 
in hopes of finding an alternative solution, but he had clearly lost the initiative.  The 
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Nazarene situation was further complicated by Cole’s abrupt departure in early 1942 on 
furlough, a decision expedited by the news that her father was dying. In the end, it would 
be more than two years before Cole returned to Swaziland, as war conditions greatly 
complicated the process of booking her return passage to South Africa. The war also 
hindered the Church’s efforts to send additional missionaries to Swaziland, and Hynd 
found himself carrying an increasingly heavy load as the sole physician available for the 
growing medical work at Bremersdorp.  In the absence of Nazarene initiative and with 72
the initial shock of the war now behind them, the administration had begun exploring 
other options for leprosy care in Swaziland.	

If the crisis of the war during the years 1940-41 had inclined the British 
administration to pass the baton for leprosy care to a third party, the slow reversal of the 
tide of the war in 1942, after the stalling of Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union and 
the Allied victories at El Alamein, saw a corresponding increase in the assertiveness of 
the British administration in Swaziland with regard to leprosy.  For his part, Dr. Drew had 
become fed up with his inability to control the lives and actions of the patients living at 
Ncabaneni.  Whereas his report written in 1940 in the midst of the war crisis had 
expressed regret over the loss of the scheme for a new leprosy institution due to war time 
economies, his report submitted early in 1943 deplored the situation at Ncabaneni and the 
government’s lack of an alternative:	
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There were 50 lepers in the leper settlement at the beginning of the year, 13 were 
admitted during the year, none were released, but 8 escaped and there were 4 
deaths; one was transferred to an institution in the Union, leaving 50 inmates at 
the end of the year.  As yet there has been no improvement in the conditions under 
which the lepers are confined, and no decision has been communicated to the 
Medical Department as to a new and less primative (sic) institution for 
accommodating them.  It is not at all surprising that so many run away, when one 
takes into consideration the conditions under which they live at present. 	
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 Not everyone in the administration agreed that the situation was quite as bad as 
Drew depicted in his report.  One reader commented critically in response that the report 
gave “the impression that conditions which obtain at present are so bad as to be 
intolerable,” to which another responded emphatically, “They (conditions) are 
intolerable.”   However badly the representatives of the administration felt about the 74
conditions under which the people at Ncabaneni lived, they were not prepared to lose 
control of their movements, particularly when it came to those who opted to run away.  In 
late 1942 and early 1943, the government drafted a proclamation in accordance with 
Transvaal Ordinance no. 23 of 1904 to have Ncabaneni declared an asylum.  As 
explained in chapter one, this ordinance granted the government wide ranging powers of 
compulsion and meant that the people living at Ncabaneni would be in the legal custody 
of the state.   This increased assertiveness was likely the cause of a noticeable spike in 75
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the population of people living at Ncabaneni, such that one year after Drew’s report, their 
numbers had reached 63.  	
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 Though regarded as necessary under the circumstances, compulsion made for 
wearying work and contributed greatly to resentment among those who experienced it.  
So even as these steps were taken, the Swaziland administration had submitted an 
application for funds made available through the Colonial Development and Welfare Act.  
As Acting High Commissioner Walter Huggard noted in his cover letter accompanying 
Drew’s medical report for 1942, the hope was that this would allow them to create an 
institution “more in accord with modern ideas,” in order to attract cases voluntarily and 
“do away with the necessity for compulsory measures to secure the return to the 
settlement of lepers who have run away from it.”   Control was the ultimate objective in 77
this vision of leprosy care, and the administration recognized that control did not 
necessarily pair well with compulsion.  It was the success of that application for funds 
that made possible both the Leprosy Survey discussed earlier and the final selection of 
Mbuluzi as the site where a leprosy settlement would be established and their final 
concerted effort to enact their vision of control over Swaziland’s leprosy sufferers.	

	
 In February, 1944, Sir Walter Johnson returned to Swaziland for a three week tour 
of the territory in his new capacity as Director of Medical Services for the High 
Commission Territories.  Although his new job title required him to deal with a number 
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of issues regarding the development of Swaziland’s medical services, the chief priority 
was the final resolution of the settlement site question. In the almost six years since his 
previous visit, all of the previously considered sites had been rejected for various reasons: 
the Nazarene site at Bremersdorp primarily because of its proximity to the growing urban 
center and the SAGM mission at Bethany because of the objections of neighbors.  Even 
the site favored by the government near Mankaiana had by the time Johnson returned to 
Swaziland “been turned down on account of the heat and a superstitious reluctance 
against this area by the Swazis.”  What exactly Johnson believed that superstition to be 78
and how it compared in importance to the heat factor are, unfortunately, impossible to 
say. My research and personal inquiries have turned up absolutely nothing to substantiate 
the idea that there was any sort of significant belief about the area that might help provide 
some sort of context for the meaning of this statement. In fact, it is not at all certain that 
Johnson even understood personally what the superstition was; Johnson had a fairly 
reliable habit of using passive voice, such as he employed in his statement above, when 
talking about decisions that originated with other people. However, the fact that he either 
did not bother to inquire as to the substance of the claim or did not see any reason to 
include further comment in a report meant for government eyes only is a relatively good 
indicator of the extent to which the absence of Swazi voices typified the whole process of 
selecting a site for the leprosy hospital.	

	
 With the decision to abandon the previously identified possibilities, two new sites 
had more recently come under consideration.  One of them Johnson rejected because it 
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was land already under use by the Agricultural Department for raising stock and because 
it lay in a malaria zone. But the other site, along the course of the Black Mbuluzi River, 
both Johnson and Drew strongly favored. The site was a piece of government owned land 
that lay about 10 miles northeast of Mbabane, which would make it relatively easy for the 
government medical officer to provide supervision.  Like Mbabane itself, the Mbuluzi 
property was located in Swaziland’s highveld region, with an elevation well over 3000 
feet above sea level, which meant cooler temperatures and freedom from concerns about 
malaria.  Furthermore, its proximity to the Black Mbuluzi meant that there was a steady 
water supply that could be tapped by means of gravitation, and Johnson hoped it would 
be enough to also generate electricity for the site.  	

	
 The objections were relatively few. The site had relatively hilly terrain and rocky 
soils which meant that it was hardly an ideal environment for agriculture, but Johnson 
downplayed the idea that the colony should attempt to be self-sustaining.  What mattered 
was that the patients be kept occupied with work, not whether or not that work was 
ultimately very productive.  Besides, he argued, with the proposed 600 acres of fenced 
land for the settlement, there would be ample room for raising stock for both milk and 
meat. A second concern was that opening up the site would require a considerable amount 
of both labor and capital, including the grading of at least two additional miles of road 
that did not exist at the time of his report. Thirdly, the land was not uninhabited, with an 
estimated twenty families on the site, but because it was government-owned, these people 
were regarded as squatters and their removal would be far less complicated than it would 
have been on land that was in Swazi hands, which would have meant securing the 
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approval of Sobhuza, whose voice had been noticeably absent from discussions about the 
site for Swaziland’s proposed new leprosy hospital. 	

	
 Sobhuza’s absence from the conversation was telling and almost certainly not 
coincidental; in fact, relations between Sobhuza and the British administration under 
Resident Commissioner Featherstone and his predecessor Bruton had been notably tense 
since the years just prior to the start of World War II. The problems ran the gamut of 
issues that had regularly plagued British relations with Swazi leadership; the question of 
uniting Swaziland with the Union of South Africa had resurfaced at the outbreak of the 
war, for example. Sobhuza and the administration, furthermore, were nearing the 
conclusion of a prolonged and heated debate over the Native Authority Proclamation, 
which Sobhuza felt infringed upon his traditional powers, particularly his right to appoint 
and dismiss chiefs. And, of most immediate relevance to the Mbuluzi situation, there was 
continued controversy over land. At the very time of Johnson’s report, Sobhuza was 
disputing the implementation of a series of Native Land Settlement Schemes, which the 
British meant to address the Swazi demand for the return of land but which often did so 
in ways that favored private land ownership over the notion of all land belonging to the 
Ngewenyama.  By 1946, Sobhuza had initiated his own land purchasing arrangements 79
by means of the Lifa Fund, which required cattle owners to contribute ten percent of their 
cattle for purchasing land in the name of the monarchy.  In light of these swirling 80
controversies, the administration was undoubtedly happy to avoid asking for Sobhuza’s 
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input on virtually any decision, much less asking him to provide significant support for an 
institution that would displace more of his people.  	

	
 Johnson’s report may have marked the high water mark in British optimism about 
what could be done for leprosy in Swaziland.  Flush with the cash infusion of CD&W 
money, the administration was spending on development projects in unprecedented ways. 
In the context of these modernizing visions, the administration sketched out a somewhat 
grandiose scheme for what they could accomplish at Mbuluzi.  In short, the government’s 
expectation, as articulated by Sowden and Callanan, was that the attractiveness of 
Mbuluzi, derived from both its facilities and its medical effectiveness, would allow them 
to achieve their vision of controlling leprosy by means of isolation without resorting to 
compulsion. Swazis, in other words, would be anxious to embrace the isolation of 
Mbuluzi once they heard from others about its advantages. Furthermore, it would allow 
them to repatriate several Swazi leprosy cases who had entered the Westfort facility in the 
interim since Madolwane Maziya and her associates had been repatriated in 1934, which 
would alleviate pressure that the administration felt from South African authorities.   81
Lastly and most grandiosely, it seems evident that many within the government felt that 
Mbuluzi would allow them to eradicate leprosy swiftly.  While the public 
pronouncements made by Swaziland administration officials in this regard could be easily 
dismissed as a calculated public relations campaign, the internal correspondence of the 
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administration through the first few years of Mbuluzi’s existence shows that they 
genuinely expected the fulfillment of their optimistic public pronouncements. 	
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  The man who best encapsulated the optimism of 1944 was A.J. Sowden who 
settled in Swaziland late in that year ready to take on the challenges of leprosy care.  
Within months of arrival, Sowden published an account in the BELRA Quarterly 
Magazine exclaiming the virtues of Swaziland’s planned settlement, which he hoped 
would be “one of the finest equipped leper settlements in the whole of Africa.”  The 83
account emphasized the beauty of the location and the amenities to be provided to the 
settlement’s inhabitants: electric lighting, a school playroom for non-infected children, a 
herd of dairy cows, a work shed for artisan craftwork, and various recreational facilities, 
“including a bioscope.” 	

	
 Less visible in Sowden’s description of the virtues of Mbuluzi were the realities 
that he touched upon only briefly in noting the arrangement of the residences for patients.  
Mbuluzi’s relative expansiveness made it possible to segregate people in ways that had 
long been impossible at Ncabaneni.  The Mbuluzi settlement was laid out over nearly 
1000 acres of ground located on two neighboring mountainsides.  From the Mbuluzi 
River, which formed much of the property’s northern and eastern boundary line, the 
elevation rose steeply some 400 feet to the top of the first peak, which was the site of the 
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hospital, the kitchens, the agricultural buildings, and the housing for uninfected children 
and staff.  To reach the residential area for leprosy patients, one had to first descend 
towards and cross a small stream that flowed between the two mountains and then begin 
another ascent towards the concrete block structures that housed the patients.  	

	
 The structures themselves made possible further subdivisions among Mbuluzi’s 
residents.  At the top of the hill were two small units devoted to housing married leprosy 
patients; below them housing for the rest of the patients had been arranged in four 
separate divisions, laid out in a roughly square configuration across the mountainside, 
each with four buildings and able to house approximately 32 patients.  The two sets of 
structures on the eastern side were reserved for women, while those on the western side 
housed the men, accomplishing one of the chief goals of the administration by 
segregating the sexes.  But the creation of two areas for men and two for women also 
made it possible to envision further segregation by degree of infectiousness, with patients 
regarded as highly infectious removed from the rest of the population.  The distances 
involved in the layout of Mbuluzi’s buildings were not overwhelming; an adult walking 
at a steady pace could cover the ground between any two buildings on the property in 30 
minutes or less.  Yet the symbolic gaps between them and the clear geographical markers 
that defined the settlement communicated a clear message of division, whether along 
lines of race, sex, or disease, and the necessary isolation of these groups from one 
another.  The habit of many Europeans who worked at Mbuluzi of  referring to each of 
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the individual divisions as a “village” or “kraal” only reinforced the idea that categories 
of difference mattered a great deal in this environment. 	
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 Although the groundwork appeared to have been laid to achieve the 
administration’s vision of control without compulsion, the optimism of 1944 was 
relatively short lived.  Problems appeared almost immediately upon commencement of 
road construction in early 1945.  The sloping and rocky terrain made for difficult labor, 
while rainy season conditions further slowed the progress of work and often made the 
road out of Mbabane to the construction site impassable for larger vehicles carrying 
necessary supplies.  In addition, labor itself was in short supply for two reasons.  First, 
the rainy season was the period when Swazis focused their most intensive labor on their 
own gardens and thus would be less likely to be seeking wage employment.   Secondly, 85
Swaziland’s economy was experiencing a relative boom period, based especially on the 
expansion of its timber industry, sugar plantations, and other sectors that attracted direct 
foreign investment.  It was also during this early period that Sowden abruptly departed 86
on home leave upon receiving news of the illness of his mother.	
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 By March of 1946, a few months prior to Sowden’s commencement of the ill-
fated Leprosy Survey, construction was underway on the buildings at Mbuluzi, but the 
pace of the work did not significantly improve.  The chief obstacle was the one that had 
perpetually plagued previous schemes for leprosy control in Swaziland: finances.  Dr. 
Drew, in his final days as the administration’s medical officer, recently retitled the Deputy 
Director of Medical Services, wrote to the government secretary explaining that “the 
frequent revisions of plans necessitated by the fluctuating financial fortunes of the 
scheme” had undoubtedly caused “a good deal of confusion,” which was causing a 
number of issues in the construction, such as the failure to construct a garage for the 
superintendent’s house or the start of a home for a Swazi staffer for which there was no 
apparent use under the current scheme.   Just over two weeks later, Drew’s replacement, 87
J.C. Callanan, visited the Mbuluzi site in order to get himself up to speed on the state of 
this major undertaking that he inherited with his new position.   	
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 Within months, Callanan was exchanging snippy correspondence with E.R. 
Roberts, the Director of Public Works, about Mbuluzi.  Callanan clearly felt the need to 
advocate for a clear minimum standard that would not compromise patient health and that 
the decisions being made regarding construction standards were “likely to result in high 
maintenance costs, for which there is no financial provision.”   Roberts, for his part, 89
wanted to support Callanan’s expectations but clearly felt trapped by the conflicting 
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pressures that resulted from the urgency of completing the project, the necessity of 
building to a reasonably high standard, and the reality of financial limitations.  	

	
 In the midst of these concerns over finances, a decision was made to bring a select 
group of leprosy patients up from the Ncabaneni settlement to work under the supervision 
of Sowden at some of the essential tasks of preparing the grounds, such as the planting of 
trees. Roberts had some concerns about the idea of his labor crew intermingling with 
leprosy patients, but he indicated that “Enquiries give no evidence ... that strong objection 
will be made by the building gang...”  The plan, however, backfired before it could even 90
be implemented.  On August 31, 1946, the foreman in charge of the work at Mbuluzi 
wrote to Roberts to inform him that:	

All white labour refuses.  All unskilled labour refuses and there is no possible 
chance to persuade them as they will walk out as one man.  I have tried to tell 
them that they will be kept clear of the Lepers, but they still reckon that everyone 
of them will get the desease (sic).  I prefer the (Medical Officer) and yourself to 
come out and hear for yourselves. 	
91
As the only extant letter on this incident, there is no choice except to reason out what may 
have happened in this relatively unique incident.  On the one hand, one might well 92
anticipate the reaction of the European workers; we have seen that there was clear 
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evidence that the European population of Swaziland was legitimately, if perhaps not 
universally or equally, concerned about the spread of leprosy as a contagious illness.  On 
the other hand, I have argued in previous chapters that there is no evidence for leprosy 
stigmatization among Swazis, nor is there any reason to expect that the Swazi laborers at 
Mbuluzi would have been concerned had they had an unmediated encounter with the men 
that Sowden would likely have selected to bring to Mbuluzi. Being needed for manual 
labor, these men would logically not have been patients suffering from severe disability 
or manifesting leprosy in its most contagious (and usually visually dramatic) forms.  But 
everything about these circumstances was highly mediated through a European 
worldview, and in point of fact, no true encounter of any sort likely ever took place.  The 
striking workers at Mbuluzi, both European and Swazi, were responding not to a physical 
encounter with leprosy sufferers but to their fears of what such an encounter might mean 
for them.  It seems to be the first recorded example of Swazis learning to stigmatize 
leprosy by way of their exposure to Western ideas, a theme that will be picked up in the 
following chapters.	

	
 The end result of these budget problems and construction delays was that the 
facility that finally opened in September of 1948 was not at all what Sowden and others 
had envisioned when work had begun nearly four years earlier.  Far from being one of the 
“finest equipped” facilities in Africa, as Sowden had anticipated back in 1945, the 
facilities at Mbuluzi had no electricity until 1954, and telephone service was delayed 
several more years after that.  Several of the buildings were badly damaged in the first 
few years of its operation, in part because of cost cutting measures in construction, such 
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as the absence of lightning rods, a critical oversight for buildings that were to be located 
on exposed mountaintops.  In the first four years of operation, at least five buildings at 
Mbuluzi were struck by lightning and suffered serious structural damage as a result, to 
say nothing of the deleterious effect such incidents had upon patient morale.   But, 93
perhaps most significantly of all, Mbuluzi was no longer a purely government operation.	

	
 The missionaries of the Church of the Nazarene had never fully given up on their 
hopes of playing a significant role in leprosy work, but they did recede significantly into 
the background during the period between 1944 and 1947, as the administration 
spearheaded the work at Mbuluzi.  But the drawn out delays and the continually under 
revision financial outlook for the Mbuluzi scheme presented new opportunities.  In this 
case, it was not only the Nazarene missionaries who were suggesting the need to 
investigate alternatives.  For example, at a meeting of the Swaziland Development 
Committee in December of 1946, the Resident Commissioner, Government Secretary, 
and Director of Medical Services had faced pointed questioning from one settler about 
the Mbuluzi scheme, which he argued had been very poorly conceived from the start.  
Would it not, he wondered, be preferable even at such a late stage in the process  to start 
fresh in partnership with a mission society?  Leprosy work, he felt, was “more suitable as 
a Missionary than as a Government activity.” 	
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 A less overtly critical example was the letter of Mrs. Fernande Homan, who lived 
in Stegi, to Callanan requesting information that she could use for an article she was 
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writing about the new leprosy work, at least in part in hopes of raising some material 
support for the new work.  Homan was well informed about the Ncabaneni situation, 
which she said always “used to upset me terribly ... whenever we passed there.”   95
Although not a missionary, Homan was also quite well informed about the interests of 
Elizabeth Cole in work among leprosy patients, most likely because Cole had been 
working at the Nazarene clinic located in Stegi for the previous year, and she did not 
hesitate to inquire about the possibility of Cole being given a role in the work at Mbuluzi.  
Callanan’s response regarding Cole was noncommittal, but the renewed possibility of 
Nazarene involvement at Mbuluzi was only gaining steam.	

	
 Hynd himself had reopened communication with the government in April of 1947 
after he had been forwarded a copy of the minutes of the Swaziland Development 
Committee meeting the previous December, at which the question of scrapping Mbuluzi 
and revisiting the idea of mission partnership had been so pointedly discussed. His letter 
tactfully suggested that, “In view of the financial difficulties facing the Administration ... 
and in view of the great value of the social and spiritual factor in the rehabilitation of the 
leper I would be prepared to discuss ... the possibility of our Mission making some 
contribution to the solution of the leper problem.”  Nothing specific came of this inquiry, 96
though Hynd did receive an invitation to meet with Resident Commissioner Beetham to 
discuss the issue of leprosy the next time he was in Mbabane.  More might have come of 
Hynd’s inquiry were it not for the staunch opposition of Callanan.  When asked to 
 183
 Fernande Homan to J.C. Callanan, 20 October, 1947, File 100, SNA.95
 David Hynd to the Government Secretary, 7 April, 1947, File 100, SNA.96
provide his input regarding Hynd’s offer of assistance, Callanan first pointed out that 
expenditures at Mbuluzi had already exceeded £16,000 and that contemplating any 
change of location would, in light of the expenditures, be “foolhardy.”  And although he 
did not object to letting Hynd offer proposals that narrowly addressed the “sociological 
and spiritual angles,” Callanan was of the opinion that even turning over management of 
the work to a mission society, such as the Church of the Nazarene, could only lead to the 
neglect of leprosy prevention:	

Leprosy Control, which must play an important part in the general scheme, if it is 
to be successful, is a public health responsibility which cannot well be delegated 
to  a Missionary body, and the curative and preventive aspects of the problem are 
so closely associated, that they could not be divorced without creating serious 
administrative difficulties. 	
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 Callanan’s letter clearly suggests that he found the missionary approach to the 
practice of medicine to be an inferior one, out of line with the practice of medicine as a 
secular and scientific endeavor that delivered “control” of disease and environments.  It is 
not entirely clear how he reached this conclusion; he was not apparently overtly hostile to 
religion, as the letter itself left room for the Nazarene missionaries to make proposals 
regarding the “spiritual angles” of leprosy work.  Nor was he overtly hostile to having 
religious people involved in the practice of medicine.  For example, in late 1947 and 
early 1948, when the Swaziland administration entered into talks with the Nazarene 
mission about the possibility of having Elizabeth Cole seconded from the mission to the 
administration to work in leprosy care, Callanan was a major advocate of the transfer, 
calling the mission’s offer to release her for this work “most generous, and her services 
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would be of greatest value to (the Mbuluzi) institution, as she is keenly interested in 
leprosy work.” 	
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 Callanan did, however, seem to feel very strongly that the administration ought to 
keep direct oversight of the public health system in Swaziland, including the work of 
leprosy care.  For this reason, his relationship with Hynd and with the Nazarene mission 
in general was never strong; in fact, David Hynd’s son, Dr. Samuel Hynd, recalled 
Callanan as a very difficult man and recounted several stories of difficulties his father 
encountered in dealing with Callanan, including some that were rather public in nature.   99
Callanan, of course, was not the only administrator in Swaziland or elsewhere in the 
British Empire who saw missionary medical endeavors as somehow suspect or 
suboptimal, but it is also perhaps unsurprising in light of these tensions that when in 
March of 1948, the administration decided that it was time to approach Hynd about 
reopening the discussion of a formal partnership between mission and government, it was 
not Callanan, but Resident Commissioner Beetham who took the initiative.	

	
 On March 31, 1948, Beetham wrote Hynd a personal letter inquiring as to 
whether the Nazarene mission might still have interest in taking over the leprosy work, 
stressing both the private nature of the inquiry and its tentative quality until the financial 
implications could be clarified.   Given the investment that the Nazarenes had shown up 100
to this stage of the game, particularly in arranging for Elizabeth Cole to visit the Westfort 
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Leprosy Institution the previous December for three weeks of training prior to her 
secondment to Mbuluzi, Beetham likely felt quite assured of the mission’s response.   101
Indeed, Hynd’s response ten days later was warmly open to the administration’s proposal.  
The terms he laid out in that letter became, in essentials, the basis for the Memorandum 
of Agreement signed by the two parties in September of that year, after the basic scheme 
had received the necessary approvals from supervising authorities.	

	
 The memorandum essentially ceded all control of the daily operations at Mbuluzi 
to the Nazarene missionaries, placing Hynd in charge of the medical supervision and 
placing Sowden at his disposal, though retaining for him the privileges pertaining to other 
public service figures in Swaziland.   The government also agreed to pay the Nazarene 102
mission a fixed sum of £1574 annually for operational expenses and assumed the 
responsibility for building maintenance costs.  For their part, the missionaries agreed to 
staff the hospital with personnel salaried by the mission and to maintain the property and 
quality of care at a level deemed satisfactory by the Director of Medical Services who 
retained the right to call for any reports he deemed necessary to ensure the responsible 
operation of the institution. The agreement also ensured that representatives of the 
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administration, Sobhuza’s parallel government, or any recognized church in operation in 
Swaziland would have appropriate access to the people at the Leprosy Hospital.	

	
 Ensuring the oversight of the Director of Medical Services and the access of these 
particular persons to the hospital helped address some of the concerns that had been 
expressed over the years about turning over control of Swaziland’s leprosy program to a 
mission organization.  The access granted to church representatives, for example, was 
clearly intended to address concerns about proselytization, though the memorandum 
contains no specific language forbidding the Nazarenes from this practice.  The more 103
specific concerns that had been raised about the Nazarene mission and its holiness 
inclinations were left out of the memorandum; the agreement, for example, does not 
explicitly say anything about alcohol or tobacco.  Nevertheless, some understanding 
seems to have been reached on these points.   On alcohol, the mission stood its ground; 
Mbuluzi was a dry institution throughout its existence.  Many of the former patients I 
interviewed remembered sneaking off to get alcohol to have been one of the more 
common rule infractions, though this hardly seemed to have been rampant. The 
missionaries did make certain concessions, at least temporarily, regarding tobacco, which 
we know because Hynd was meticulous about thanking all contributors to the work at 
 187
 Existing missionary correspondence does provide evidence, however, that the missionaries were 103
sensitive to this concern.  In 1954, Elizabeth Cole wrote to David Hynd indicating that she had 3 or 4 
patients at Mbuluzi who were candidates for baptism and wondered whether this could be arranged during 
the upcoming campmeeting at the Bremersdorp mission station.  Hynd replied that he thought it unwise “... 
to baptise them (at Bremersdorp) while they are patients in the Colony, as we might have some 
repercussions.”  See Elizabeth Cole to David Hynd, 21 June, 1954; Hynd to Cole, 26 June, 1954, Box 2499, 
Unprocessed Correspondence, David Hynd Collection, NA.
Mbuluzi, even when their gifts could not have met his personal approval.  On November 
30, 1953, he wrote to a Miss Mearns of Mbabane: 	

Miss Cole informed me that you had some tobacco which you wish to give to any 
of the leprosy patients, who use it.  There are five who chew tobacco and one who 
smokes cigarettes.  If you will send the tobacco along to me, I will see that they 
get it, if their condition permits.  	

Thanking you for this gift and for the other things which come from 
Mbabane from time to time and which all the other patients can enjoy. 	
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It is possible to hear in Hynd’s letter a hint of the ways in which such compromises 
grated against his conscience and his vision for leprosy work, but they did little to 
dampen his fervor or that of Elizabeth Cole for taking up the work at Mbuluzi.  On 
Sunday, September 12, 1948, Hynd wrote to Cole who had recently moved to Mbuluzi 
still in limbo on the question of her secondment to the government for leprosy work,  “Dr. 
Callanan was on the phone with me 2 days ago, saying that the cable had been received 
saying we had to take over the Leper Hospital as from Sept. 1st.  So you see we are 
running it now!!!”  	
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 With an agreement finally in place, it still remained to open the hospital by 
populating it with patients.  Nearly fourteen years after the arrival of Madolwane Maziya 
and her fellow Swazis from Westfort, Ncabaneni now housed dozens of leprosy patients 
who needed to be transferred up to Mbuluzi.  Within a week of learning that the Nazarene 
mission had been approved to operate the leprosy work, Hynd and Sowden, accompanied 
 188
 Hynd to Mearns, David Hynd Collection, NA.  Even this concession was constrained by other rules in 104
place at Mbuluzi, which forbid smoking in the hospital building, the building used for church and school, 
or inside any of the residence buildings unless no one in the room objected.  See David Hynd’s memo, 
“Tobacco Smoking at the Leper Colony,” 6 February, 1951, David Hynd Collection, NA.
 Hynd to Cole, David Hynd Collection, NA.105
by some others from the Nazarene mission, had visited the people living at Ncabaneni to 
announce to them the new arrangements for leprosy care.  By Monday, September 20, the 
first patients were ready for transfer to Mbuluzi, with the sickest cases being transported 
by Sowden in an ambulance while others climbed into the back of a lorry with their 
possessions for the 36 mile drive into the mountains above Mbabane.  By Saturday, 
September 25, the move was largely completed, save for a few who temporarily remained 
at Ncabaneni to finish clearing out the place.   	
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  In the meantime, the Nazarene missionaries had worked quickly to appropriate 
the site in order to build its association with the religious symbolism of leprosy.  Before 
the patients were transferred, the missionaries assigned the “villages” in the housing area 
names, each evoking one of the fruit of the Spirit described in the fifth chapter of the 
Apostle Paul’s letter to the Galatians: Ekutandaneni (“love”), Ekujabuleni (“joy”), 
Ekutuleni (“peace”), Ekubekezeleni (“long-suffering”), and Emuseni (“gentleness”).  The 
entire settlement was named Tembelihle (“good hope”). By Sunday, September 26, 1948, 
they were ready for the official dedication of the Mbuluzi Leprosy Hospital.  Whatever 
disappointments existed in government circles about the shortcomings of Mbuluzi 
relative to the vision that had existed at the start of construction in 1944 were 
dramatically downplayed by the mission in a public display of renewed optimism.  
Marjory Burne, a young South African woman who was helping with office work in the 
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Bremersdorp hospital, published the fullest account of the dedication, capturing the 
prevailing optimism of the missionaries:	

The sun shone brightly on that Sunday morning ... and our hearts rejoiced.  On 
our arrival, Miss Cole, dressed in her white nurse’s uniform and radiantly happy, 
greeted us with these words, “It’s true, my friends, it’s not a dream!” One of the 
newly erected, white buildings was used for the service; for there is, as yet, no 
church.  This was an unusual service, and our hearts were strangely moved as we 
looked upon this congregation of lepers who were seated on one side of the hall, 
while the staff and visitors were seated on the other. 	
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 Burne’s narrative emphasizes the hopefulness of the moment, evoking the images 
of the bright sunshine and the whiteness of both Sister Cole’s nursing uniform and the 
building wherein the dedication service took place.  The “lepers,” by contrast, not only sit 
apart during the service but are described within Burne’s article chiefly in terms of their 
physical bodies as “deformed,” “diseased,” and “decayed.”  The service itself contained 
reminders of transformation the missionaries hoped would come about in the lives of 
these patients at Mbuluzi.  David Hynd preached a message that called on the patients to 
“determine to walk after the Spirit in their new home and not after the flesh.”  Another 
message, given by a Swazi Nazarene minister from the Bremersdorp area named J. 
Malambe, reminded everyone of the great love of God. By the time Agnes (Nema) Hynd, 
the wife of David Hynd, pronounced the benediction to close the service, “we felt that 
God had truly been with us.”   All of this dedicatory activity was carried out largely in 108
the absence of representatives of the Swaziland administration.  Given the administrative 
transfer of responsibilities and what it symbolized in terms of the vision for what kind of 
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place Mbuluzi would come to be, it was perhaps fitting that the guests of honor were 
Nazarene missionaries, as well as missionaries, a Swazi minister, and school girls from 
the neighboring SAGM mission station rather than the Resident Commissioner or the 
Director of Medical Services.	

	
 Present on that day but perhaps somewhat less than fully enthralled with this new 
dispensation for Swaziland’s leprosy work was A.J. Sowden whose relationship with the 
new Nazarene management of Mbuluzi would soon come to symbolize all of the clashing 
expectations that existed around leprosy. Sowden’s ideas about leprosy care as a modern 
medical endeavor and his understanding of himself as the lynchpin in its success would 
very quickly contribute to a breakdown in his relationship with Hynd in particular, but  
according to Burne, he played his role on the day of the hospital dedication well.  
Sowden, an Anglican who had been named a subdeacon in the Diocese of Zululand and 
who took up religious work back in the U.K. after his time at Mbuluzi, had addressed the 
congregation during the service, “pointing those who thirsted to Jesus, the source of the 
Water of Life.”   And Sowden had attempted to keep a positive outlook on things during 109
the delays of the previous years.  Early in 1948, he had published a piece in the BELRA 
Quarterly Magazine that sounded themes much like those used by the Nazarene 
missionaries to describe the leprosy situation in Swaziland.  It began with a “view of one 
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part of Swaziland,” in which Sowden recounted many of the standard tropes about life at 
Ncabaneni: uninfected children living with infected family members, the problems of 
overcrowding, the dilapidated structures, the misery of Swazi “lepers” with their 
mutilated bodies and apathetic spirits, living in “this financially forgotten corner of the 
Empire.”  	
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 The article then moved to the contrasting view of developments at Mbuluzi, and if 
Sowden’s earlier declarations about opening one of the “finest equipped leper 
settlements” were no longer in evidence, he could at least hold up the natural beauty of 
the settlement site, its spaciousness, and its provision for properly ordered care as reasons 
for hope.  And although BELRA was not an explicitly religious organization, Sowden 
nevertheless resorted to Christian imagery as he closed his article: “A difficult time lies 
ahead, but why should we fear?  At least one of the ten lepers returned to give thanks to 
the Great Healer, and we have never found the leper unthankful in the past.  Faith and 
trust will grow and give birth to the spirit of thankfulness which, like a leaven, will 
permeate the whole settlement.”  Kathleen Vongsathorn has recently described such 111
language as part of the standard approach for “selling leprosy” as a humanitarian concern 
within the British Empire, and Sowden’s appeal certainly checks off most of the key 
points that she has identified: using the Bible as a key point of reference, emphasizing the 
vulnerability of innocent children, and appealing for philanthropic generosity as a 
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measure of patriotic duty.  The particulars might vary in terms of emphasis dependent 112
upon the audience of a particular organization, but both Christian missions and secular 
humanitarian philanthropies such as BELRA relied upon these familiar themes in a 
relatively intense competition for funding.	

	
 Given their reliance upon these standard tropes, it might be easy to dismiss the 
parallels between Sowden’s language and that of the missionaries as superficial, and in 
some sense, this proved true.  Yet prior to the 1948 transfer of administrative 
responsibilities, Sowden and the Nazarene missionaries appeared to be well on their way 
to establishing a warm working relationship.  For example, as the missionaries and 
Sowden had their first introductions in 1945, Elizabeth Cole wrote that she was “very 
happy to hear Mr Sowden’s views concerning leper work and missions,” which had led 
her to think that “our mountain shall be removed before too long.”  In 1947, when Hynd 113
needed insights into the thinking of the administration regarding Nazarene involvement at 
Mbuluzi and specifically about finding a role for Elizabeth Cole, he exchanged personal 
and rather frank letters with Sowden in which Sowden expressed continued support for 
the idea of Nazarene involvement, especially by Elizabeth Cole.  Even at the point when 
the transfer of administration took place, Hynd was still writing sympathetically to 
Sowden, expressing his confidence that “our cooperation ... will mean something 
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worthwhile for these Swazi lepers whose mental, physical and spiritual rehabilitation is 
such a crying need.” 	
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 But by September of 1948, Sowden was just coming off his frustrating survey 
work in the Stegi district, and seemed to be souring generally on Swaziland. Moreover, 
there were significant signs of an emerging clash of cultures between himself and Hynd. 
In early October, when Hynd drew up a memo outlining the division of responsibilities 
for administering the Mbuluzi Hospital, Sowden responded very poorly to what he 
perceived as Hynd’s “distinct change of attitude towards me.”  In a lengthy letter of 115
complaint addressed to Callanan, Sowden explained on the basis of his reading of the 
memo and a conversation with Hynd that he felt he had been demoted unfairly from 
“Superintendent in charge of the Hospital” to merely “Lay Superintendent,” a title that 
Hynd had used to refer to Sowden’s position in one previous letter but that he had already 
agreed to cease using in a concession to Sowden’s protests.   As a consequence of the 116
demotion, Sowden felt excluded from “any matter relating to the treatment of the lepers” 
and consequently would be deprived “of the opportunity of sharing in the only side of the 
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work which offers any degree of encouragement.”  When Hynd responded to Sowden’s 117
letter a few days later, he tried to downplay the tensions, making reference to the clause 
in the administrative memo that left room for Sowden to carry out “any other duties 
assigned to him by the Medical Superintendent for the well-being and rehabilitation of 
the patients” as providing ample room for Sowden’s participation in the medical work.  
Besides, Hynd insisted, many of the duties assigned to Sowden in carrying on “schemes 
initiated for inculcating in the patients the ideal of self-help by teaching them handicrafts 
and the raising of their own food” were of “vital importance” and would likely “consume 
a large part of his time if they are to be done properly.”   Hynd eventually also agreed to 118
rewrite portions of the administrative memo to give Sowden more explicit responsibilities 
for patient treatment, which patched things up enough for the work to proceed at 
Mbuluzi, but the proverbial handwriting was on the wall. 	
119
	
 In the end, Sowden remained just under two years from the time that Nazarene 
administration at Mbuluzi took effect.  By the end of 1949, Sowden’s Leprosy Survey 
work had been completely closed down, and although there is no record of further public 
conflict between himself and Hynd, their relationship seems always to have been tense 
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and characterized by a thousand little slights.  They had terse exchanges over all manner 
of minor issues, for example, whether it was better to translate the name of the 
Ekubezeleni village as “long-suffering” (Hynd’s default translation) or “patience” (which 
Sowden felt to be less morbid), whether “Mbuluzi” should have a “u” at its beginning, 
whether Hynd had the right to open correspondence addressed to “The Superintendent” 
during periods of Sowden’s absence, whether patients should be granted an overnight 
absence from Mbuluzi, whether or how soon Sowden needed to inform Hynd if he 
himself had to depart Mbuluzi for emergency reasons, and more.  In one particularly 120
illustrative incident, Sowden had abruptly hung up on a phone conversation with Hynd in 
which the two of them had strongly disagreed about the participation of Mbuluzi’s newly 
organized Girl Guide troop in the King’s Birthday parade in Mbabane.  The disagreement 
started over Hynd’s reluctance to allow the girls to participate at all, but by the time 
Sowden hung up on him had degenerated into a squabble over who should be responsible 
for the lorry that would transport the girls to Mbabane and then through the parade in 
order to keep them segregated from the public.  The seven letters exchanged over two 
weeks both before and after the phone incident and the parade itself only further 
illustrated the tense relationship between the two men. 	
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 It is clear that neither party was overly distressed when the time came for 
Sowden’s departure; in fact, the Nazarenes were genuinely glad for him to go. Shortly 
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before Sowden’s departure in June of 1950, Hynd wrote to A. Donald Miller, the General 
Secretary for the Mission to Lepers in the U.K. who had recently visited Mbuluzi, 
commenting that, “Mr Sowden is going on his regular overseas leave in June.  For the 
reasons we mentioned to you when you were here, we would be very happy if he could 
find another sphere for his labours.”   Though the “reasons” were not enumerated again 122
in the correspondence, it seems not to have been entirely coincidental that Hynd 
immediately followed up his news of Sowden’s departure with expressions of hope for a 
season of special spiritual blessings in the leprosy work. Indeed, the view of Sowden as a 
chief obstacle to the advancement of the spiritual dimensions of the leprosy work was 
very much on the rise.	

	
 The suggestion that the missionaries had come to see Sowden as an impediment 
to the spiritual work at Mbuluzi is significantly stronger in Hynd’s correspondence with 
Elizabeth Cole, who had returned to the United States on furlough at the time.  In his first 
letter commenting on the Sowden situation, he remarked that, “Things go much better 
with them away,” and that, “If any opportunity arises to close the door for (their return) I 
shall certainly avail myself of it...”   Two months later, Hynd wrote again upon hearing 123
from acquaintances in Mbabane that Sowden “was taking holy orders and was not 
coming back.  ‘Taking holy orders’ in the church of England means getting ready for 
ordination as a minister!!”   Hynd’s double exclamation points expressed his 124
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astonishment at the idea of Sowden becoming a minister, as he noted in a subsequent 
letter to Cole, “... with the news of Mr. Sowden not coming back I believe the spiritual 
help and blessing which can be given to these unfortunate souls (the patients at Mbuluzi) 
will be greatly enhanced.”   In the Nazarene view, Sowden had become not altogether 125
different from those Swazi patients and staff people at Mbuluzi whose refusal to accept 
the pattern of life under Nazarene administration made them a problem to overcome, a 
subject that will be addressed more fully in the subsequent chapter.  But when Hynd 
welcomed Cole back to her post at Mbuluzi as Matron, he explicitly linked his wishes for 
a “blessed term of service for both you and the patients” with the hope that “it will be 
easier without the distraction of Sowden and Ntisane’s attitude,” referring to the 
agricultural demonstrator supplied by the government to Mbuluzi until the year prior to 
Hynd’s letter. 	
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 Along with being an impediment to the spiritual side of the work that was such a 
high priority for them, the missionaries also clearly feared that Sowden was poisoning 
their already frayed relationship with the administration in Mbabane.  When Hynd wrote 
to Cole about the news that Sowden was taking up ministerial work in England, he also 
noted the welcome news that Resident Commissioner Beetham, whom he “felt had been 
influenced by Mr. Sowden,” had received a transfer to the Bechuanaland Protectorate.  
And when Cole returned to Swaziland and heard from Mbuluzi’s Swazi chaplain a rumor 
(ultimately proven unfounded) that Sowden was returning to Swaziland and to Mbuluzi, 
 198
 David Hynd to Elizabeth Cole, 30 January, 1951, File 1366-17, NA.125
 David Hynd to Elizabeth Cole, 23 August, 1951, File 1366-17, NA.126
she wrote to Hynd that she felt it most urgent that they immediately address the plowing 
and some other maintenance work around Mbuluzi.  This would offer proof “that we are 
able to handle the work without Mr. Sowden (so that) we might be able to counteract 
public opinion in Mbabane and among the lepers,” which would give the mission 
“something to stand on in fighting Mr. Sowden’s return.”   Clearly, the Nazarene 127
missionaries lived with the sense that their hold on the leprosy work remained somewhat 
tenuous at this early stage and were anxious to do whatever was necessary to maintain or 
strengthen that position.	

	
 In truth, the missionaries may have had an exaggerated sense of Sowden’s 
influence in administration circles, as illustrated by the government correspondence 
surrounding his resignation.  Sowden waited almost six months after his return to the 
United Kingdom to inform the government of Swaziland of his intention not to return.  
Although the tone of his letter was properly deferential, apologizing for the delay in 
making the decision and expressing appreciation for the kindness the administration had 
shown him and his wife, the other correspondence in the files regarding Sowden suggests 
that the administration believed Sowden had made his decision some time earlier and had 
only waited to announce his decision because it allowed him to remain on the 
government’s payroll for a longer period of time.  In the end, removing Sowden from the 
administration and closing out questions regarding compensation proved almost as 
difficult as it had been to negotiate his compensation package with the government in the 
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first place.   Much of that correspondence is, as one would expect, very tedious in its 128
nature, but one telling observation that emerges from the correspondence and the entirety 
of Sowden’s experience in Swaziland is the sense that he felt his role as a leprosy field 
worker warranted a great deal of special treatment, even a somewhat entitled attitude.  
Sowden was not alone in feeling this way; some of the correspondence from 
administration figures made reference to his “excellent service” under “difficult 
conditions” or the need to treat his compensation as a “special exception” because of the 
“nature of his duties.”  But when Sowden did not feel adequately appreciated or able to 129
execute his vision of leprosy control, as in the case of the survey or in light of the transfer 
of Mbuluzi to the Nazarenes, these things grated against his sense of the distinction and 
seem to have contributed greatly to his departure from Swaziland.	

	
 Sowden’s departure was just one indication of the waning of the government’s 
vision for Mbuluzi during its early years of operation.  The expiration of the original 
Memorandum of Agreement between the administration and the Nazarene Mission in 
March of 1956 further marked the ascendance of the mission over the government.   Per 130
the terms of the agreement, the government retained the right, upon expiration of the 
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original contract, to resume control of Mbuluzi free of any need to compensate the 
Nazarene mission except for “permanent improvements” that had been carried out with 
the approval of the administration, minus some reasonable amount for depreciation in 
value.  For his part, Callanan, who continued to serve as Director of Medical Services 
throughout the years of the agreement, persisted in regarding the arrangement with the 
Nazarenes as a temporary expedience, driven by the need to “effect a saving of some 
£18,000, and secondarily to finalise our commitment during the life of the Scheme.”  131
Because of this, Callanan often proved resistant to Hynd’s requests for assistance that 
might have financial repercussions for the government.	

	
 As the date of expiration of the agreement approached, Callanan clung to the idea 
that Mbuluzi should and could still fulfill the government’s original vision, some of 
which was, in fact, already becoming reality.  Since the opening of Mbuluzi, for example, 
a number of Westfort patients for whom the administration had assumed financial 
responsibility were repatriated to Swaziland, largely without incident. The one notable 
exception was the case of Audrey Masimula, a female patient who remained at Mbuluzi 
only about three weeks in 1950 after her transfer from Westfort before fleeing back to 
Pretoria where she complained bitterly about the poor quality of food, the miserable 
sleeping conditions, and the inadequate quality of medical treatment she had experienced 
at Mbuluzi.  Although Hynd disputed her allegations, the administration decided that it 
was better not to force her return to Swaziland.  She thus remained at Westfort until July 
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of 1953 when, for reasons unknown, she ran away from that institution as well and 
disappeared. 	
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 Masimula was not the only patient to disappear from Mbuluzi without permission 
during its first few years, but the cases were scarce enough that Callanan and the 
administration could feel confident that they were gaining control of leprosy on 
something approximating their own terms.  Even more important, perhaps, was the fact 
that the number of resident patients appeared to be in decline, which lent credence to the 
administration’s view that the eradication of leprosy was readily attainable.  The annual 
reports submitted by Hynd showed that the high water mark for resident patient numbers 
at Mbuluzi was reached in the first two full years of its operation, when he reported 75 
and 78 patients in residence during 1949 and 1950 respectively. But midway through 
1950, Hynd introduced Diaminodiphenylsulphone (D.A.D.P.S.) or Dapsone, as it is more 
commonly known, as the preferred method of treatment at Mbuluzi.  As a result, at the 
end of 1951, there were only 57 patients in residence at Mbuluzi, and the year after that, 
only 43.   With patient numbers cut nearly in half in just two years, the administration, 133
and especially Callanan, became increasingly bold in imagining the other uses to which it 
might put Mbuluzi if it could be reclaimed from the Nazarene mission in 1956. 	
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 Callanan and the administration chiefly hoped that Mbuluzi might fit into a 
scheme for tuberculosis treatment, a disease related to leprosy in that its causative agent 
was also a microbacterium and also in the sense that it was generally regarded as wise to 
keep patients with tuberculosis isolated from the general population.  Although one 
government officer would later comment on an internal communication that it had 
“always been the long term intention” to use Mbuluzi for tuberculosis treatment once the 
leprosy numbers had declined, it was actually Callanan who first seriously raised this 
suggestion in 1952 after the report of the first dramatic drop in patient numbers.   No 134
one openly discussed potential alternatives with Hynd, which was probably just as well 
since there is nothing to indicate that the missionaries shared this vision.  The two 
diseases may have been related in biomedical terms, but tuberculosis never had anything 
like the symbolic power of leprosy in the mind of Christians, in Swaziland or elsewhere. 
Nevertheless, behind the scenes, Callanan became increasingly insistent that tuberculosis 
was now the medical crisis that needed the attention of the government.  In 1955, 
Callanan wrote a confidential memo arguing that because of “... the ill-informed and 
mischievous criticisms to which Government is constantly being subject in connection 
with Tuberculosis and the prospect of these undesirable tendencies being accentuated 
unless there is evidence of further progress in a field in which there is ample scope for 
improvement,” the government needed to prioritize the necessary actions to resume 
 203
 J.C. Callanan to the Government Secretary, 4 March, 1952, File 1420A, “Mbuluzi Leper Hospital 134
Lighting Plant,” SNA.  The comment about the government’s “long term intention” was made by an 
unknown author (not Callanan) in a handwritten internal memo dated 13 March, 1956, File 3021D, SNA.
management of Mbuluzi and make provision for isolating tuberculosis patients there.  135
The administration as a whole was on board with this approach, as the hundreds of new 
tuberculosis diagnoses each year during this time period made it clear that this was a 
growing public health issue. The problem, as Callanan well knew, was that the financial 
position of the Swaziland administration made such actions impossible to consider, nor 
was there any immediate hope for a significant change in their position.  	
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 In light of this, the administration decided that it was best to see if the Nazarene 
mission would be open to the continuation of the Memorandum of Agreement on a year 
to year basis.  If not, there would be little choice but to give the mission another long 
term arrangement, as there simply was no money available to cover the additional 
expenses that would be incurred if the Leprosy Hospital resorted to government control at 
this stage.  Whether Hynd and the Nazarenes were unaware of the strength of their 
bargaining position at this moment or simply preferred not to exploit their advantage, 
they apparently indicated their acceptance of the year to year arrangement.  On April 3, 
1956, Callanan wrote to Hynd indicating that the Government Secretary had given 
approval of the continuation of the previous scheme.    In his letter, Callanan used 
language indicating that it was still the government’s intention to take over management 
of Mbuluzi at some point in the future, writing that the continuation would last “until 
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such time as Government is in a position to resume control of the Institution.”   But, in 137
truth, the decision to continue the previous arrangement was not seriously revisited for 
the next several decades, and Mbuluzi became more and more an institution wholly 
associated with the medical work of the Nazarene mission.	

	
 When the partnership between mission and government was first created in 1948 
and then continued in 1956, it opened the door for Mbuluzi and leprosy care to become 
more fully a missionary “baby,” as Megan Vaughan characterized it.  Ultimately, the 
disease was simply a higher priority for them than it was for the administration, and this 
was almost entirely because of its deep spiritual importance.  It cannot be said with any 
accuracy that the administration was somehow uninterested in leprosy; they clearly had a 
significant and specific vision to pursue, and they did so with notable consistency over 
the course of two decades. And it is worth reiterating the frequency with which they 
objected to the idea of simply surrendering the work to the mission.  However, the 
difference was clearly in the way that leprosy connected at a symbolic or spiritual level 
for the missionaries, which elevated it as a priority on their agenda to a place that it never 
could attain in the British vision.  How that mission vision played out in the daily life and 
operation of the Mbuluzi Leprosy Hospital is the chief subject of chapter four.  
 205
 J.C. Callanan to David Hynd, 3 April, 1956, David Hynd Collection, NA.  The letter can also be found 137
in File 3021D, SNA.
Chapter 4 
Leprosy, Piety, and Identity: The Mbuluzi Leprosy Hospital as Informal Pilgrimage 
Site, 1948-1982 	
1!
The sum total effect of the developments in medical science that characterized the 
years of operation for the Mbuluzi Leprosy Hospital was to render leprosy treatment a 
much more routine procedure that generally followed a predictable course. This rapidly 
shifting medical knowledge and the increasingly routine nature of leprosy cures, 
however, did little to reduce the interest of the missionaries of the Church of the 
Nazarene or within the wider networks of their supporters, which extended well beyond 
Nazarene circles to a global network of mostly-Christian organizations concerned with 
leprosy.  From a medical perspective, Mbuluzi was never a large or “important” 
institution; Hynd’s year end report for 1950, which recorded 78 patients in residence, 
would stand as the high water mark for patient population.  This fact, however, could 
hardly have been less relevant to the people associated with the Nazarene mission whose 
narratives became, after 1948, the chief representations of Mbuluzi.  For them, the 
hospital remained a central point of interest and a frequent destination for overseas 
visitors, vacationing missionaries, and others who were attracted by the spiritual heroism 
of leprosy work and the secluded splendor of Mbuluzi’s mountainous surroundings.  This 
chapter frames that legacy of Mbuluzi’s peculiar prominence in terms of Christian 
pilgrimage and explores how this position shaped the identities of patients whose lives 
were consequently put on display.	
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The animating ideas for this chapter grew out of my first encounter with Gogo 
Shiba and her narrative of the declining quality of her life after her time as a patient at the 
Mbuluzi Leprosy Hospital, described in the Introduction.  Gogo Shiba helped me see that 
the narratives of Mbuluzi’s visitors were not merely ephemeral fantasies and that the 
behaviors of outsiders towards the people who lived at Mbuluzi had very real, if not 
always predictable, consequences that played themselves out over the rest of their lives.  
It was not, in other words, an inconsequential thing to live as the object of someone else’s 
pilgrimage.	

My argument is that the leprosy work produced an unusual spiritual resonance in 
the minds and hearts of the Nazarene missionaries and their global supporters, which now 
could finally take full form in Swaziland as the responsibility for leprosy work passed 
more or less exclusively from government into missionary hands.  This combined with 
Mbuluzi’s isolated mountainous environment to make it a kind of ‘destination’ for 
Christians. I do not want to overextend the metaphor, but I have found it helpful to think 
of the hospital as an informal pilgrimage site for European and American visitors to 
Swaziland. I refer to it as an informal site of pilgrimage only because none of these 
visitors from abroad, mostly steeped in an evangelical Protestant worldview, described 
their visits to Mbuluzi as such, but the hallmarks of a pilgrimage are all present. People 
who wished to visit Mbuluzi were required to complete a relatively lengthy and 
sometimes difficult journey to reach their destination, frequently brought with them gifts 
or offerings to present, always participated in prayer and worship with the leprosy 
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community, and generally reported receiving some sort of spiritual blessing as a result of 
their journey. 	

The second part of my thesis is a little more difficult to tease out: how did this 
status as an informal pilgrimage site affect the people living there as patients and even as 
staff? What did it mean to live for an extended period of time as the object of someone 
else’s pilgrimage? Did it unintentionally foster a new identity for Mbuluzi’s patients as 
‘lepers,’ an identity rooted in dependency? Following James Ferguson’s recent work, I 
argue that the dynamics in play at Mbuluzi were readily understood by Swazis as offering 
a viable form of richly social dependence that created deep moral bonds between them 
and the Western pilgrims who visited them.  The construction of those bonds helps 2
explain the dislocation and even embitterment experienced by Gogo Shiba and other 
patients after the closing of Mbuluzi.	

Using this lens of an informal pilgrimage site helps distinguish my analysis of 
Mbuluzi from other recent work on leprosy institutions throughout Africa, which have 
ultimately leaned heavily on questions about government relationships with missions and 
with patients.  Works like that of Kathleen Vongsathorn in Uganda or John Manton in 
Nigeria provide examples of the dynamics of mission-government relations, and leprosy 
work as a site where the two of them continually negotiated their relationships.  As 
illustrated in the last chapter, this was an important dynamic in Swaziland, but one that 
decreased significantly after the government’s 1956 decision not to reassert its 
 208
 James Ferguson, ‘Declarations of dependence: labour, personhood, and welfare in southern Africa,’ 2
Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute (N.S.) 19 (2013): 223-242.
administrative role at Mbuluzi.  Shobana Shankar and Barbara Cooper have also recently 
highlighted the dynamics of American missionaries at work in Nigeria and Niger, where 
their relative distance from the colonial administrations added unique dimensions to their 
work and their sense of priority.  Geographically closer, studies like those of Harriet 
Deacon and Simonne Horwitz in South Africa have emphasized the operation of leprosy 
institutions such as Robben Island and Westfort as mirrors of the policies of racial 
segregation that characterized the governance of the larger society.  Again, this is not an 
irrelevant issue in Swaziland or at Mbuluzi, where the positions of greatest prominence 
were clearly collected in the hands of people of European descent.  Nevertheless, as I will 
argue below, the relatively small size of the Mbuluzi institution and its particular spiritual 
ethos reduced, though it certainly did not eradicate, the significance of racial difference.  
In some ways, my analysis here may follow most closely the model laid out by Eric 
Silla’s social history of leprosy in Mali, which tries to bring the patient experience and 
their initiatives in community and identity construction into the center of the story.  Yet 
even in this case, the patients in Mali were part of a much larger group, both per capita 
and in total numbers, and experienced much higher levels of social stigma than Swazis 
did.  And so rather than focus exclusively on the ways in which patients forged their new 
identities, I argue that the process of identity formation needs to be understood as a 
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cooperative (though not always intentional) intersection of ideas that connected at 
Mbuluzi.  	
3
Although Mbuluzi would be the most enduring Nazarene work with leprosy 
sufferers and the one that most fully gave them the opportunity to enact their vision of 
leprosy care, it was not the first such Nazarene work in the region.  Preceding Mbuluzi by 
18 years, the Nazarenes had briefly operated a leprosy colony in the southern portion of 
Portuguese East Africa (Mozambique).  The Nazarene mission in the Portuguese colony 
had been opened in the early 1920s when an independent missionary had asked the 
denomination to take over his growing work that had begun among migrant laborers on 
the mines of the Witwatersrand and then spread back to their home areas.  In 1930, the 
security of this fledgling work had been endangered by a Portuguese edict declaring that 
no church would be allowed to operate in its East Africa colony without permanent 
buildings, something the Nazarene mission still lacked.  At the last moment, an abrupt 
end to Nazarene work in the region was avoided when Dr. William C. Terril, the 
Superintendent of the South East Africa Mission Conference of the Methodist Episcopal 
Church, agreed to transfer to the Nazarene church a well-developed mission station at 
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Tavane, which the Methodists had decided they no longer needed.   In addition to his 4
Methodist superintendency, Terril was also a representative of the American Mission to 
Lepers in the region and had, in conjunction with that organization, facilitated the 
creation of a leprosy colony just one mile away from the mission station site.  Thus, in 
1930, the Nazarenes inherited both a mission station and the supervision of a leprosy 
colony with support from the American Mission to Lepers.	

For most of its existence, the colony housed somewhere in the neighborhood of 
100 patients, larger than Mbuluzi in its peak years of patient population.  But in the end, 
the Nazarene connection to the colony would last only six years, as the Portuguese 
administration opened its own leprosy colony in 1938 and required all leprosy patients 
from neighboring facilities to be transferred into the new one, some sixty miles away 
from the Nazarene mission.  Despite the relative brevity of its operation, the Tavane 
colony foreshadowed in important ways the focus of Nazarene leprosy work, and because 
most of the people involved were quite close to the Swaziland missionaries (indeed, 
many of them served stints in Swaziland first), it set some significant precedents that 
would be more fully realized at Mbuluzi.	

Nowhere was the overlap more clearly in evidence than with regard to the 
language used to characterize leprosy work.  Here, the best examples come from the 
letters of an American missionary nurse from Oklahoma named Minnie Martin.  Martin 
had already served more than ten years as a missionary in Swaziland when she came to 
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Tavane to assume her role in the medical work there, which involved both supervision of 
the leprosy colony and the operation of a general clinic.  In her letters, Martin 
emphasized the spiritual rewards of her work among the leprosy sufferers, “The Lord 
surely does love the lepers, and I love this work for Him.”   Lacking effective medicines 5
(like other leprosy facilities in the world at this time, the Tavane colony was using 
chaulmoogra oil), Martin and her colleagues emphasized the spiritual healing available to 
lift these men and women out of their misery.  As significant numbers of the Tavane 
patients began to convert to Christianity, for example, Martin and the other missionaries 
began to emphasize the practice of tithing, asking them to donate one-tenth of the value 
of their peanut gardens to God’s work among leprosy patients elsewhere in the world:	

I told them I was sure the Lord would bless their gardens, if they would do this.  
They promised joyfully, as it appealed to them very much... There are about 90 
lepers usually and a number are not able to work at all, and most of them gave the 
tithe, although only about half profess to be Christians.  We do give the dear Lord 
all the praise and the glory!  It is truly marvelous, it is the Lord’s doing... as many, 
many people have no peanuts, as the locusts came in clouds and destroyed 
everything in many place.  We do praise Him! 	
6!
The spiritual and material blessings accrued by way of the patients’ decision to 
give their tithe faithfully received considerable positive press from Martin and the other 
Nazarene missionaries who had few hesitations about creating a firm link between the 
two.  Martin’s co-worker, C.S. Jenkins, for example, composed a 1935 newsletter to his 
American supporters in which he contrasted the “shadow” of leprosy suffering and 
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rejection (“No one cares for them except the Christians.”) with the “sunshine” of grace 
represented by many  leprosy sufferers (so recently, “heathen”) giving their tithe: “The 
result is that they have another bumper crop this year again.”  Yet another missionary, 7
celebrating the tithe of the colony inhabitants, took the opportunity to “diverge for a 
moment” and expound upon the blessings he himself had received as a consequence of 
giving, not just his tithe, “... but no less than 50% during the whole of the past year, and 
God has not let me down yet, and I sincerely believe that Mrs. Ferree’s healing was one 
of the blessings poured out.”   The stories of the tithing practice of those with leprosy 8
thus became an example that others could build upon regarding the transformative fruit 
borne out of Christian conversion.	

The Nazarene missionaries were disappointed when the Tavane colony closed, 
and the government removed its residents to the island colony in 1938, but this was not 
the end of their connections.  In fact, the move opened up the development of some of the 
“pilgrimage” language that became so significant to Mbuluzi’s later identity.  In an 
undated article from roughly 1940, for example, Minnie Martin wrote of the difficult and 
financially costly journey involved in a visit to the island: “... we waited and prayed and 
cried with a burdened heart for the poor lepers, who had waited so long for us to come 
again.  Their disappointment was harder than ours, as they have such few bright spots in 
their lives.”  The article went on, however, to describe the great joy of the missionaries 
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when they discovered the men and women of the island in improved physical health and 
still faithful to their Christian commitments.  Samson, the leader of the Christians in the 
colony, reported that 82 of 87 Christians had given their tithes during the past season for 
the benefit of those who could not garden for themselves.  In light of this report, Martin 
noted, “No wonder God does bless the lepers as they do love Him and others, who are 
more helpless than themselves.”   	
9
The sacred nature of the journey to the island only increased when in December 
of 1941, the boat carrying Minnie Martin, one of her missionary colleagues, the Rev. 
Glenn Grose, two Mozambican Christians, Anna Mathuse and Antonio Manhique, and 
two oarsmen capsized in rough water on the return to the mainland.  Though the others 
managed to reach the shore, Rev. Grose drowned, a major loss for the small mission at 
Tavane.   Despite the tragedy, Nazarene missionaries continued to make the pilgrimage 10
to the leprosy colony, especially at Christmas time, over the next two decades.  Their role 
in the physical care of leprosy sufferers had long since ceased, but they still found 
significance in promoting the spiritual side of the work.	
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No one from Tavane ever took a direct hand in the leprosy work in Swaziland, but 
it still had some significant and rather specific effects on the shape of that future work.  
For one, it was the existence of the Tavane leprosy colony that had directly led to the 
arrival of Elizabeth Cole for missionary service in the region, as she named the work 
among leprosy victims in Portuguese East Africa as her specific “area of interest” on her 
1934 application.   Cole accepted assignment to Swaziland as a provisional step towards 11
future leprosy work, and there was at least one opportunity in 1936 when she might have 
been transferred to Tavane to replace an ailing Minnie Martin, but Cole could not be 
released from the RFM Hospital at the time. 	
12
Probably more significantly, the Tavane work served as a primer for the Nazarene 
missionaries in the powerful spiritual resonance of leprosy work with overseas supporters 
and linked them to broader networks of outside support across denominational lines.  C.S. 
Jenkins expressed some of the peculiar power of leprosy work in a 1930 letter to his 
superiors back in the United States when he explained to them that, because the American 
Mission to Lepers already provided adequate financial support to operate the leprosy 
colony, “I have felt that perhaps this (leprosy) work should not be stressed among our 
people too much at home.  It seems to touch a responsive cord in nearly every 
consecrated heart.”   Dr. Terril, the Methodist who arranged the 1930 transfer of the 13
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Tavane mission station and its leprosy colony into Nazarene hands, had also orchestrated, 
in that same year, the donation of £100 of American Mission to Lepers money as seed 
money to help David Hynd start a leprosy work in Swaziland (referenced in chapter 1).  
Although Hynd did not share Jenkins’s reluctance to push leprosy work in front of other 
Nazarenes, the links he established with with Christian agencies like the Mission to 
Lepers would play a crucial role in supporting the later work at Mbuluzi.	

 The Tavane experience, then, served as an important precursor to the subsequent 
Nazarene work in Swaziland, especially in establishing a pattern of leprosy care that 
placed the spiritual transformation of the leprosy sufferers at the center.  As explained in 
the previous chapter, the Nazarene missionaries responsible for the Mbuluzi Leprosy 
Hospital moved quickly to shape it according to this particular vision.  Many of their first 
efforts, however, were more or less superficial, such as the choice of names applied to the 
various villages where resident patients were to live.  But as time went on, the 
missionaries were increasingly bold in shaping the institution according to their own 
norms.  Some early concessions to government expectations, such as allowing the use of 
tobacco by patients, went by the wayside.  A 1958 published list of rules for the 
institution, for example, expressly prohibited patients from smoking tobacco. 	
14
Fittingly, in the year after the government’s decision to extend the memorandum 
of agreement with the Nazarene mission, the most permanent and visible symbol of the 
ascendance of the spiritual reached completion with the construction and dedication of 
Mbuluzi’s church building.  Though by no means an elaborate building, the church stood 
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prominently at the physical and visual center of the settlement, a stone’s throw from the 
hospital building.  Some of the factors in this choice of site were practical: church 
services were often being held outdoors because, although a multipurpose recreational 
building with adequate space existed, the missionaries wanted patients with limited 
mobility and receiving care in the hospital building, which stood somewhat distant from 
the other original structures, to be able to attend alongside the other patients.  
Constructing the church in proximity to the hospital ensured that patients who were 
staying in the hospital could reach the church as needed.   But the symbolic significance 15
was also impossible to miss; the hospital and church building, standing virtually alone in 
the center of the colony reminded everyone that Mbuluzi’s staff aspired to healing for 
both body and spirit.	

There is no evidence to suggest that the Nazarene missionaries ever lost their 
commitment to this dual role in leprosy work, or in medical missions more generally, nor 
their conviction that mission organizations were the preferred option for conducting 
leprosy work. To the contrary, in May of 1963, while consulting about the potential 
opening of a new leprosy work in Nyasaland, Hynd wrote, “BELRA is not a religious 
organisation, and we feel the deep spiritual and social need of these people would be met, 
as well as their physical need, by a missionary organisation like ourselves.”  The fact 16
that Hynd had approached BELRA, the British Empire Leprosy Relief Association, in 
earlier years to support his own work in Swaziland or the fact that it had many Christian 
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members and connections to Christian charities apparently was insufficient in Hynd’s 
perspective. Leprosy work was missionary work, a linkage that existed in most parts of 
British colonial Africa.	

But Hynd and his colleagues certainly were not under the impression that leprosy 
work needed to be exclusively Nazarene work; rather they worked diligently to broaden 
the base of sympathetic supporters who would undergird their work and its spiritual 
vision.  Here again, timing proved to be critically important, as the work at Mbuluzi was 
just getting off the ground at the same time that the Mission to Lepers was seeking to 
expand its reach in the region by opening an auxiliary branch in South Africa.  Though 
the international organization had already given a grant of £150 annually to underwrite 
the secondment of Elizabeth Cole to Mbuluzi in 1947, the founding of a South African 
office made the Mission to Lepers the single most prominent ally of the Nazarene 
mission’s work at Mbuluzi over the coming decades.   In launching its South African 17
branch, the international organization in 1947 appointed as its secretary for the region the 
Rev. Frank Oldrieve, a Baptist minister living in Natal who had been a key figure in 
previous years for both the Mission to Lepers and especially for BELRA during its early 
years in the 1920s.   As it happened, Oldrieve was visiting Swaziland consulting with the 18
Nazarene missionaries, Mr. Sowden, and administration figures in March of 1948 when a 
stroke very suddenly took his life.  After his burial in Mbabane’s cemetery, it fell to Hynd 
to cable the news of his passing to the international offices in London.  Despite the 
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tragedy, Oldrieve’s visit had helped seal the support of the Mission to Lepers for 
increased Nazarene involvement at Mbuluzi, and given the relative paucity of leprosy in 
the region along with the relatively well developed South African economy, Mbuluzi was 
well positioned to benefit from this growing relationship. 	
19
The church building itself was only the most visible fruit of this relationship.  
Hynd knew with certainty that the government, with its reluctance to pay for even an 
electric power supply, would never consent to paying for the construction of a church 
building, something that clearly lay outside their institutional vision.  But early in 1955, 
having just assisted in the completion of a major filming production discussed later in this 
chapter, Hynd asked the Mission to Lepers to consider a grant of £600 for the 
construction of a church building with capacity to seat 120 people.   It took less than a 20
week for the organization’s council to agree to this request, though the project itself 
would take more than two additional years to complete.  Over the years that followed, the 
Mission to Lepers would help supply the Mbuluzi settlement with many additional 
resources, such as clothing, medicine, and even vehicles.  In nearly every case, the 
church, rather than the hospital, served as the backdrop of most of these interactions, both 
in stories told and in the photographic record.	

Because it had been chosen with the idea that its doctor would travel up from the 
government center at Mbabane, the site of the Mbuluzi Leprosy Hospital was not 
particularly convenient for the missionaries of the Church of the Nazarene.  But the 
 219
 David Hynd to A. Donald Miller, 24 March, 1948, David Hynd Collection, NA.19
 Hynd to Miller, 16 March, 1955.20
journey along the single dirt road that provided access to the hospital, which was not 
infrequently rendered impassable during the rainy season, became an essential part of the 
narrative that surrounded the leprosy work. While Cole made Mbuluzi her permanent 
residence, Hynd and his successors supervised the leprosy work from the growing 
Nazarene mission at Bremersdorp, approximately 35 miles away. The supervising doctor 
typically visited the leprosy hospital twice each month, prescribing treatment for new 
arrivals, following up on the progress of the other residents, and performing the 
occasional surgical procedure resulting from the progression of leprosy. The isolation of 
the hospital may have complicated the work from a logistical perspective, but it added 
significantly to the romance of leprosy work in many people’s minds, as well as the 
perceived heroism of those who carried on this work. Observers who made the 
pilgrimage to Mbuluzi frequently commented admiringly on Elizabeth Cole’s ability to 
endure the isolation of Mbuluzi, implicitly disregarding the fact that she had the company 
of dozens of leprosy patients at all times. 	

Indeed, life at Mbuluzi more closely resembled a rural village community than a 
secluded prison, albeit one suffused with a Protestant Christian ethos. Those patients 
physically able to do so contributed to building maintenance, growing crops, herding or 
milking cattle, and other activities aimed at the economic maintenance of the settlement.  
As in the Westfort model, patients who contributed to such activities received some 
minimal financial compensation for their labors, but wages were tightly controlled. 
Schooling was typically available for children, usually with yet another of the patients as 
their teacher, and when the numbers of girls was large enough, they organized a Girl 
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Guides troop. Church attendance was obligatory, and although only a minority of the 
patients came from any kind of Protestant background, it was Nazarene missionaries who 
generally conducted the services, and the most frequent non-Nazarene participants came 
from the neighboring station of the South Africa General Mission, which helped ensure a 
prevailing Protestant ethos.  	
21
Several of my informants also recalled participating in what was probably 
Mbuluzi’s most enduring ritual, the annual dramatization of the Christmas story enacted 
by the patients on the grounds of the hospital.  Christmas and Easter, as days of high 
religious significance in the Christian tradition, had already for some time been seasons 
when the missionaries at Bremersdorp had prioritized visits to the Ncabaneni settlement, 
but the grounds at Mbuluzi provided a spacious canvas for enlivening these occasions.  
The idea of dramatizing the Nativity was actually Mrs. Sowden’s innovation, as she 
orchestrated a performance in 1949 entitled “No Room in the Inn.”  In an article for The 
Times of Swaziland, A.J. Sowden described the proceedings:	

The natural beauties of the Mbuluzi Valley provided a delightful setting for a 
Nativity Play... The play was performed out of doors and the parts of Shepherds, 
Inn-keeper and wife and Joseph and Mary were magnificently portrayed by leper 
patients... Visitors from the S.A.G.M. Girls School and from Mbabane were very 
impressed by the talent displayed and by the natural acting of the cattle in the 
stable and the donkey. 	
22!
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Such reenactments became the center point of Mbuluzi’s Christmas observation, 
with the performances enduring at least well into the 1970s.  But the day also commonly 
included church services, feasting, and gift giving, typically funded by outside support.  
The significance of outside support was emphasized at that 1949 Christmas celebration 
by Resident Commissioner Beetham who was himself among the visitors and gift-givers 
that day.  His address to the leprosy patients, as reported in Sowden’s news article, 
emphasized that there were “... many many people in Swaziland, and in fact all over the 
world who are thinking of you here at Mbuluzi.”   Beetham meant his message to 23
communicate to the patients their good fortune at having so many who cared about their 
condition as well as access to the medicines that would cure them of their leprosy, but it 
is more difficult to ascertain just what the Swazis made of these times when these 
‘pilgrims’ from other parts of Swaziland, South Africa, and abroad visited.	

The pilgrims to Mbuluzi were of different kinds: missionaries, resident 
commissioners, colonial health officers, OXFAM consultants, members of the local Red 
Cross chapter, and more.   In its early years especially, when the hospital was still 24
relatively strongly linked to the British administration, it may have received its most well 
known visitor, the Lady Baden-Powell, head of the international Girl Guides 
organization.  On a tour of Africa in early 1950, Lady Baden-Powell stopped for an 
inspection of the Girl Guides Company that had been organized at Mbuluzi, again at the 
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initiative of Mrs. Sowden, who was working with the assistance of Miss Nora Earnshaw, 
a Nazarene nurse at the hospital.  The programme for her visit included both traditional 
activities of Girl Guide Companies, such as the building of the Tree of Guiding on which 
the girls placed cards explaining the steps to different badges, and elements that were 
more peculiar to the leprosy colony context, such as demonstrations of the handicrafts the 
girls made in conjunction with occupational therapy and the preventive exercises which 
were meant to help the girls avoid the paralysis that could result from nerve damage 
associated with leprosy.   Some months later, upon her return to London, Lady Baden-25
Powell would recall in a radio news interview that her visit to Mbuluzi was one of two 
chief highlights from her tour, particularly a display of Old English sword dancing that 
was included in the programme.  Baden-Powell was herself not above the enchanting 26
romance of the leprosy work, but her language in the radio interview is telling.  Like 
Sowden in his news article for The Times of Swaziland, Baden-Powell referred to the 
company at Mbuluzi not as the “Girl Guides Company of the Mbuluzi Leprosy Hospital” 
but simply as the “Leper Guides,” an obvious reminder of their distinct status in the mind 
of this foreign pilgrim, as with so many others.	

The most common pilgrims, of course, were local missionaries, many of whom 
journeyed to Mbuluzi on get-away excursions, seeking rest and spiritual renewal for their 
own work in other parts of Swaziland or South Africa.  The correspondence files of 
Elizabeth Cole, David Hynd, and others are simply replete with examples of people 
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visiting Mbuluzi at various intervals and for varying lengths of stay.  The isolation of 
Mbuluzi attracted them for many reasons; in at least one case, an unmarried female 
missionary who had become romantically involved with one of the mission’s married 
men spent a few weeks at Mbuluzi simply to stay out of the public eye for a bit after 
being forced to resign.   Another missionary was assigned to the leprosy hospital for 27
educational work when her health had failed under the demands of her previous station, 
with the hope that the atmosphere at Mbuluzi would prove less demanding and allow her 
to physically recuperate while still engaged in productive activity. David Hynd himself, 
after his retirement from the RFM Hospital in 1961, took up residence at Mbuluzi and 
continued as the medical superintendent there until 1967.	

Most of the pilgrims, however, were truly visitors.  Some made the journey 
routinely and still remembered it with a fond nostalgia years later. In 1977, R.S.W. Ford, 
from the Mission to Lepers, recalled of his first journey to Mbuluzi in 1950 that his ‘old 
Pontiac scarcely took the indignities of long journeying and an appalling ten miles or so 
up a travesty road through Pine Valley to Umbuluzi.’  Ford was, at a minimum, an 28
annual visitor to the settlement, typically around the Christmas season, and always 
accompanied by ‘the usual cargo of comforts and good things for your patients.’  Other 29
pilgrims to Mbuluzi traveled greater distances. Overseas visitors with connections to the 
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mission, such as representatives from the U.S. headquarters of the Church of the 
Nazarene, made the leprosy hospital a routine stop on their itineraries. These journeys 
commonly sparked the kind of language found in this account from an anonymous visitor 
to Mbuluzi in 1957:	

The winding road took us through Swaziland’s fascinating scenery … But my 
thoughts were suddenly cut short, for here was the end of the road, and before us 
the locked gate of the colony. I braced myself from the harrowing sights I was 
sure to encounter within. We were met by Miss Cole with a smile of welcome and 
a very acceptable cup of tea; and then to work, laden with oranges, sweets and 
bread from the Red Cross. We went in search of the patients in various parts of the 
grounds – some on the lawn, basking in the sun, some busy at tasks they were 
able to do; one old lady with only one hand was attempting knitting, and very 
proud of the result! 	

As we said our good-byes and heard the gate click behind us, a surge of 
admiration welled up in me for all those who devoted their lives and efforts to the 
alleviation of suffering, for doctors and nurses, for missionaries and Red Cross 
visitors, for the heroic staff who have chosen to live in comparative exile for the 
sake of a band of stricken people – and lastly for those who contribute funds so 
that this work of mercy may go on. 	
30!
Here, the stark contrast between the ‘stricken’ leprosy patients and the ‘heroic 
staff’ produces a profound paternalism. But it is problematic to conclude that this author’s 
condescending attitude was an expression of a generic paternalism applied to all Swazis. 
After all, most of the ‘heroic’ staff, who had chosen this ‘exile’ at Mbuluzi, were Swazis, 
including nurses, chaplains, and agricultural supervisors. It is true that people of 
European descent always held the senior positions of supervising physician and nurse 
matron, but Swazi Christians who answered the call to leprosy work could share in some 
of its heroic luster, if only in clearly circumscribed ways.	
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Within those limits, the Nazarene staff recognized the important roles that Swazi 
Christians played in helping them build their desired Christian community at Mbuluzi. A 
letter from Dr Hynd to the General Secretary of the Mission to Lepers, London, is 
indicative of this preoccupation with building a Christian community and the roles 
Swazis assumed within it:	

One of our female Swazi teachers trained in our mission teacher-training course 
here at Bremersdorp came of her own accord expressing a call to give herself to 
the work of teaching in the school at the colony. She is one of our finest girls and 
we are deeply grateful to God for His Spirit’s working in her heart without any 
pressure from any other source. There has been a distinct improvement also in the 
general discipline and morale of the place since the admission as a patient of a 
very outstanding Christian Swazi. While sorry that this disease should have 
overtaken him, we are grateful that such a man should be living amongst them in 
the male village. He takes his stand on the side of right every time. 	
31!
Convincing patients of their need for a double cure of their physical and spiritual selves 
was, therefore, a process significantly eased with the participation of other Swazis. 
Notably, those who filled these roles, such as the teacher referenced in Hynd’s letter, were 
responding to a spiritual “call,” the same sort of language that so powerfully shaped the 
life of Elizabeth Cole, as we saw in chapter two.	

	
 Conversely, when the missionaries found themselves dealing with Swazis who did 
not have a call to leprosy work and whose interest in the spiritual dimensions of the work 
may have been lacking, they were anxious to be rid of their influence as soon as possible.  
Just as Hynd and Cole were glad for Mr. Sowden’s departure because of the way in which 
they perceived that he was a detriment to the spiritual atmosphere at Mbuluzi, Swazis 
who did not share the vision became impediments to the work.  A clear example of this 
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was the tenure of Hugh Mason Ntisane, the government appointed agricultural 
demonstrator who served at Mbuluzi during its first two years of operation.  Although 
praised by Sowden for his “loyal service” and as an “excellent worker,” the missionaries 
quickly came to regard Ntisane as a troublemaker.   Shortly after Sowden’s departure 32
and while Elizabeth Cole was in the United States on furlough in 1950, David Hynd 
began conversations with the two missionary women serving at Mbuluzi regarding what 
should be done about Ntisane.  Arrangements had been made for his transfer to another 
assignment within the Agricultural Department until, in July, Ntisane attended revival 
services hosted by two female Bible students.  As a consequence of those services, 
Ntisane had reportedly confessed his wrongdoing (the exact nature of which is left 
unspecified in the correspondence) and changed his behaviors in alignment with the 
missionary expectations.  This, in turn, caused the mission to request that his transfer 
order be rescinded, and all was well until November, when the missionaries learned that 
Ntisane was responsible for the pregnancy of Fanny Dlamini, the unmarried daughter of 
Mbuluzi’s chaplain, Rev. Samuel Dlamini.  This discovery brought Ntisane’s swift 
removal and replacement with another man who had ties to the Nazarene church.  In 
Hynd’s assessment just weeks after these events, “Already there is a different atmosphere 
about the place and a relief from strain.”   Nearly thirty years later, a new generation of 33
missionaries found themselves dealing with a similar situation, trying to rid themselves of 
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the perceived deleterious influence of an agricultural worker whose “spirit has not been 
good from the beginning.”   In the decades in between, the staff at the Mbuluzi Leprosy 34
Hospital had expended a considerable amount of energy working to maintain the proper 
“spirit” about the place and to identify the people called to contribute to the work.	

	
 No individual Swazi more clearly embodied the significance of the divine calling 
or played a more prominent role in the leprosy work at Mbuluzi than its first chaplain, 
Rev. Samuel Dlamini.  A member of a prominent family in Swaziland’s royal clan, 
Samuel Dlamini had been one of the early converts of the Church of the Nazarene,  
receiving baptism and membership in the denomination under the ministry of the 
founding missionary, Harmon Schmelzenbach.  He had gone on to become, in 1939, one 
of the four men who became Swaziland’s first class of ordained elders during the visit of 
General Superintendent J.G. Morrison. Just two years later, Dlamini volunteered, in 
response to a calling from God, to serve as the chaplain for a unit of Swazi soldiers being 
deployed to North Africa and, eventually, Italy.  Dlamini served with distinction in the 
army from 1942 until the end of the war in 1945, earning promotion to the rank of 
sergeant major and five medals for his service. The service of the Swazi regiments 
became an important feature in the collective identity of the Swazi nation, 
commemorated, for example, in the praise poetry of Sobhuza II.  Dlamini’s service to 35
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his nation and his church earned him considerable stature as a recognizable leader with a 
strong reputation for holiness.	

	
 It was not long after his return from the war that Dlamini experienced the call of 
God upon his life once more, this time in the form of the prayers of his own twelve-year 
old son, Allen.  In 1949, an article in Umphaphamisi, the periodical of the Church of the 
Nazarene in Swaziland, had appeared reporting on the great need for a chaplain to come 
to the new Mbuluzi Leprosy Hospital to provide spiritual leadership for the patients.  
That night, during their family prayers, as Allen prayed for God to call someone to 
Mbuluzi, his father felt as though God were pointing directly at him, instructing him to 
offer himself for this role.  The narrative of Samuel Dlamini’s decision to follow this 
calling was one that fit exceptionally well with the pietistic associations of the Nazarene 
missionaries with leprosy work, and the story was one that they told and retold in a 
variety of contexts.  Its most extended form appeared in a short biography of Dlamini 
distributed by the church’s publishing house and missionary society to churches 
throughout the United States and beyond.  In that account, Marjory Burne and Helen 
Temple described Dlamini’s decision and the reaction to it in the following language:	

Many could not understand his willingness to go to such a place. Some were 
astounded that he would give up the honored position of district leader to take this 
humble and undesirable assignment with the leprosy patients. But to Samuel there 
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was no thought of stepping down. Any assignment God gave was an honor he was 
proud to accept. 	
36!
	
 Careful attention should be paid to the depiction of his decision as one that was 
“humble and undesirable.”  Just as Elizabeth Cole was heroized for her ability to endure 
the isolation of Mbuluzi in service of the “lepers,” so too, did Swazis such as Samuel 
Dlamini see their spiritual authority increased by the decision to join the work.  In 
Dlamini’s case, the narrative was only further dramatized when, after about a year of 
service at Mbuluzi, his wife fell ill and passed away and then, beginning in 1956, his 
sight, which had first given him trouble during his military chaplaincy, began to fail more 
dramatically.  By 1962, Dlamini was completely blind and ready to step aside from his 
service at Mbuluzi, though he and his second wife, who also became an ordained elder in 
the Church of the Nazarene, continued in ministry for more than twenty additional years.	

	
 The stories of personalities such as Samuel Dlamini emerged front and center as 
the missionaries of the Church of the Nazarene worked to frame the story of Mbuluzi in 
their own terms.  Marjory Burne, in an article reflecting on the anniversary of the opening 
of Mbuluzi, wrote of the new found spiritual and physical health of the Mbuluzi 
residents, “We can attribute much of their spiritual well-being to the work of our Swazi 
Nazarene pastor, Rev. Samuel Dlamini, who is called of God to take up this work among 
the lepers.”  Describing the “great burden he has for these people,” Burne made reference 
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both to Dlamini’s work in teaching and preaching, as well as his work aiding patients 
with their “difficulties, many of which are domestic problems resulting from their 
segregation from their families...”   The result of Dlamini’s work, in tandem with the 37
efforts of the missionaries, was that many of the patients had become Christians, and 
“some have real victory in their hearts,” a reference to the holiness concept of 
sanctification.  	

	
 Some of this was forced optimism, of course, meant to cover over more complex 
realities.  No pubic version of Dlamini’s life, for example, ever made reference to the 
troubles he experienced with his own children, which apparently went beyond the 
pregnancy of his unwed daughter.  This, on the one hand, was just common politeness, 
but the missionary correspondence makes it clear that these family matters had tangible 
effects on his work at Mbuluzi, causing him to be absent for prolonged periods while 
dealing with matters at his Ndzingini home and leaving him vulnerable to allegations of 
hypocrisy from patients who were unhappy about his interventions in their own lives.   38
And the patients themselves did not always cooperate with their own spiritual 
regeneration.  Just months after the first anniversary about which Burne wrote such a 
glowing report had passed, in a more unguarded moment, Cole wrote to Burne the note 
referenced in chapter two about her feeling that everything would have been in vain if 
they did not soon see “the lepers turning to God.”  For Cole, and for her missionary 
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colleagues, this was paramount.  She went on to write, “I would rather be blotted 
completely out of the picture these folks can not be won for Jesus.”   The public 39
narrative about Mbuluzi never included these sorts of confessions or troubles and thus 
diverged in significant ways from the realities of the situation. 	

	
 Nevertheless, the missionaries persisted in pursuit of the goal of causing lepers to 
turn to God, and in this endeavor, they very much had time on their side.  If medical 
missionaries in other areas of work sometimes debated the dilemma of discharging a 
patient who was physically cured but who had resisted their offers of a spiritual cure, 
leprosy treatment at inpatient facilities like Mbuluzi rarely presented such a tension.  
Because the efficacy of leprosy treatments was uncertain and the course of the disease 
unpredictable even with the advent of Dapsone and other antibiotic therapies, patients 
generally stayed for years at a time, even when their leprosy symptoms may have 
subsided. This meant that there was ample time to present them the opportunity to take up 
an alternative life.  The response of the leprosy patients to the alternative life offered at 
Mbuluzi varied significantly.	

Mbuluzi’s relatively small size probably helped save it from experiencing the 
kinds of large-scale mobilization and rebellion that Eric Silla and Simmone Horwitz 
describe at the Djikoroni Institute in Mali and the Westfort Leprosy Institution in South 
Africa respectively. But this is not to suggest that the patients at Mbuluzi never raised 
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objections to the conditions of life at Mbuluzi.  Segregation at Mbuluzi may have been 40
nominally voluntary, but the mission still attempted to shape the life of the settlement 
according to its own social and moral norms. Not everyone was willing to accept the 
resulting curtailment of their choices. Some patients ran away, alleging neglect and very 
poor living conditions. My informants also mentioned instances of patients sneaking 
away to get alcohol or refusing to participate in church services.   	
41
Issues surrounding sexuality cropped up fairly frequently, as the mission ideal was 
for far-reaching gender segregation and for patients to abstain from romantic or sexual 
relations with anyone at all.  The 1958 rules, for example, established clear boundaries: 
“Male and female patients are not allowed to enter the village of opposite sex, or 
converse with the patients there at any time without permission.”   Furthermore, the 42
exchange of letters between patients of opposite sexes, understood as a precursor towards 
engagement and marriage, was prohibited.  Patients routinely tested those boundaries, 
whether in developing relationships with patients of the opposite sex or sneaking people 
in or out for sexual liaisons.  The missionaries were more understanding when patients 
rebelled against their isolation from spouses, and they tried to offer assistance when 
family circumstances called for interventions.  But even here, the line was drawn quite 
clearly on issues of sexual intimacy; when the wife of one patient who had been a 
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repeated source of trouble on this issue also developed leprosy, the missionaries were 
restrained in their comments but clearly felt vindicated in their conservative approach to 
contact.  	

In one chapter of Elizabeth Cole’s book about Mbuluzi, she crafted a series of 
four stories regarding the various ways in which patients rebelled against the rules at 
Mbuluzi.  The chapter first recounted how a search for “witchcraft paraphernalia” in the 
patient residences had left hospital staff “loaded with sacks and tins containing horns, 
bones, foul-smelling concoctions, huge teeth, and many weird objects.”  This was, in 
turn, followed by the uncovering of a scheme for brewing traditional Swazi beer in one of 
the men’s villages and the confiscation of “eight gallons of very intoxicating liquor.”  Not 
long after this, Cole learned from the incensed wife of a male patient that young women 
from “just over the mountains” were visiting the men’s villages at night, which led to yet 
another intervention by Cole.  Finally, Cole discovered that patients were growing dagga 
(marijuana) around their residences. This story, one of the more commonly recollected 
stories that former missionaries recounted to me came in varying renditions: one version 
claims that it was an agricultural agent of the government who duped the unwitting 
patients into growing dagga for him.  Another version, and the one Cole herself recorded 
in her book, suggests patients were growing the dagga for themselves.   But the best 43
evidence suggests that Cole was convinced that the patients were knowingly growing 
dagga at the direction of Hugh Mason Ntisane, the former agricultural demonstrator who 
was sneaking back into the colony at night to remove the dagga and export it to South 
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Africa for sale.  In the letter Cole wrote to Hynd in which she made this accusation, she 
was very careful in her choice of words, as she believed that not only Ntisane, but the 
man who was serving as the colony’s school teacher were involved, and she was afraid 
that there would be trouble in the colony if the information was revealed prematurely, 
including possible reprisals against the patient who had been her informant. 	
44
Whether reprisals were likely or not, these incidents do help us understand 
something of the cultural gap that existed between Swazi patients and missionary ideals.  
I have already made reference in chapter one to the reluctance of Swazis to rely 
exclusively upon Western medical regimes for treatment, and there is nothing in the 
documentary evidence relative to Mbuluzi’s history to suggest that the patients as a whole 
ever ceased using traditional Swazi remedies more than temporarily. Beer brewing and 
consumption were likewise firmly entrenched components of traditional Swazi social life, 
especially during the rainy season (as was the case in this incident) when beer was the 
one essential reward for participation in the communal work parties that undertook the 
difficult labor of preparing and maintaining fields for the year’s crops.  What Cole 45
condemned as both illegal and immoral behavior, the patients involved likely saw as 
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merely a reasonable reward for their completion of the labor that Cole and her associates 
compelled them to do.	

The Swazi perspective on dagga was in some ways similar to the beer issue. 
Although difficult to establish with precision the date for the arrival of dagga in the 
region, Brian du Toit has compiled a convincing case for dating its migration into 
Southern Africa via Indian Ocean and East African trade routes to a period at least several 
centuries prior to the advent of European voyages of exploration.  Consistent with du 46
Toit’s assessment of dagga use across the region, Brian Marwick described the smoking 
of dagga as “a habit very firmly entrenched” in Swaziland, especially as a leisure activity 
among older men and as a stimulant for men in the army before entering into battle.   In 47
P.A.W. Cook’s 1931 collection of tibongo (praise poems) connected with the men who 
had ruled as the Swazi Ngwenyama, dagga and the implements used for smoking it 
appear in two of the poems in a totally matter-of-fact fashion.  Similarly, a proverb used 48
among the Swazi declares, “indzaba itfungelea egudwini,” which roughly translates, “He 
is a topic for discussion over dagga smoking pipes.”  While one has to be careful about 49
generalizations across wide spans of time, there certainly seems to be evidence that 
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moderate dagga consumption was a relatively common occurrence in Swaziland and 
across the region, which might legitimately lead to confusion or consternation among 
Mbuluzi’s patients at the harsh condemnation of the practice by the missionary staff.	

But the incident at Mbuluzi is further illuminated by some knowledge of the 
particular moment in which it transpired. In the same year as the incident at Mbuluzi, for 
example, South Africa’s DRUM magazine ran a feature story painting a picture of a very 
lively dagga trafficking system operating throughout the region and arguing that it 
constituted a major public menace that needed to be corrected.  Furthermore, in the late 50
1940s and early 1950s, law enforcement agencies in both South Africa and Swaziland 
had embarked upon concentrated efforts to squelch this black market exchange both 
between and within the two countries.  Also in 1952, the South African government 
published a major study on dagga abuse in the country, which included an investigation 
of the traffic by way of Swaziland and the other High Commission territories.  The report 
affirmed the idea that dagga consumption had a long history in the region and the view 
that police forces across the region needed to be cracking down on trafficking as a public 
menace.  Of all the surrounding territories, the investigation found Swaziland to be the 
heaviest source of imports, though it was unclear how much was locally grown and how 
much Swaziland served as a conduit for trafficking dagga from Portuguese East Africa 
and Zululand into the urban centers of the Reef. 	
51
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Swaziland’s dagga trade flourished not just on its environment’s ecological 
suitability for growing the plant, but also on the exceptionally high regard for the quality 
of its product around the region, a reputation that has apparently held true right up to the 
present.  The 1952 government investigation noted that Swazi dagga commanded a 
higher price than that from other areas because of its popularity, and du Toit’s research in 
the 1970s found the same thing to be true.   He found numerous individuals who placed 52
“their only faith in cannabis from Swaziland,” and referenced one informant who made 
the following report:	

 .... he always gets his cannabis from Swaziland because his ‘wise’ forefathers 
who were in charge of Shaka’s ‘impis’ (regiments) used to make an expedition to 
Swaziland to get dagga for the Royal family and ‘indunas’ (chiefs) because it was 
believed it was the best obtainable in the country. 	
53!
High demand meant that individuals continued to grow the crop in the face of 
police action aimed at disrupting the illegal traffic, and this seems to have been what was 
happening at Mbuluzi.  The 1952 and 1953 annual reports of Swaziland’s Police 
Commissioner indicated that his force had made a concerted effort in those years to 
disrupt dagga production, which the authorities believed was having the desired effect.  
The report for 1953 concluded: 	

Police patrols are now engaged in obviating this traffic at its source by seizing and 
destroying plants before they reach maturity.  Reports reveal that growers are now 
resorting to growing plants in containers suspended in the branches of large trees 
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in an endeavour to conceal them from Police patrols.  Obviously only a very small 
quantity can be produced in this way. 	
54!
Interestingly, in the South African government’s report on the police patrols in Swaziland 
and the other High Commission territories, it noted they they relied significantly upon 
“officials of the Veterinary Department” to help them identify areas for patrol, since their 
activities naturally took them to a wide variety of rural contexts where people commonly 
grew the plant.   In other words, the police strategy relied precisely upon men such as 55
Hugh Mason Ntisane, which may well have provided him with the confidence to attempt 
to develop his own dagga trafficking business on a government-controlled piece of 
property. The potential financial gains clearly outweighed the obvious risks, and Ntisane 
was apparently not the only one who saw it this way.  In 1956, DRUM published a two-
part exposé on the dagga trade in and around the South African town of Bergville where a 
1954 police raid had resulted in widespread violence and the eventual execution of 
twenty-two men.  Even with the tragedy fresh in everyone memories, the DRUM reporter 
found a flourishing dagga trade in the area, as the lure of ready profits proved too much 
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for people with few alternatives to resist.   In the absence of significant cultural 56
condemnation of dagga production or consumption, people like Ntisane and the Mbuluzi 
patients who aided him seemingly found this particular act of subterfuge quite appealing.	

How much Elizabeth Cole and her missionary colleagues understood about this 
larger context is uncertain, but it certainly was not important to them in their recounting 
of the stories. In Cole’s book, each of these incidents with the patients became an 
opportunity for the Christian staff to overcome the “giants in the land.”   The resolutions 57
were consistently the result of God’s provision, as he worked supernaturally to overcome 
the darkness that ensnared those who “for so many years had been in the midst of Satan’s 
strongholds.”  In the dagga case, for example, the guilty patients, when confronted by the 
police with their wrongdoing, had suddenly become “very religious” protesting that the 
destruction of the plants should be delayed because it happened the the police had come 
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on the Sunday.  In Cole’s telling, her quick prayer for an answer to this plea was 
answered by the sudden recollection to her mind of the Gospel of John’s account of Jesus 
driving moneychangers from the temple: “The scripture was quoted and a comparison 
was made between the Temple that had been built for God at Jerusalem, and Tembelihle, 
which was built for God at Mbuluzi.”  In this way, the deceitful intentions of the patients 
were overcome, and the “the old giant dagga... was literally chopped to death” under the 
watchful eye of the police and the chaplain.    The stories, as framed by Elizabeth Cole, 58
all dramatize the mission perception of their work as a fundamentally spiritual one, but 
each story also demonstrates the limits of mission control even over this small 
community.  The nature of both the written and oral sources makes it impossible to 
quantify in any serious way the frequency with which such incidents occurred, but it is 
clear that the patients at Mbuluzi never surrendered their ability to act as autonomous 
human beings.	

When issues of patient behavior did arrive, the missionaries were quick to invoke 
the moral and spiritual character of the community as a means of restoring order.  In early 
1975, for example, Sister Nita Clegg, who had replaced Elizabeth Cole after her 
retirement in 1972, found herself dealing with many of the same kinds of behavioral 
issues that Cole had described in the early years of the hospital.  In need of assistance, 
Clegg wrote to Dr. Samuel Hynd, who had replaced his father as the Medical 
Superintendent at RFMH and for Mbuluzi, explaining her concerns about sexual relations 
between several unmarried patients and a recent incident in which one patient had 
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attempted to use “muti” (traditional medicines) to harm another patient.   Hynd’s 59
response attempted to leverage the still considerable influence of his father, who, though 
at this time retired and living in Mbabane, was as well known a public figure as almost 
any other in Swaziland.   He asked David Hynd to visit Mbuluzi to reinforce the rules 60
that governed the institution, which he did on March 12, 1975.  Summarizing his meeting 
with the patients, the elder Hynd explained that after meeting with the Swazi chaplain 
and his wife to get their assessment of the situation, he had called together a meeting of 
the patients in the church:	

I gave them a little bit of the history of the Colony and how we had the backing of 
the Government and Swazi authority in the running of the place and that the laws 
we had set up for everyone to live happily and profit from their treatment etc. 
were in accord with Swazi custom, the laws of the Government and the laws of 
the church.  I then went over all the type-written laws that we had set up and 
elaborated on each one.  After reading each law and elaborating on it, I asked 
them if they heard well and if they agreed with the law, and all said ‘Yebo’ to each 
law.  So I hope it may help them to have heard the laws all together in the church 
and that when any tend to break the laws some of the other patients may remind 
them of what I said. 	
61
Hynd’s account emphasized his position of authority to obtain the agreement of 
the patients to comply with community expectations.  But choosing the church as the 
gathering place communicated clearly the significance of the spiritual considerations at 
play and the necessity of operating as a community that would abide by the rules.  
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Sister’s Clegg’s observations of the event emphasized the spiritual nature of the activity 
even more directly: 	

When your father gave out the rules it was a ‘blessed’ service.  It was very 
impressive to me since I’d never seen anyone make rules such a ‘good thing.’  
After reading each rule he would make them agree that it was a very good rule.  It 
made me think he was Moses reading out the 10 Commandments and after each 
one saying to the people how good each commandment was.  In spite of our 
difficulties with witchdoctor medicine and ‘izindabas’ this past year has been a 
blessed year and one of the busiest and happiest years of my life. 	
62!
Clegg was no novice missionary, overawed by the cultural dexterity of one of her 
seniors; she had been in Swaziland for 19 years at this stage.  It was Hynd’s ability to 
evoke the spiritual authority necessary to restore the proper order of things that earned 
her admiration and which she understood to be the key feature in stamping out patient 
rebellion.  	

But while some rebelled in ways large or small, others embraced their life at 
Mbuluzi and the peculiar connections they derived from their presence at this 
mountaintop locale, which existed simultaneously as a medical institution and a sacred 
site. Certainly, embracing the identity of a ‘leper’ could bring a person unexpected 
notoriety in this context. At Mbuluzi, there was one patient, in particular, whose story 
brought unusual celebrity to himself and to the colony as a whole. That patient, a man by 
the name of Salakwanda Zulu, became in 1954 the subject of a biographical film 
produced by the Mission to Lepers, London. Shot in full color and sound, the 30-minute 
film recounts the story of Salakwanda Zulu from his rebellious early years living as a 
gangster working on the Rand, including a stint smuggling dagga across the Swaziland-
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South Africa border while posing in a clerical collar, through his experience of rejection 
by family and friends while suffering from leprosy at Ncabaneni, to his later years as a 
disabled but joy-filled leprosy patient and Christian convert at Mbuluzi.  	
63
The Mission to Lepers used the film, Salakwanda Zulu, to great effect as a 
fundraising tool, and the film drew the Nazarene work at Mbuluzi quite tightly into their 
sphere of interests, enough that a subsequent film, entitled The Good Heart, was also shot 
on location at Mbuluzi.  The staff and patients at Mbuluzi also generally seemed to 
appreciate the production. Patients at Mbuluzi watched Salakwanda Zulu in October 
1955, and Dr. Reginald Jones, another Nazarene medical missionary who was supervising 
the Mbuluzi work while David Hynd was on furlough, reported that ‘they were very 
thrilled with it all.’  One suspects that this comment may actually mask a more divided 64
range of feeling among the patients, but it is difficult to believe that the patients at 
Mbuluzi would not have recognized that the film raised the overall profile of the leprosy 
work and brought them very tangible benefits, such as clothing, blankets, meat, 
medicines, bandages, school supplies, books, and more. It was not that such gifts were 
never sent to other areas of the work, but the pool of people willing to give in support of 
leprosy work was undoubtedly wider and deeper than it was for other areas of the 
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mission’s work.  As Megan Vaughan has noted, ‘It is not easy to assess the degree to 65
which African leprosy patients ‘learned to be lepers.”’  The case of Salakwanda Zulu, 66
however, makes it relatively easy to see how powerful the appeal of this new identity as a 
Christian leper might be.	

Zulu’s biography, in being told and retold in a variety of public settings, became 
the patient narrative equivalent of Samuel Dlamini’s heroic ministry narrative.  His story 
was particularly appealing because he had suffered the most dramatic ravages of leprosy, 
ultimately losing his sight, most of his fingers, and both legs, which David Hynd was 
forced to amputate in order to halt the spread of a toxic infection. In his published 
testimony, Zulu affirmed what the film only implied when he shared with people that, 
‘My present physical state, however, does not surprise me, for I believe that I am reaping 
that which I have sown.’   Zulu, far from being beaten down by the hardships that 67
resulted from his physical condition, was by all accounts a vibrantly alive personality.  
Outfitted with special boots to cover the stumps of his legs and a shortened set of crutches 
that preserved some degree of mobility, his boisterous singing and Christian devotion 
became one of the defining memories of Mbuluzi for those who lived, worked, and 
visited there in the years prior to his death on January 15, 1960. 	
68
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Following the production of the film about his life, Salakwanda Zulu became 
absolutely central in the relationship between the Mbuluzi Leprosy Hospital and the 
wider world.  Whenever Hynd would write to staff members of the Mission to Lepers, for 
example, whether in South Africa or in the U.K., he would consistently make reference to 
Zulu’s life and general physical condition.  In July, 1957, for example, when Hynd was 
communicating with Reg Ford about the dedication of the new church, built with Mission 
to Lepers money, the only specific detail he referenced about the dedication service was 
that “Salakwanda Zulu sang a solo at the dedication service, which was very touching.”   69
And they, in turn, would reliably inquire about his health or recall their personal 
interactions with him.  In addition to his starring role in the film, Zulu was also one of 
Mbuluzi’s specially supported cases, and his sponsor was the Honorable Mrs. Arthur 
Gordon, one of the chief patrons of the Mission to Lepers in the U.K. who had visited 
Mbuluzi in 1951. Reginald (Reg) S.W. Ford, the Secretary for the Southern Africa branch 
of the Mission to Lepers, routinely used the story of Salakwanda Zulu in his work as he 
traveled the region raising awareness and drumming up support for leprosy work 
throughout the area.	

When Salakwanda Zulu died, the patients and staff of Mbuluzi interred his body 
in a small graveyard, located along the western periphery of the colony, “surrounded by a 
group of sorrowing friends who had learned to love and respect him for the wonderful 
example he had set - a wonderful example of the victory of the spirit over the flesh.”   70
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Fittingly, perhaps, his passing was also commemorated in the London offices of the 
Mission to Lepers where “... an opportunity was taken at our Morning Prayers to pay a 
tribute to this fine old servant of the Lord.”   The graveyard at Mbuluzi was generally 71
only for those few patients whose families would not or could not come to retrieve their 
bodies upon their death, a small number indeed since the majority of patients at Mbuluzi 
eventually received their discharge and returned home healthy.  In Salakwanda Zulu’s 
case, such rejection by family had become positively central to his new-found identity, 
and although one might look critically at the narrative of his life as chiefly a construct of 
the missionaries who relayed it to the world at large, there is little grounds to suspect that 
the narrative was one that he was reluctant to embrace for himself.  Former patients old 
enough to remember Zulu, who were mostly children at the time, recalled both the fear 
they felt when confronted with the ravages of the disease on his body but also the warm 
and encouraging personality they encountered once the initial visual shock had passed.  
Whatever its unquantifiable spiritual effects on him, enacting the role of redeemed 
Christian “leper” seems to have been quite a sensible choice for Zulu personally.	

Vaughan goes on to say that it is also difficult to tell how patients ‘felt about 
ceasing to be ‘lepers’ when they were cured, ‘cleansed,’ and sent home.’  But, in 72
Swaziland and elsewhere, it was possible for patients to maintain an identity as ‘lepers’ 
even after they were sent home. Their leprosy may have been cured, but there were 
continual fears that the condition might recur, to say nothing of the disabilities many 
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incurred as a result of leprosy. For this reason, patients were always encouraged to return 
for follow up examinations, and many of them received visits in their homes from social 
workers charged with helping them cope with their disabilities.  Patients did not always 
turn back up at the expected intervals for their medical follow up, but it was not unheard 
of for patients to simply reappear during the Christmas season, sometimes after extended 
absences.  Others, whose permanent disabilities and/or advanced age meant that they 
were not necessarily warmly welcomed in the homes of their families became permanent 
residents of Mbuluzi, even if they no longer required treatment for leprosy. In some ways, 
cutting ties with the leprosy work was more challenging than continuing in its sphere of 
influence.	

These dynamics of life at Mbuluzi resonate markedly with the kinds of 
dependence that James Ferguson describes with regard to the nineteenth century period of 
Ngoni expansion and development of an industrial capitalist complex in southern Africa. 
The parallels are imprecise, of course, between a militarily expansionist state, the labor 
recruitment and employment practices of the Witwatersrand Native Labor Association 
and its ilk, and a specialized medical institution whose only prolonged effort at active 
incorporation of new members (in the form of the Leprosy Survey) had been a rather 
abject failure.  But Mbuluzi clearly was a place that drew people into a form of 
membership that was inherently unequal and yet fully social. 	

The Swazi men and women who submitted themselves to the treatment regime 
and peculiar patterns of social life at Mbuluzi, living as the objects of other people’s 
pilgrimage, seemed to see this, not as a humiliation, but as an opportunity to enter into 
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their own “quite full-bodied social membership.”   Men and women like Salakwanda 73
Zulu who allowed themselves to be assigned the “leper” identity received in return a 
fixed position within an identifiable hierarchy of people and resources in which both 
superior and subordinate had specific obligations to one another, a model of social 
relationships that likely resonated well with their own expectations. As Ferguson has 
argued, the people living within such systems did not understand relations of dependence 
as oppressive to their individual liberty; rather, those very relationships helped define 
both their personhood and that of their superiors, based upon a moral bond of mutual 
benefit to all parties. The leprosy patients at Mbuluzi, then, willingly entered into a 
relationship of dependence upon the pilgrims from the outside, because it created a strong 
mutual bond between them, one that they believed would continue to be beneficial to 
everyone.	

Entering into this hierarchical relationship of dependence meant, to some degree, 
accepting a position defined by stigmatization leading to separation, concepts firmly 
rooted in a Western conception of the disease.  There is, simply put, no evidence that 
Swazis ever developed a general fear of leprosy or any pattern of people being separated 
from households as a consequence of contracting the illness.  The only patients who 
somewhat regularly experienced difficulty in returning to their homes after a stay at 
Mbuluzi were those like Salakwanda Zulu who were elderly and suffering from physical 
disabilities that would have made them a significant burden for any household.  The 
correspondence between the various medical superintendents and nurse matrons who 
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served at Mbuluzi over the years generally reflect some awareness that leprosy was not a 
particularly contagious  disease, yet the mission’s public language reflected a more 
dramatized view of the disease as a contagion.  Two of my informants, nurses who 
trained in the Nazarene nursing college in the 1950s and 1960s, remembered the anxieties 
that circulated among nursing students before their required visit to Mbuluzi for leprosy 
training.  Others reported feeling anxious about leprosy as a consequence of stories they 
heard in mission schools and churches.  Such fears were rather clearly not natural but the 
product of some Swazis’ encounter with Western culture.	

Even if the staff generally knew in their minds that the dangers of leprosy 
contagion were relatively low, old habits of separation proved tough to shake.  Hear 
again, for example, the language of Mr. Sowden and Lady Baden-Powell in remarking on 
the activities of the “Leper Guides,” holding up their distinctive quality as defined by 
their illness.  In fact, nearly everything about the way Mbuluzi was organized reminded 
all of its inhabitants of the distinctions between “clean staff” and “lepers.”  The housing 
area where the staff lived was off limits to patients.  The church had two entrances, one 
for patients and one for staff, located at opposite ends of the building from one another.  
One of my informants, a frequent pilgrim to Mbuluzi as both a student and a teacher at 
the SAGM school nearby, recalled being given very clear instructions as to how to avoid 
infection by limiting her contact with the patients and washing her hands carefully with 
antiseptic solutions after attending services.  Another pilgrim, this one a nurse from the 
RFM Hospital, devoted a whole letter to her friends and supporters at home to recount 
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her overnight visit to Mbuluzi, which included speaking at a Sunday evening service held 
weekly for just the “clean staff.”   	
74
The rules of the colony further reinforced the centrality of separation.  Of twelve 
rules published in the 1958 list, nine dealt explicitly with patient movement and 
communication.  In addition to those rules regulating contact and communication 
between patients of opposite sexes, Mbuluzi patients were not to leave their assigned (and 
fenced) village communities without permission, except to go to the hospital.  Their 
visitors were not allowed to enter the village areas, nor were they allowed to stay at the 
designated residence outside the colony for more than two nights.  Patients were not even 
allowed to speak with visitors unless they had permission to do so.  Such rigid and even 
dehumanizing rules stand in contrast to Elizabeth Cole’s seemingly conscious decision to 
abandon the use of the word “leper” quite abruptly in the year 1951.  In part, she seems to 
have become conscious of the debates over the use of the word that were even then in the 
air as a result of a visit she made during her furlough to the Carville National 
Leprosarium in Louisiana, which was in the midst of a transformative era of its own 
thanks to the activism of its patient population and their battles against leprosy 
stigmatization.  But even in Swaziland, the daily experience of life among Mbuluzi’s 75
residents, her awareness of the differences in the progress of their illness, and the varying 
ways in which they responded to the life offered at Mbuluzi must surely have helped her 
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see the problems inherent in using a word that lumped together such divergent 
experiences.  	
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If the experience of life with leprosy patients had a humanizing effect, what then 
accounts for the rigidity of the rules and their fundamental presumption of the need to 
create separation?  The rules, it seems, provided the staff at the hospital a measure of 
control to which they could resort in times of crises such as the one Nita Clegg 
encountered in 1975 when David Hynd returned to the colony and compelled the patients 
to affirm the essential goodness of the rules for the community.  But both written and oral 
sources regarding life at Mbuluzi suggest that these times were the exception and that 
what most patients experienced at Mbuluzi was a more humane connection constructed 
upon the mundane interactions of daily life.  Despite the occasional crackdown on patient 
behavior in pursuit of a mission-inspired vision of orderliness, most patients willingly 
accepted these conditions as a means of gaining access to resources.	

Certainly, there was room for them to be concerned.  If the period of Mbuluzi’s 
construction had been a period of relative economic boom for Swaziland, new foreign 
investment had dramatically slowed by the 1960s.  Nor was the newly independent 
Swaziland immune to the macroeconomic challenges confronting much of sub-Saharan 
Africa during the 1970s and on into the 1980s, as the visions of development offered by 
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many post-colonial governments met mostly with disappointment.  This, in combination 
with rapid population growth meant that many Swazis were once again left in search of 
bonds that provided certain basic kinds of security.   The phenomenon that had played 77
out a generation earlier within the confines of Ncabaneni was now amplified by the 
greater size of the Mbuluzi site and the permanent presence of Western missionaries who 
kept Mbuluzi connected to resources that never existed at Ncabaneni.	

In its thirty-four years of operation, the Mbuluzi Leprosy Hospital never ceased to 
be an institution of medical care, and as noted in chapter three, its existence corresponded 
with some very dramatic developments in terms of the effectiveness of available medical 
treatments.  There is no evidence that David Hynd and his missionary successors, acting 
in their role of Medical Superintendent of the hospital, were ever anything but 
conscientious about keeping the medical work at Mbuluzi apace with established best 
practice in medical care.  Hynd’s personal papers, for example, contain substantial 
numbers of medical reports from outside sources on leprosy treatment as well as notes 
from several conferences he attended at the Westfort Leprosy Hospital.  His annual 
reports, as well as those of his successors, routinely contained data on the medicines in 
use, the places from which new cases came, and other data useful in tracking the 
distribution of the disease around Swaziland.    We have already seen how this 
commitment to best practices in medicine produced a dramatic, although temporary, 
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decline in patient numbers within the first two years of the introduction of Dapsone as the 
chief drug for patient treatment at Mbuluzi, and the medical staff continued to approach 
leprosy treatment in a dynamic fashion throughout the years.  In the following chapter, 
we will see how the move towards using the WHO-recommended course of Multi-Drug 
Therapy contributed to the decision to close Mbuluzi entirely.  	

!
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Chapter 5: 
From Dependency to Dislocation: Closing the Mbuluzi Leprosy Hospital and the 
end of Swaziland’s Leprosy Control Programme	
!
When Mbuluzi finally closed its doors in 1982, more than 600 patients had passed 
through the institution, for varying lengths of time.  In most ways, the hospital was 
simply a victim of its own success. With dwindling patient numbers and increased 
confidence in the effectiveness of available medical treatment, a dedicated institution 
whose primary purpose had been to isolate leprosy patients from the general population 
was no longer necessary, a luxury that no one thought that Swaziland could afford. In 
place of the institutional model, Swaziland now adopted an outpatient model of leprosy 
control, no longer under the direction of Nazarene missionaries but in a new government 
partnership with the Leprosy Mission (Southern Africa), which introduced Multi-Drug 
Therapy into the country and ultimately helped Swaziland meet the World Health 
Organization’s definition for disease elimination.  By the time the partnership with the 1
Leprosy Mission came to an end in 2005, the work of leprosy control in Swaziland was 
chiefly a rehabilitative one, checking up on a few cases, like Gogo Shiba, whose illness 
had led to their suffering permanent physical disabilities. The period defined by the final 
years of Mbuluzi’s operation through the eventual, albeit unofficial, shuttering of 
Swaziland’s entire Leprosy Control Programme saw circumstances in which there were 
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some striking new developments, but also some very noticeable continuities with the 
approaches to the disease that had characterized the work over the prior seventy years.	

If the need to be attentive to how one positioned oneself relative to shifting 
medical, financial, and political realities had been a constant thread in the narrative of this 
dissertation, then the final decade of Mbuluzi’s operation was entirely in tune with its 
past. Even in the latter years of Elizabeth Cole’s time of service, there had been some 
major shifts in the program itself.  In fact, the year 1969 was particularly crucial.  Prior to 
this, Mbuluzi had typically housed a resident population of between forty and fifty 
patients in any given month, numbers that had remained relatively stable since the 
introduction of dapsone in 1950.  But in 1969, those numbers fell off dramatically.  On 
December 31, 1968, Mbuluzi had forty-five patients in residence; by July, the number 
was down to just fifteen.  And although the number rebounded slightly in the remaining 
months of the year, the patient population on December 31, 1969 was twenty-six.  Only 
rarely in the remaining years of its operation did patient numbers climb back above 
thirty. 	
2
Why did numbers fall?  Some of the decline resulted from continued 
improvements in medical knowledge.  1969 was the year that the staff at Mbuluzi started 
using Clofazamine, which they referred to as lamprene, though only in five patients and 
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chiefly as a tool for treatment when patients were experiencing severe leprosy reactions.   3
This soon became one of the frontline drugs in leprosy treatment and remains today one 
of the three drugs used in the treatment of multi-bacillary leprosy via multi-drug therapy.  
In and of itself, however, this would not explain a sudden drop in patient population 
numbers.	

In the bigger picture, the Mbuluzi work and Swaziland’s health infrastructure in 
general were also experiencing the hardships of diminished government appropriations, 
as Swaziland’s newly independent government established its priorities in face of 
mounting financial difficulties.  When Dr. Stark composed his March 7, 1969 letter 
thanking the Leprosy Mission for its subventions in aid of the Mbuluzi work, he wrote 
ominously: “This year, it looks as if we are going to need as much help as we can get, as 
the Government of Swaziland is having to cut down on appropriations to every 
department.  Unfortunately the medical departments have come in for their share of the 
cut as well.”   He clearly anticipated lean times ahead, and although it is difficult to get a 4
clear sense of how the actual balance of payments worked out, his feelings were clearly 
not anomalous. The Annual Medical and Sanitary Reports from the late 1960s and early 
1970s frequently make reference to budgetary constraints as a major hindrance in 
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progress on other government-funded projects such as building construction and the 
development of the national tuberculosis control programme.	

Even more telling was a document that Samuel Hynd composed in June of 1969.  
A sort of manifesto on the condition of Nazarene medical missions in Swaziland, Hynd’s 
essay emphasized two essential points: 	

1.) That medical work in Swaziland had always been and must remain into the future 
“a legitimate part of the whole ministry of the Church and an integral part of its 
witness to the Gospel,” which meant that the mission needed to address the need for a 
properly motivated Christian staff. 	
5
2.) That the challenges of acquiring adequate financial support for the work were 
greater than they had ever been.	

Hynd and his colleagues clearly recognized that the coming of political independence 
raised new questions about the place of medical missionary endeavors. Would the 
government of the new Swazi nation view them as partners for future development or as 
vestiges of the previous era of domination by European interlopers? In the essay, Hynd 
emphasized that missionaries must be mindful of the fact that their place was that of a 
“welcome guest in Swaziland,” but that maintaining that place would require that the 
people of Swaziland be taken into “full confidence” and trained for “their future 
responsibilities.”  At the same time, he stressed that the “new government which is still 
feeling its way and learning the intricacies of running a modern state” needed to fulfill its 
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obligations to provide adequate healthcare for its people by financially supporting 
medical work of all kinds in the country.  Hynd felt that, with the proper data, a 
convincing case could be made regarding the financial needs of all facets of the medical 
mission work, including the Mbuluzi Leprosy Hospital, and that the mission could 
reasonably expect a “sympathetic hearing” in its pleas for greater support. 	
6
The reduction in patient population, which corresponded generally with the time 
period in which Hynd was writing his manifesto, was likely tied to the experience of 
financial hardships and the mission’s expectation that these were likely to continue.   At 7
Mbuluzi, the financial difficulties seem to have led to the conclusion that it was time to 
say farewell to some cases who may have lingered at the hospital longer than was 
absolutely necessary.  When Stark wrote to the Leprosy Mission in March of 1970, he 
noted among those discharged were “a number who had been several years in residence.  
It was with mingled feelings that they left their happy home and said ‘Good-bye’ to their 
friends.”   The progress of leprosy treatment was, at this time, certainly an adequately 8
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uneven thing to justify the continued residence of patients whose signs of active leprosy 
may have receded some time before, especially if they were willing to remain. And, 
under the circumstances outlined in the previous chapter, in which Mbuluzi’s patients 
could feel assured of a reasonable supply of social and material resources, it was only 
logical that a significant number of patients would be willing. Now, however, the hard 
financial realities seem to have mandated that some of these patients be encouraged, 
perhaps even compelled, to return to their homes.	

Despite reduced numbers, the work at Mbuluzi continued for more than a decade 
beyond the crisis of 1969, however haltingly it may have done so.  There was a growing 
sense among many who were involved in leprosy work that the steady diminution of 
numbers at Mbuluzi did not necessarily mean that eradication was right around the 
corner.  Indeed, by the 1970s, many were coming face to face with the naiveté of the 
scientific optimism characteristic of the generation that constructed Mbuluzi and hoped 
its presence would quickly bring the end of leprosy.  Samuel Hynd captured a sliver of 
that sentiment in a letter to the General Secretary for the European Federation of Anti-
Leprosy Associations (E.L.E.P.): “Our experience appears to be much the same as other 
parts of the world where we thought that by this time leprosy would be practically wiped 
out but in spite of the new drugs available and better conditions throughout the country, 
we are still finding new cases from areas where we have known leprosy to be endemic 
but even from new areas from which we have not previously seen cases of leprosy.”  9
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Hynd and his colleagues could legitimately claim to have gained control of leprosy; the 
model of disease control that Mbuluzi represented had proven adequate to cut the 
prevalence rate of leprosy more than in half, and there certainly did not appear to be any 
danger of the disease becoming resurgent. However, there was still a gap between this 
achievement and the hopes of David Hynd, Sowden and others that an institution like 
Mbuluzi would be the key to eradicating leprosy. The sense that Mbuluzi may have come 
to the outer limits of its usefulness as a tool for combating leprosy without entirely 
wiping out the disease left two distinct but intertwined questions to be addressed: what 
should be done about the remaining cases of leprosy in Swaziland?  And what should be 
done with the facilities at Mbuluzi?	

As I highlighted in chapter three, the question of the future of the facility was 
nearly as old as the institution itself, since J.C. Callanan had envisioned it growing into a 
facility for tuberculosis patients. The Nazarene mission had demonstrated a clear 
preference for keeping the focus at Mbuluzi on leprosy work, but over time they did 
attempt some minor modifications to the operation of the facilities.  In the mid-1960s, 
during the time when David Hynd was living there after his retirement from the RFMH, 
they had opened an outpatient clinic that operated from the colony’s gatehouse building.   10
The important thing to recognize about the clinic work was that it was always understood 
as a supplement or an appendage to the leprosy work, rather than a direct extension of it. 
In fact, it could probably be better conceived of as an extension of the RFMH, which 
continued to operate a network of these outpatient clinics throughout the country. The 
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positioning of the clinic in the building closest to the entry gate was part of an intentional 
strategy to keep people off the grounds of the colony itself and minimize any potential 
mixing of the patient populations. The fortunes of this outpatient venture tended to vary 
considerably depending on the ability of the Nazarene mission to provide staffing, and by 
1975, it was more or less on its last legs as an expansion of the Mbuluzi endeavor.  	
11
Wider visions for what the institution could become, as had always been the case, 
typically came from outside sources and especially from the government. Since those 
earliest days, the British administration, beginning at Callanan’s urging, had harbored 
visions of creating a combined leprosy/tuberculosis treatment center at Mbuluzi.  
Although the Nazarene missionaries certainly never attempted to initiate any such 
change, David Hynd had at least briefly revisited the issue in 1962 on behalf of Dr. J.B. 
Whitworth, who became Swaziland’s Director of Medical Services upon Callanan’s 
retirement in October of 1957.  Hynd’s report came in response to a 1957/58 World 
Health Organization survey which estimated that 1% of Swaziland’s population was 
suffering from tuberculosis (meaning roughly 2,400 people), with only sixty beds in all 
mission and government hospitals available for these patients.  Whitworth himself had 12
grown increasingly insistent that something needed to be done rather urgently to address 
Swaziland’s tuberculosis case load, annually referring to it in his Medical & Sanitary 
Reports after 1959 as the chief health problem facing Swaziland. A joint UNICEF/WHO 
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project finally got underway in 1963 after numerous bureaucratic delays, which had 
clearly frustrated Whitworth enormously, and his appeal for Hynd to reconsider a merger 
of leprosy and tuberculosis treatment at Mbuluzi seems to have been chiefly motivated by 
his desire to find some sort of avenue for progress in this area. Hynd’s report concluded 
that it would be possible to house approximately 100 tuberculosis patients at Mbuluzi 
with just a few additions to the existing facilities, but once the UNICEF/WHO project got 
underway in Manzini, nothing further ever came of the idea.	

A decade later, new ideas about the future use of the Mbuluzi settlement began to 
emerge, especially in light of another season in which patient numbers had noticeably 
dwindled.  This time, the idea got as far as having the Ministry of Health approve the use 
of existing buildings to establish a workshop for people suffering from physical 
disabilities.  This was an area that had been neglected in Swaziland, as suggested by the 
letter of Dr. Fanny Friedman, the Chief Medical Officer for the Ministry of Health, who 
acknowledged that caring for the disabled was “too big a problem to be tackled in 
Swaziland by a small voluntary group.”   He was referring to the Swaziland Society for 13
the Handicapped, an organization founded in 1970 and which had, from its beginning had 
connections with the Mbuluzi work, thanks chiefly to Mr. Cuthbert Pretious, a leader in 
Swaziland’s Red Cross Society and one of the more regular and fondly remembered of 
Mbuluzi’s pilgrims.  The Catholic Church’s St. Joseph’s Mission, which lay just to the 
east of Manzini, had also been developing as a resource center for people with physical 
disabilities, especially those who were blind.  One of the key figures there was Father 
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Angelo Ciccone, an Italian missionary in Swaziland who had himself been keenly 
interested in starting leprosy work in Swaziland under Catholic auspices before finding 
himself cut out of that work by the Nazarene success in securing it under their leadership.  	

Work with people suffering from disabilities offered some of the same spiritual 
rewards associated with leprosy work; after all, many of the miracles of Christ and the 
Apostles recorded in the Gospels involved the healing of people suffering from physical 
disabilities.  And because nerve damage was one of the more common symptoms of 
leprosy, many of its victims needed the sorts of rehabilitation and occupational therapy 
that others with physical disabilities needed.  This intersection of concerns produced 
natural synergy between the two areas of medical work and made it possible for the idea 
to gain traction with the Nazarene missionaries who had never had a lot of enthusiasm for 
combining tuberculosis and leprosy care.	

It was likely not entirely coincidental that discussions about the future of the 
Mbuluzi Hospital structures began in earnest in late 1972, following the decision of 
Elizabeth Cole to retire.  Cole was not an overt opponent of the idea of mixing the 
leprosy work at Mbuluzi with some other medical endeavors, but she never particularly 
warmed to the idea and apparently maintained an assumption to the end that it would be 
best for leprosy patients to have their own dedicated facility.  When Cole retired at age 
61, she left a small fund in the care of the Nazarene mission but stipulating its use in 
future leprosy work; she specifically envisioned the construction of a new hospital wing 
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connected to the RFMH in Manzini.  Her first concern, in other words, was with the 14
question of what should be done with the leprosy patients and not so much with the future 
of the facility itself. Moreover, being near the end of her missionary career, she was not 
likely to drive new ideas forward.  It would have been only natural that her retirement 
and the realization that others would have to follow in her footsteps likely helped spur 
new kinds of thinking about what Mbuluzi might become. Though the nurse matrons who 
followed in her steps at Mbuluzi were each called to missionary service in their own 
right, none of Cole’s immediate successors were publicly known to have a spiritual call to 
leprosy work specifically, the trait that had chiefly defined the public personality of 
Elizabeth Cole.	

But once Cole had stepped aside, the pace of conversations quickened noticeably 
regarding Mbuluzi’s future.  Some of the initiative came from the Swaziland Society for 
the Handicapped, whose management committee first proposed in October of 1972 that 
the Society investigate leasing some of the available space at Mbuluzi, which they 
thought would provide enough space for “a handicapped workshop and residential 
quarters, perhaps with a dozen adults of either sex.”   An approach to Dr. Stark at the 15
RFMH just prior to the October meeting and a follow up conversation with Sister 
Elizabeth Mishler, the new matron at Mbuluzi, suggested that both of them were on 
board. Getting a firm response from the Ministry of Health proved more difficult, but by 
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February of 1973, Dr. Friedman had at least agreed to investigate their request.   By 16
November, the Ministry of Health had formally approved the Society’s workshop 
proposal, but alongside the workshop, was also planning to have the Ministry of 
Agriculture assume control of Mbuluzi’s cattle herd with the goal of creating a dairy 
demonstration project. 	

Dr. Friedman described this as “a very good step in the demonstration of co-
ordinated effort by different Ministries...” which would go “... a long way to integration 
of efforts which will be instrumental in assisting to remove the time old stigma attached 
to leprosy.”  Friedman’s language and vision could, of course, have just as easily come 17
from Callanan, Sowden, or other public health officers of a prior generation in Swaziland. 
The parallels between her ideas of leprosy as a stigmatized disease best treated as part of 
an integrated system of care and those of the World War II generation are quite striking. 
Transition to independence aside, relatively little had changed in the upper levels of 
Swaziland’s medical administration. Given the dearth of Swazi leadership prepared to 
step into roles like that of Friedman, it is perhaps little surprise that Swaziland’s 
administrators still subscribed to many of the modernizing visions that animated the 
administration immediately after World War II. And, as with that previous generation, 
much of fate of those visions depended upon forces not directly under the control of local 
decision makers.	
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As it happened, the cooperative workshop for people with disabilities never came 
into existence.  In yet another demonstration of the ways in which outside expertise 
swayed the course of developments in Swaziland, it was an outside consultant whose 
work in conducting “a survey of the handicapped in Swaziland, has found that the 
original plan will not work, and the scope of the project beyond the reach of the (Society 
for the Handicapped).”   The integration of the Ministry of Agriculture’s dairy farm 18
project, however, survived this reassessment, but it soon became an entirely new nexus 
for conflict.	

In many ways, the conflicts that emerged over the dairy project encapsulated 
many of the cultural clashes that had long existed between the missionary view of the 
leprosy hospital/colony as a work apart versus the government view that it was somehow 
a part of a larger structure representative of the benefits of modernity and progress. Just 
as David Hynd’s relationship with Callanan and Sowden had frayed over these differing 
expectations, so also would his son’s relationship to government be tested on these same 
philosophical grounds. As Dr. Friedman’s letter to Samuel Hynd had indicated, the 
government saw this as an opportunity to show how cooperative ventures and 
coordinated efforts by varying government agencies brought tangible benefits to a wide 
range of people.  The missionaries, on the other hand, wanted to be sure that the interests 
of the leprosy work continued to receive preferential treatment.	
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The leprosy colony had long had a herd of dairy cows at its disposal and, at 
various times, had enjoyed a relative bounty of milk for its patients.   But the new plan 19
called for that herd to be turned over to the supervision of employees of the Ministry of 
Agriculture who would provide certain fixed quantities of milk to the hospital patients, as 
well as paying cash for access to the colony’s housing, land, and farm equipment. In late 
1974, as Samuel Hynd was negotiating the exact terms of this new arrangement, he laid 
down some very clear provisions that protected the favored treatment of the colony and 
its residents, providing them with forty liters of milk daily (providing roughly one liter of 
milk for each of the colony’s adult inhabitants), the meat of one animal from the herd 
roughly every two months, and some oversight for the hospital in the disciplining of all 
personnel on site, regardless of assignment or responsibilities.   	
20
The problem, as Hynd soon discovered, was that the government was not really in 
the mood to negotiate. In truth, the missionaries had no leverage in the situation, as all of 
the Mbuluzi property was ultimately under government control.  Having been content for 
the better part of two decades to leave the property largely at the disposal of the mission, 
the government was now in a more assertive mood and no longer perceived the leprosy 
work as a high priority work on its own terms. Hynd might have received a more 
sympathetic hearing from people working in the government’s medical offices, but it was 
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undoubtedly difficult for the Ministry of Agriculture to see where the needs of a few 
dozen leprosy patients at most could supersede its visions. The reply from the Ministry 
negated or modified most of Hynd’s terms: halving the milk supply, promising meat only 
at the discretion of the farm manager, and insisting that only the Ministry retained 
disciplinary oversight of farm personnel. 	
21
The tension was, in one sense, merely a question of perspective.  Was the dairy 
farm a sidelight to the leprosy colony whose interests and practices should have priority?  
Or was it an equal partner, perhaps even an autonomous unit, free to pursue its own 
objectives and policies?  The failure to bring all parties into alignment on these questions 
produced seven years of on and off clashes that exposed the different priorities of the two 
parties.  In May of 1976, for example, Nita Clegg learned from the Peace Corps volunteer 
who was living at Mbuluzi and supervising the dairy farm that, after consultations with 
his superiors at the Ministry of Agriculture, they had decided to stop supplying free meat 
to the hospital because they wanted the farm to begin turning a profit. Clegg could 
understand the desire for profitability, but from her perspective, this was a direct threat to 
patient well being.  The only viable option was for the Ministry of Health to increase the 
subsidy it paid the Nazarene mission, but this probably seemed a little too much to hope 
for. 	
22
The frequency and intensity of these clashes continued to build slowly and 
steadily over the years.  Provision of staff housing and the collection of rental payments 
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for the use of facilities and equipment constantly arose.  From the missionary perspective, 
as they struggled to remain connected to an older vision of Mbuluzi as a place of 
Christian harmony, these were not mere nuisances but fundamental distractions from the 
higher aims of leprosy work and the transformation of patient lives.  It was, for example, 
the man appointed by the Ministry of Agriculture to take charge of the dairy project about 
whom Nita Clegg wrote the letter, cited in the previous chapter, regarding “his spirit” not 
being a good one right from the beginning.  She fervently hoped that his transfer to 
service in another area of Ministry work would come about, but in the end, he outlasted 
Clegg who departed Swaziland in 1978.  	

The situation had deteriorated still further by 1981, but by this time, there had 
been one significant personnel change that directly affected both parties. In 1978, Samuel 
Hynd parted with the Nazarene mission and had taken up a new post as Swaziland’s 
Minister of Health. In the meantime, Clegg had been replaced at Mbuluzi first by Jane 
Brewington and then by Claudia Stevenson, another American missionary nurse and one 
who had experienced a clear and specific calling to leprosy work in the form of a vision, 
much as Elizabeth Cole had back in the 1930s.  The existing correspondence leaves 23
some gaps to explain exactly what took place, but by September of 1981, Hynd was 
implementing a new Leprosy Control Agreement for Swaziland, not with the Nazarene 
mission but with the Leprosy Mission in Southern Africa. In so doing, Hynd began 
asserting a more active government role in supervising the affairs at Mbuluzi. In a letter 
to the leadership of the Nazarene mission, he rather harshly critiqued his successors at the 
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RFMH for having left Stevenson to “fight a lone battle against extreme odds,” resulting 
in “the present sad situation” as a consequence of the “inability or unwillingness on the 
part of her missionary and hospital authorities to investigate her cries for help.”  Although 
the mission was now taking steps to aid Stevenson, Hynd was also initiating “a more 
active role by my Ministry officials” in making a “definite demarcation of responsibility 
and area of operation between Leprosy Hospital and Dairy Demonstration Farm more 
clear.” 	
24
The details of the sequence of events and the precise details of what took place 
are not at all clear; however, those details are of lesser significance than the ways in 
which all of these pieces pointed towards the new realities of Mbuluzi and the end of its 
operation.  Though some of the old practices persisted, the Christmas pageant for 
example, the site had lost much of its sacred veneer, as a consequence of both the 
reduction in the patient load and the movement of key personnel. In addition, other kinds 
of evidence began to emerge which suggested that Mbuluzi was simply no longer 
effective in fulfilling its purpose.	

Much of this new information came about as a consequence of a resurgence in 
external interventions, largely stimulated by the investment of the Leprosy Mission.  In 
1978-79, the Leprosy Mission had organized a leprosy survey, which was carried out by a 
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leprosy specialist from Ethiopia, with significantly more fruitful results than its ill-fated 
predecessor of the 1940s. The new survey turned up as many as eighty new cases of 
leprosy in the country, roughly three times the patient population housed at Mbuluzi at 
that time. On the one hand, this pointed to a breakdown within  the country in leprosy 
surveillance, and in the two years following the survey, the Leprosy Mission organized 
training workshops for doctors and nurses by members of their international staff, 
including one by Dr. Stanley Browne who was the Leprosy Mission’s medical consultant 
and one of the chief voices on leprosy care in the world at the time. On the other hand, 
the results of the leprosy survey only confirmed the general feeling globally that long 
term residential care was not to be preferred from any perspective over the possibility of 
outpatient care. Thus, when in 1979, consultants from Denmark (usually referred to as the  
“Dangroup”) recommended, as part of a health study conducted on behalf of the African 
Development Bank, that Mbuluzi be closed as the country’s treatment center and that a 
new centralized referral unit be opened at the RFMH in Manzini, it was only a matter of 
time before the doors closed for good. 	
25
The formal decision to close Mbuluzi came on March 4, 1982 at a meeting 
assembled at the office of the Ministry of Health in Mbabane.   Present at the meeting 26
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were representatives of the Ministry of Health, the Leprosy Mission, and the Raleigh 
Fitkin Memorial Hospital.  The chair of the meeting was none other than Dr. Samuel 
Hynd, in his capacity as the country’s Minister of Health.  Along with Dr. Z.M. Dlamini, 
the country’s Director of Medical Services, they represented a renewed investment by the 
government of Swaziland in leprosy work, something that had generally been absent 
since 1956.  The other key players in the conversation were Walter Maasch, R.S.W. 
Ford’s successor as the Secretary for the Leprosy Mission in Southern Africa, and Peter 
Laubscher, the organization’s field secretary for Swaziland.  Just six months out from the 
signing of the new agreement, Maasch and Laubscher were primary agents in setting a 
new course for Swaziland’s Leprosy Control Programme.  It was perhaps the great irony 
of the situation that Hynd, as a former missionary of the denomination that had 
negotiated so long and so delicately with the British administration of Swaziland, was 
now making the decisions that relegated the same mission to a clearly secondary position.  
Dr. Wardlaw, the chief medical officer at RFMH, and Mr. Mdluli, the hospital’s 
administrator, had a notable role to play in this meeting, but at many subsequent meetings 
of the Management Committee of the Leprosy Control Programme, representatives of 
RFMH had very little to do with the proceedings.	

The Nazarene mission had not been cut entirely out of the picture, however, as the 
new home base for Swaziland’s leprosy treatment was to be RFMH.  In fact, a few of the 
remaining patients from Mbuluzi had already been transferred to the Manzini hospital 
and had been admitted to the general wards.  All of this might suggest an actual increase 
in Nazarene involvement with leprosy treatment in Swaziland, but in fact, the 
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circumstances were quite different.  The Leprosy Control Programme, under the direction 
of the Leprosy Mission reporting to the Ministry of Health, was a tenant at the RFMH 
and operated with a high level of autonomy.  Though they made use of RFMH laboratory 
facilities, relied upon Nazarene missionary doctors to sign orders, and admitted the few 
patients who needed hospital care to the RFMH’s wards,  they did the lion’s share of their 
administrative work and outpatient care in a space that they rented from the hospital, 
located in an outlying wing of the 300-bed facility. 	

Perhaps unsurprisingly, given how persistent the issue had remained throughout 
the twentieth century, the decision to close Mbuluzi gave rise yet again to a conversation 
centered around stigma. Even at this late stage and with an accumulated mountain of 
evidence that there was little stigmatization of leprosy in Swaziland, much of the 
discussion at the decisive meeting revolved around the question of how well the leprosy 
patients would be received if they were admitted to ordinary hospital wards at RFMH.  
The documentary evidence suggests that there was by this time some difference of 
opinion even among the missionaries as to what they should expect in this regard.  To 
take one example, in their year-end report to the Leprosy Mission for the year 1971, the 
Nazarenes had declared that there was very little social prejudice that would prevent 
patients from presenting themselves for treatment at Mbuluzi; however, the very next 
year, the report, in responding to the very same question, suggested that there was “still 
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some witchcraft association,” that they felt might constitute or create some degree of 
social prejudice.   	
27
It is quite likely that at least part of the explanation for the discrepancies between 
these annual reports lay in their differing authorship.  The 1971 report was the work of 
Dr. Kenneth Stark, a Nazarene doctor with more than twenty years of service in 
Swaziland by that time but also an American doctor and one who had always played a 
secondary role in matters related to leprosy. As Michelle Moran has demonstrated, the 
American medical establishment had had its own experience with leprosy as an imperial 
disease that posed a looming public health threat, but this was chiefly the product of an 
earlier period, at the turn of the nineteenth into the twentieth centuries. American leprosy 
treatment was also confined to the Carville institution in Louisiana and the Hawaiian 
islands, which meant that there was little opportunity for medical students to be exposed 
to it. And certainly, by the 1970s, doctors such as Stark, who had trained as a physician 
before the advent of sulphone therapies, if they heard anything about leprosy treatment 
from American medical sources would chiefly have heard about the triumph of new 
scientific developments for which Carville became a major research center. 	
28
The 1972 report, on the other hand, was the work of Samuel Hynd, whose work at 
RFMH had begun one year after Stark but whose experience of Swaziland was much 
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deeper and whose views of Swazis and of leprosy had been profoundly shaped by his 
father’s work there.   As a consequence of his experience in leprosy work and the ways in 
which his life had been shaped by his father’s work, Samuel Hynd consistently held that 
there was evidence of stigmatization among Swazis, writing in 1974, for example, that 
“There is a natural fear still amongst the Swazis of Leprosy and it needs someone with a 
dedication which goes beyond the normal limit for someone to take this work on.”   This 29
idea seems to have continued to have a hold right through the 1982 meeting.  The 
minutes of the meeting do not identify by name the people who held particular concerns, 
summarizing the general conversation without identifying particular speakers, but, given 
that he was running the meeting in his role as Minister of Health, it may very well have 
been Hynd who anticipated the possibility of stigmatization as a problem for patients at 
RFMH.  When I spoke to him nearly thirty years later, he certainly still remembered 
surprise as being his chief reaction to the smooth transition and acknowledged that he had 
anticipated having considerably greater difficulties in transitioning patients out of 
Mbuluzi and into general hospital wards.	

But, as events happened, the stigma issue once again proved to be a non-story.  
Relatively few patients even came to Manzini; the majority were discharged from 
Mbuluzi directly to their homes.  By the time of the next Management Committee 
meeting in May, only one elderly woman remained at Mbuluzi, likely as a result of her 
physical disabilities, and responsibility for her care was being handed over to social 
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workers from the Ministry of Home Affairs. The patients who did receive a transfer to the 
RFMH had experienced no problems in the transition.  As often as possible, the staff 
assigned them to separated rooms rather than the general wards, but there had been no 
sign of problems in any cases.  	

The only exception was that some nurses had expressed fears of infection, a 
continuation of a pattern with which the missionaries had had some previous experience 
in which Swazis who worked closely with them had adopted at least mildly stigmatized 
views of leprosy patients and their illness. As recently as 1976, a Swazi member of the 
hospital administration had expressed resistance to leprosy patients receiving treatment at 
RFHM; Sister Clegg chalked the man’s resistance up to his ignorance of the reduced 
medical capabilities of the Mbuluzi facility as well as his personal fear of the disease.  In 30
1982, with the nurses expressing fear of leprosy infection, Sister Claudia Stevenson, the 
last nurse matron at Mbuluzi who had now been seconded by the Nazarene mission to the 
Leprosy Mission to continue doing leprosy work, was asked to do some educational work 
with them in order to dispel the anxieties of nurses and to ensure that those anxieties were 
not transferred to the patient population as a whole.  In the end, this seems to have been 31
adequate to address the concerns. However, this repeated dynamic in the Swaziland 
context demonstrates quite clearly the reality that stigmatizing behavior is learned and not 
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even all that subconsciously, but often through relatively overt processes of training and 
education.	

Once Mbuluzi closed its doors for good, the Leprosy Control Programme was 
briefly revitalized in Swaziland by the investment of the Leprosy Mission staffers who 
had energy and resources for the task at hand.  In some senses, little changed in the 
transition to Leprosy Mission direction.  Although not identified with any particular 
Christian denomination, the Leprosy Mission was a consciously Christian organization, 
and chiefly evangelical Protestant in its orientation.  Thus, for example, they articulated 
their philosophy of recruitment for local workers in language similar to that of earlier 
Nazarene missionaries: “It is important to us that such workers should be dedicated 
Christians, since our ministry to leprosy patients and their dependants will be a 
compassionate and spiritual one as well as a medical and social one.”   Given that there 32
would be no great likelihood of finding people with practical experience of leprosy work 
in Swaziland, they planned to recruit people from Swaziland’s evangelical churches and 
to pay for the necessary seminars to bring those recruits up to par in terms of job-related 
skills.  Just as David Hynd had insisted from the very beginning, the work of leprosy care 
in Swaziland would still prioritize a concern for the spiritual, as well as the physical.  But 
rather unlike the agreement negotiated between the Nazarenes and the British 
 278
 Walter O. Maasch to Samuel Hynd, 11 February, 1981, David Hynd Collection, NA.  The Leprosy 32
Mission’s predisposition to Protestantism was also suggested in a letter from David Hynd to Walter Maasch 
shortly after Hynd, in his honorary role as a Vice-President of the organization, had reviewed a draft of the 
new Leprosy Mission Constitution.  Hynd, who had shown his own suspicions regarding Catholics over the 
years, pointed out that it might not be wise for the Leprosy Mission to include language that suggested that 
the Leprosy Mission only wanted to cooperate with institutions that were run by Protestant churches, as the 
drafted language apparently did.  See David Hynd to Walter Maasch, 11 June, 1980, David Hynd 
Collection, NA.
administration back in 1948, the Ministry of Health under Samuel Hynd’s leadership 
raised no concerns about this as a facet of leprosy control. Hynd’s influence, as well as 
the growing numbers of Christian churches in Swaziland, helped ensure that the clashes 
of the past between British colonial and evangelical holiness cultures were not a 
significant factor in the decision-making process. The new agreement secured for the 
Leprosy Mission “freedom in Christian worship and witness within Swaziland, subject to 
respect for public order and morality.”  The only caveat was that such activity “by 
patients or staff will be entirely voluntary and without constraint.” 	
33
The twenty-three years following the closure of Mbuluzi saw some remarkable 
progress in leprosy control in Swaziland. With multi-drug therapy, the long-promised 
eradication of the illness was finally on its way to becoming reality. In October of 1991, it 
was my own father who declared at a meeting of the Management Committee that he did 
not believe Swaziland had leprosy anymore.  This was not precisely true; the minutes of 34
subsequent quarterly meetings usually made note of one or two individual new cases that 
had been identified since the last meeting. But the number of cases now fell well below 
the threshold of 1 in 10,000 that the World Health Organization identified as the 
benchmark for disease elimination. And some of these new cases were not Swazis but 
Mozambican refugees, seeking asylum from the civil war which had torn apart their own 
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country in the previous 16 years.  The main task of the two to three staffers employed by 35
the Leprosy Mission in the country was to oversee the long term care of patients like 
Gogo Shiba who needed access to medication, thereby sustaining at least partially the 
moral bonds created by their earlier encounters at Mbuluzi. But dwindling patient 
numbers, the shifting attention of the global health community to other issues, and the 
finite resources of a financially strapped Swazi government inevitably meant a 
diminished place for leprosy patients.	

In 2005, the government of Swaziland officially took control of the Leprosy 
Control Programme. A Ministry of Health employee was designated to continue the 
programme and sent to Ethiopia for a course of study on “Leprosy/TB and HIV/AIDS.”  36
The very fact that his course of preparation combined leprosy with the two dominant 
public health issues in Swaziland at the time probably was an indication of just how little 
attention leprosy would receive upon his return, and indeed, none of the former patients 
that I met could recall a visit from this man beyond the first time when he was introduced 
at their homes by his Leprosy Mission predecessor. When I visited the Leprosy Control 
Programme offices at the RFMH in 2009 and 2010, I found files badly neglected, filled 
with mouse droppings, and furniture covered in dust. It was evident that no one had 
carried on any active work with the leprosy program in quite some time, and the people I 
spoke to confirmed that no one from the government was ever seen visiting the offices or 
making use of those files. The whole picture was as clear a visual representation as one 
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might think to look for in trying to understand why leprosy is now classified by the WHO 
as one of seventeen neglected tropical diseases.  It was, furthermore, a telling symbol of 37
the transformation of leprosy care in Swaziland from its prominence in earlier decades to 
irrelevance. This is, of course, in some ways a happy ending to the story, as leprosy is no 
longer the kind of public health threat that demands attention in Swaziland. But, as I have 
argued throughout this dissertation, that was in some senses always the case.  Yet, for the 
reasons identified here, there was a period of time in which the disease received 
considerable resources, and the optimistic colonial-era promises of the benefits of 
modernity suggested that there would be resources for the future as well. For former 
patients like Gogo Shiba, the final severing of those moral bonds of relational dependence 
and the resulting sense of dislocation and abjection, heard in her assertion that ‘no one 
cares for us now,’ has surely been dramatic.	

!
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Conclusion	

Shifting Circumstances, Adaptive Living	
!
When I first wrote the prospectus outlining my research plans for this dissertation, 
I confidently asserted that there was a very simple but interesting story that needed to be 
told. Leprosy, I claimed, was a disease stigmatized in more or less equal proportions by 
both Swazis and Westerners of all stripes. As such, it presented an interesting contrast to 
the standard narrative of Western colonizing cultures oppressing, coercing, and otherwise 
attempting to remake African cultures into their own image. Here, I thought, was a place 
where European bureaucrats, American missionaries, and Swazi commoners all shared 
the same natural fear of a much misunderstood disease. The interesting piece of the story 
would be to learn how these various groups responded over the course of the twentieth 
century to the dramatically shifting medical understanding of the disease that I described 
in the opening paragraphs of this dissertation. What similarities and differences would 
mark their movements along these roughly similar trajectories? Even now, it strikes me as 
an interesting story to tell, if only there were anything accurate about the basic 
assumptions that underpinned that prospectus.	

I think it is likely a good thing that my prospectus, as for so many of my graduate 
school predecessors, was essentially a dead document after only a very short time in the 
field. It did not, however, necessarily feel that way when I first began to realize that the 
stigmas I had anticipated uncovering were nowhere near as common as I had expected. 
Indeed, for a time, it appeared to me that I would have no alternative but to simply recite 
the multitude of ways in which Westerners had followed their erroneous assumptions 
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about both leprosy and Swazi culture into creating unnecessarily oppressive institutions 
that exerted their power over Swazis who would, in the lingo of so many of the books I 
read during my graduate training, demonstrate their agency by displays of resistance 
against hegemonic regimes. At best, I thought the dissertation would become another 
cautionary tale about the misfortunes of inattentive philanthropy, encapsulated in 
contemporary images of rusted out tractors donated by development agencies and 
abandoned once outside funding ran out on unsustainable projects. And, in some sense, 
these are themes of this dissertation. It is clear that missionaries and British 
administrators often did misunderstand their local context or were confused about what 
exactly Swazis thought about leprosy, and it was not unusual for them to outright ignore 
Swazi input when it suited them to do so. And, of course, the patients who sneaked away 
from Mbuluzi to purchase alcohol or who grew dagga to supplement their incomes were 
resisting an imposed order whose legitimacy they did not fully acknowledge.	

Ultimately, however, I find this bifurcated mode of analysis unhelpful or, at best, 
extremely limited. The events I have described are much more helpfully analyzed in 
terms of adaptability and negotiation, and they help us see a great deal more about the 
limits of Western power and influence in the colonial context than they do about its 
hegemonic aspirations. Furthermore, it seems to me to do little good in this case to try 
casting aspersions on the character of Western missionaries and administrators as the 
agents of oppression. To do so is clearly to create a straw man that badly caricatures the 
realities of the situation. Did they believe in the superiority of their culture and its modes 
of knowing the world? Yes. Were they often frustrated when Swazis did not conform to 
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their expectations? Of course. Did they have large egos that made it difficult for them to 
cooperate well even among themselves or lay aside their prior assumptions? Quite often, 
yes. But they were also, by and large, deeply committed to their work as motivated by 
their various religious and humanitarian concerns. And for all the misunderstandings that 
can be seen clearly in retrospect, they also did ultimately eradicate leprosy in Swaziland 
(at least, by the statistical measures used by the World Health Organization), an 
achievement that should not be simply brushed aside. 	

The story on the Swazi side of this equation is, in my view, even more fascinating 
and the one that certainly bears further investigation. If my claims in this dissertation 
regarding the Swazi role in the story of leprosy care in Swaziland have been relatively 
more modest than those I have made regarding Westerners and their role, it is chiefly 
because of my keen awareness of the limits of my own research process and 
understanding. Some of the obstacles that hindered my field research were well outside of 
my control. The offices of the Leprosy Control Programme, for example, were in a 
building that happened to be undergoing a major renovation project while I was in 
Swaziland and therefore unavailable. Those offices contain files that provide data on the 
experiences of every individual patient treated for leprosy in Swaziland since the opening 
of the Mbuluzi Leprosy Hospital in 1948, and my inability to access them was all the 
more frustrating since I had to walk by the building that housed them virtually every day 
as I headed out to conduct other elements of my research.  	

Other obstacles might be considered a consequence of my inability to better 
forecast the future. In a perfect world, I would have achieved fluency in siSwati prior to 
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arriving in the field (a regret that, as a missionary child living in Swaziland, I somehow 
never imagined would have the significance that it does to me now), which would have 
considerably eased the interview process with my informants. With more complete 
knowledge of the situation, I would also have chosen a different place of residence for 
my fieldwork, which might have allowed for more extended or at least more numerous 
points of contact with at least some of my informants. Of course, hindsight is 20/20 in 
such matters, and no research is ever conducted under ideal field circumstances. 	

Despite these limitations, I hope that this dissertation has managed to uncover 
some fascinating and significant elements of Swazi thinking about leprosy, as well as 
about the ways in which they demonstrated a dynamic adaptability that helped them turn 
the experience of leprosy into something fruitful. Understanding the reasons why and 
under what circumstances some Swazis learned to stigmatize leprosy as well as why so 
many Swazis were apparently quite ready to live under the stigmatized gaze of outsiders 
hints at the crucial processes by which peoples of different cultures adapt themselves to 
shifting circumstances. This is not to say that Swazis simply abandoned their own 
cultural ideas in favor of those of more powerful outsiders; I have tried to show that the 
actions and adaptations enacted by Swazis were coherent from within their own particular 
cultural perspectives and are rightly understood only as evolutions of their own ideas.	

Trying to understand as carefully as possible the evolution of all the ideas and 
perspectives at play in this dissertation and how those ideas motivated the actions of all 
parties seems to me to be a very worthwhile goal in the twenty-first century. 
Conversations about disease control and eradication are every bit as live today as they 
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were in Swaziland in the 1940s. The diseases have changed; leprosy has been replaced by 
HIV/AIDS, malaria, and now ebola. But many of the central dynamics of the leprosy 
story have not changed very much. Western governments and philanthropic organizations 
still command vast resources that they often wield relatively carelessly in the developing 
world, however admirable the causes may be. The Swaziland leprosy experience is an 
appropriate reminder that a touch of humility in the face of local knowledge and a fair 
amount of attentive listening are likely to go a long way in determining the long term 
fruitfulness of those endeavors.	

!
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